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Introduction
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Executive Summary
It is a well-known and extensively studied phenomenon that market participants in posses-
sion of private information actively trade in the stock market. Less known and researched
are informed trading activities in the options market. Nevertheless, various incentives such
as low initial capital, high financial leverage and discreetness offered by options markets
could induce traders with privileged information to trade in options rather than in the
underlying asset.
The first chapter of this thesis aims therefore to detect informed trading activities
based on put options. It contributes to the existing literature in two ways: firstly, it studies
informed trading activities in options rather than stock markets, and secondly, it provides
a statistical method to detect informed trades in option contracts. An option trade is iden-
tified as informed when it is characterized by an unusually large increment in open interest
and volume, induces large gains, and is not hedged in the stock market. As an empirical
application of this new detection procedure, each put option contract on 14 companies
traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange during the period 1996-2006 are ana-
lyzed. Three European companies with options traded on the Eurex are also considered.
The method detects several informed trades which can be connected to one of the three
following events: merger and acquisition announcements, quarterly financial/earnings re-
lated statements, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.
In the second chapter of this thesis, the model is extended to call options, and option
trading strategies with underlying financial and insurance institutions strongly affected
by the recent financial crisis are analyzed. Three various options markets are explored:
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), with companies such as AIG, Lehman
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Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among others; Eurex (Zurich and
Frankfurt), with United Bank of Switzerland (UBS), Credit Suisse Group and Deutsche
Bank; and Euronext (Paris and London), with Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, BNP Paribas and HSBC.
The empirical findings suggest that periods leading up to key events such as the takeovers
of AIG and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, the collapse of Bear Stearns Corporation and pub-
lic announcements relating to large losses/writedowns are preceded by profitable trading
activities in put and call options.
Motivated by the empirical findings of the two first chapters, in the third chapter
the (ex-ante) informational content of large changes in open interest is studied when the
linkage between option market variables and subsequent price movements in the underly-
ing stock are investigated. A daily statistic which measures the imbalance between newly
issued puts and calls is defined. Conditional on this, the cumulative distribution of several
indicators of future market activities is estimated. Differences between the unconditional
and conditional distribution are used as a measure for the predictive power of the daily
statistic. Chapter three empirically shows that whenever the imbalance between newly
issued puts and calls takes extreme values, the conditional distribution exhibits significant
changes with respect to its unconditional counterpart: when the number of newly issued
put options is large compared to the number of newly issued call options, the conditional
distribution functions of the idiosyncratic return noise process becomes heavier on the
left side and a large drop in the underlying stock is more likely to follow. In the opposite
scenario, when the statistic exhibits a large imbalance in favor of call options, the idiosyn-
cratic return noise tends to be higher than after calm days. Those findings confirm the
informational content of large daily changes in open interest.
The fourth and last chapter of this thesis moves to a purely theoretical setting and
proposes a new multivariate time-change technique for stochastic processes used in the
modeling of financial assets. Multivariate returns of financial assets feature a number of
important characteristics. First, they can jump, leading to multivariate non-normal behav-
ior. Second, their volatilities and correlations can vary stochastically over time. Third, re-
turns co-move with their volatilities and correlations, often negatively for equities. Fourth,
returns, volatilities and correlations can co-jump, leading to self-exciting market behavior.
A general family of multivariate time changed Le´vy processes that can simultaneously
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address these issues using a new class of multivariate time changes based on a matrix
subordination approach is presented in this chapter. The framework includes as special
cases many models in the literature, gives rise to a variety of new multivariate models,
and is likewise simple to apply using the characteristic function methodology also used in
the univariate context.
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1Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Options
Markets
Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, Loriano Mancini
Summary. This paper presents a new method to detect informed trading activities in the options
markets. An option trade is identified as informed when it is characterized by an unusual large
increment in open interest and volume, induces large gains, and is not hedged in the stock market.
For the period 1996–2006, each put option contract on 14 companies traded in the Chicago Board
Options Exchange is analyzed. Three European companies with options traded on the Eurex are
also considered. Our method detects several informed trades which can be associated to one of the
following three events: merger and acquisition announcements, quarterly financial/earning related
statements, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
Keywords: Put Options, Open Interest, Informed trading
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14, G17, G34, C61, C65
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1.1 Introduction
Informed trading activities in stock markets have been extensively studied in Finance.
Various researchers have investigated the fundamental economic question of how new
information gets incorporated into asset prices, how various frictions induced by trading
mechanism impact this process, how informed traders should implement their trading
strategies optimally to profit from their private signals, and other related aspects; e.g.
[38], [21], [17], [20], [23], [25], [26], [6].
Our paper contributes to this literature in two directions: it studies informed trading
activities in option rather than stock markets, and it provides a statistical method to
detect informed trades in option contracts. Various incentives such as low initial capital,
high financial leverage and discreetness offered by options market can induce traders with
privileged information to trade in options rather than in the underlying asset. Unlike
the stock market, options trading can involve the creation of new positions whenever the
parties underwrite new contracts, increasing therefore the open interest (i.e. total number
of existing option contracts on a given day). This paper shows that certain changes in
open interest can reveal the information content of those specific trades.
From a legal point of view this study does not constitute proof per se of such activities.
Legal proof would require trader identity and their motivations, information which is not
contained in our database. Therefore, whenever we refer to informed trading activities, we
think of suspicious trading activities.
According to our method, an option trade is identified as informed when it is char-
acterized by a statistically large increment in open interest and volume, induces large
returns and gains, and is not hedged in the stock market. Specifically, for each option
the increment in open interest is compared to its daily volume to check whether or not
this transaction can be classified as unusual. If so, the corresponding return and gain are
calculated over various horizons. When the return and gain are statistically important, the
probability that the option trade is not delta hedged is calculated. When this probability
is sufficiently low, the option trade is identified as informed. This method is applied to
each put option contract on 14 companies in various business sectors traded in the Chicago
Board Options Exchange from January 1996 to April 2006 analyzing approximately 1.5
million of option contracts. In total 37 transactions are identified as informed trades: 6
occurring in the days leading up to merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements, 14
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before quarterly financial/earnings related statements, 13 related to the terrorist attacks
of September 11th, and 4 which could not be identified. For example four informed trades
surrounding M&A announcements are detected in the airline sector. Two of them involved
put options on American Airlines and United Airlines stock traded on May 10th and 11th,
2000, namely two weeks before UAL’s acquisition of US Airways was announced. These
trades generated a total gain of almost $3 million.1 Another informed trade in a put option
with underlying Delta Air Lines occurred a few weeks before the public announcement on
January 21st, 2003 of the planned alliance among Delta, Northwest and Continental. In
this case the total gain was more than $1 million. As noted in e.g. [28] and [7], takeover
announcements are ideal events for studying information discovery in the security price
formation process. Whereas trades made before scheduled announcements might be based
on speculative bets, takeover announcements are not planned and trades prior to such
events are likely to be started by traders who possess private information as detected by
our method. Other detected informed trades can be associated to announcements related
to drops in sales, production scale backs, and earnings shortfalls. For example three in-
formed trades on put options with underlying Philip Morris stock are detected a few days
before three separate legal cases against the company seeking a total amount of more than
$50 million in damages for smokers’ deaths and inoperable lung cancer. The corresponding
gains in put options amounted to more than $10 million.
Our method is also applied to each put option on Swiss Re, Munich Re and EADS
traded on EUREX from January 1999 to January 2008. Informed option trades on Swiss Re
and Munich Re—the world’s two largest reinsurers—are detected in the days leading up to
the terrorist attacks on September 11th. Liabilities for the two companies were estimated
to be in the amount of billions of dollars a few days after the attacks inducing large drops
of stock prices and net gains in those transactions of more than €11.4 million. In the
case of EADS, the parent of plane maker Airbus, six informed option trades are identified
between April and June 2006. These trades precede the June 14th, 2006 announcement
1 As reported in the New York Times edition of May 25th, 2000, AMR was considered the company most
threatened by the merger, explaining therefore the 17% drop in its stock in the days after the public
announcement. According to James Goodwin, chairman and chief executive of UAL, two major hurdles
would challenge UAL: “the first is to get US Airways shareholders to approve this transaction. [The
second] is the regulatory work, which revolves around the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Justice and the European Union”. The skepticism on Wall Street was immediately reflected on UAL
shares which declined $7.19 to $53.19 on the announcement day.
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that deliveries of the superjumbo jet A380 would be delayed by a further six months
period, causing a 26% fall in the underlying stock, and a total gain of €7.5 million in
these option trades.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature on informed
trading. Section 1.3 introduces our methodology to detect option informed trades. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the database. Section 1.5 presents the empirical results. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Related literature
This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature dealing with informed trading
activities and linkages of information between option and stock markets. Analysis of in-
formed trades has typically focused on specific events such as stock and option trading
prior to M&A announcements (e.g. [28], [27] and [7]), asset returns around quarterly earn-
ings announcements (e.g. [32], [1], [41], [43] and [12]), or option trades in the days leading
up to the terrorist attacks of September 11th ([40]). Our paper contributes to this litera-
ture in several ways. First, it does not focus on a single type of event but rather analyzes
a long time period (more than ten years of daily and intraday data) uncovering various
kinds of informed trading activities in different occasions. The case of EADS will be con-
sidered as an example. Second, previous papers use typically regression models in which
the underlying stock return is the dependent variable and option variables are explana-
tory variables. We use a different, nonparametric approach. Option trades are identified
as informed when they are statistically unusual according to the empirical probability
of that event. Third, a novel feature in our approach is that it takes into account the
hedging dimension. Option trades which are subsequently hedged should not be classified
as informed trades. Fourth, we compute realized returns and gains from informed option
trades quantifying the importance of such trades. Our methodology has some similarities
to that of [40], such as using open interest to detect informed trading. However, there are
also important differences concerning the data, method and aims. For example Poteshman
focuses mainly on the airline sector and suspicious trading activities in the days leading
up to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, but does not consider the potential hedg-
ing demand and uses a quantile regression approach. We perform a more general analysis,
considering different sectors and events, and use a different approach. [21] and [18] develop
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the probability of information-based trading (PIN). This method has been mainly applied
to detect informed trades in stock markets as for e.g. in [17], [19] and [45].
The second strand of literature investigates the linkage and information flow between
options and stock markets; e.g. [13], [44], [16], [36], [20], [8], [39], [29], and [14]. In par-
ticular [20] introduce an equilibrium model where informed investors decide endogenously
whether to trade in the stock and the option market in a “pooling equilibrium” and [39]
provide empirical evidence of this equilibrium analyzing put-call ratios. Overall this re-
search indicates that signed option volumes have an impact on future underlying asset
price dynamics. [15] show that deviations from put-call parity contain information about
future stock returns. Our goal is different. We aim at identifying the arrival of single in-
formed trade in the option market for e.g. as soon as it takes place. Our findings suggest
that informed trades detected by our procedure are not reflected into stock prices until the
event occurs. Our paper is also related to the detection of insider trades, the latter being
a subclass of informed trades; e.g. [37], [4], [34], [33] and [12]. Our empirical results show
that option markets are profitable for informed traders suggesting that informed traders
might consider options as superior trading vehicles; e.g. [3], [2], [42], [10], [35], [31] and [9].
[11] forecast asset crashes using shares trading volume. [5] emphasize the role of trans-
action volume as a tool for technical analysis. We complement these works by showing that
certain increments in open interest have predictive power for future drops in the underlying
stock. [46] studies information trading as well.
1.3 Detecting option informed trading activity
An informed trade in put options is defined as follows: C1) an aggressive trade in an
option contract, C2) which is made a few days before the occurrence of a specific event
and generates large gains in the following days, and C3) the position is not hedged in the
stock market and not used for hedging purposes. These three characteristics, Ci, i = 1, 2, 3,
lead to the following method to detect informed trading activities: first on each day the put
option contract with largest increment in open interest relative to its volume is identified,
then the rate of return and dollar gain generated by this transaction are calculated, and
finally it is studied whether hedging demands were at the origin of the trades. Options
trades which are delta hedged are not regarded as informed trades. Below we describe
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in detail and apply this method to a large dataset of American put option trades. The
method could be easily applied to call option trades as well.
Informed traders can obviously undertake a large variety of trading activities for
example with various degrees of complexity to split their orders, jam the signals, etc. In this
paper we restrict our attention to the economically sensible informed trade characterized
by Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, above, that can be identified using available databases as we will see
below.
1.3.1 The first criterion: Increment in open interest relative to volume
For every put option k available at day t we compute the difference ∆OIkt := OI
k
t −OIkt−1,
where OIkt is its open interest at day t and := means defined as. In the case that the option
does not exist at time t−1, its open interest is set to zero. Since we are interested in unusual
transactions, only the option with the largest increment in open interest is considered
Xt := max
k∈Kt
∆OIkt (1.1)
whereKt is the set of all put options available at day t. The main motivation for considering
increments in open interests is the following. Large volumes do not necessarily imply that
large buy orders are executed because the same put option could be traded several times
during the day. In contrast large increments in open interest are originated by large buy
orders. These increments also imply that other long investors are unwilling to close their
positions forcing the market maker to issue new put options. Let Vt denote the trading
volume corresponding to the put option selected in (2.1). We focus on transactions for
which the corresponding volume almost coincides with the increment in open interest.
The positive difference Zt := (Vt −Xt) provides a measure of how often the newly issued
options are exchanged: the smaller the Zt, the less the new options are traded during
the day on which they are created. In that case the originator of such transactions is not
interested in intraday speculations but has reasons for keeping her position for a longer
period possibly waiting for the realization of future events.
This first criterion already allows us to identify single transactions as potential candi-
dates for informed trading activities. Let qt denote the ex-ante joint historical probability
of observing larger increment Xt in open interest and lower values of Zt
qt := P[X ≥ Xt, Z ≤ Zt] = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Xi≥Xt,Zi≤Zt}
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where N represents the length of the estimation window, e.g. N = 500 days, and 1{A}
is the indicator function of event A. By construction, low values of qt suggest that these
transactions were unusual. For example when qt = 1/N , it means that what occurred on
day t has no precedents in the previous two years.
1.3.2 The second criterion: Relative return and realized gain
The second criterion takes into consideration the ex-post relative returns and realized
gains from transactions with a low ex-ante probability qt. For each day t the trade with
the largest increment in open interest is considered. Let Rt denote the maximum return
generated in the following two trading weeks
Rt := max
j=1,...,10
Pt+j − Pt
Pt
(1.2)
where Pt denotes the price of the selected option at day t. When Rt is unusually high, an
unusual event occurs during the two trading weeks.
For the computation of realized gains, only the number of exercised options is con-
sidered. This can be done using decrements in open interest. Whenever the daily change
in open interest of a specific option k, ∆OIkt , is negative, at least an amount of |∆OIkt |
options were exercised.2 In the following we omit the superscript k and whenever we refer
to a specific option we mean the one which was selected because of its largest increment in
open interest and volume, i.e. lowest ex-ante probability qt. It is generally more profitable
to sell rather than exercise options but the OptionMetrics database used for our analysis
does not provide information on that. Given our definition of informed trade, however, it
is likely that on the event day the drop in the stock price is large enough to reach the
exercise region. In the following we restrict our analysis to profits generated only through
exercise. Hence our findings should be interpreted in a conservative manner.
Let Gt denote the corresponding cumulative gains achieved through the exercise of
options
2 The creation of new positions (which increases open interest), and the exercise of already existing options
(which decreases open interest), can off-set each other so that a constant level of open interest does not
necessarily mean that no options were exercised. In the database used for our analysis, OptionMetrics,
the exercise of options can only be identified using the decrement in open interest which is a lower bound
for the actual number of exercised options.
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Gt :=
τt∑
t˜=t+1
[(K − St˜)+ − Pt] · (−∆OIt˜) · 1{∆OIt˜<0}
where τt is such that t < τt ≤ T , with T being the maturity of the selected option.
If the put options were optimally exercised (i.e. when the underlying asset St˜ is in the
stopping region), the payoff (K −St˜)+ corresponds to the price of the option at time t˜. In
principle the cumulative gains Gt could be calculated for every τt ≤ T . This has however
the disadvantage that Gt can include gains which are realized through the exercise of
options which were issued before time t.3 Therefore time τt is defined as follows
τ∗t := arg max
l∈{t+1,...,T}
{ l∑
t˜=t+1
(−∆OIt˜) · 1{∆OIt˜<0} ≤ Xt
}
τt := min(τ∗t , 30)
giving the informed trader no more than 30 days to collect her gains. In general in the
curly brackets the sum of negative decrements till time τt will be smaller than the observed
increment Xt. In that case, we will add to Gt the gains realized through the fraction of
the next decrement in open interest. Hence the sum of all negative decrements in open
interest considered will be exactly equal to the increment Xt. Calculating Gt for each day
t and each option in our database provides information on whether or not option trades
with a low ex-ante probability qt generate large gains through exercise. Using the maximal
return Rt in (2.3) the ex-post joint historical probability pt of the event {Xt, Zt, Rt} is
pt := P[X ≥ Xt, Z ≤ Zt, R ≥ Rt] = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Xi≥Xt,Zi≤Zt,Ri≥Rt}.
The empirical probability (1 − pt) can be interpreted as a proxy for the probability of
informed trading in the option market.
1.3.3 The third criterion: Hedging option position
Option trades for which the first two criteria show abnormal behavior cannot be imme-
diately classified as informed trading. It could be the case that such transactions were
3 Consider for example an option which exhibits an unusually high increment in open interest at time
t, say OIt−1 = 1000 and OIt = 3000, resulting in Xt := OIt − OIt−1 = 2000. Suppose that in the
days following this transaction the level of open interest decreases and after h days reaches the level
OIt+h = 500. One should only consider the gains realized through exercise till time τt ≤ t+ h, where τt
is such that the sum of negative decrements in open interest during [t+ 1, τt] equals Xt = 2000.
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hedged by traders using the underlying asset. Without knowing the exact composition of
each trader’s portfolio, it is not possible to assess directly whether each option trade was
hedged or not. For example suppose that a trader buys a large number of stock, hedges
this exposure buying put options, and the stock price indeed drops a few days later. Using
the first two criteria, such a transaction in put option would be classified as informed.
Another misclassification would occur in the opposite situation when the investor buys a
large amount of put options and hedges her position by buying the suitable amount of the
underlying stock.
We attempt to assess indirectly whether unusual trades in put options are actually
delta hedged using the underlying asset. The idea is to compare the theoretical total
amount of shares bought for non-hedging purposes and the total volume of buyer-initiated
transactions in the underlying stock. If the latter is significantly larger than the former,
then it is likely that some of the buyer-initiated trades occur for hedging purposes. In
the opposite case we conclude that the new option positions are naked. The difficulty is
that the volume due to hedging is typically a small component of the total buyer-initiated
volume. To approximate this volume we assume that when hedging occurs and no informed
trades take place, newly issued options are hedged on the same day. Moreover, a hedging
analysis at the level of single option is not possible using the OptionMetrics database.
We therefore check whether all the newly issued options are hedged on a specific day t.
Given our definition of informed option trades, such trades certainly account for a large
fraction of the newly issued options. For each day t, the total volume of the underlying
stock is divided into seller- and buyer-initiated using intraday volumes and transaction
prices according to the [30] algorithm.4 Then the buyer-initiated volume, V buyt , is divided
into volume due to hedging and to non-hedging purposes, V buy,hedget and V
buy,non-hedge
t ,
respectively. Let ∆P,kt be the delta of put option k and K
P
t the set of put option (newly
issued or already existing) on day t. Similarly for ∆C,kt and K
C
t . Let
αt :=
∑
k∈KPt
|OIP,kt −OIP,kt−1| · |∆P,kt | , γt :=
∑
k∈KCt
|OIC,kt −OIC,kt−1| ·∆C,kt ,
4 The algorithm states that a trade with a transaction price above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint
is classified as a buyer- (seller-) initiated trade. A trade at the quote midpoint is classified as seller-
initiated if the midpoint moved down from the previous trade (down-tick), and buyer-initiated if the
midpoint moved up (up-tick). If there was no movement from the previous price, the previous rule is
successively applied to several lags to determine whether a trade was buyer- or seller-initiated.
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βt :=
∑
k∈KPt
|∆P,kt −∆P,kt−1| ·OIP,kt−1 , δt :=
∑
k∈KCt
|∆C,kt −∆C,kt−1| ·OIC,kt−1.
The αt and γt represent the theoretical number of shares to buy for hedging the new
options issued at time t, whereas βt and δt are the theoretical number of shares to buy to
rebalance the portfolio of existing options at time t. Absolute changes in open interests
and deltas account for the fact that each option contract has a long and short side that
follow opposite trading strategies if hedging occurs. The theoretical buyer-initiated volume
of stock at time t for hedging purposes, V buy,hedge-theoryt , is
V buy,hedge-theoryt := αt + βt + γt + δt.
When the first two criteria of our method do not signal any informed trade, we approximate
V buy,hedget by V
buy,hedge-theory
t . Then the amount of stock bought for non-hedging purposes
is calculated as
V buy,non-hedget = V
buy
t − V buy,hedge-theoryt .
When informed option trades take place on day i, V buy,non-hedgei cannot be computed as
in the last equation because V buy,hedge-theoryi would be distorted by the option informed
trades. We circumvent this issue by forecasting the volume V buy,non-hedgei on day i using
historical data on V buy,non-hedget . The conditional distribution of V
buy,non-hedge
i is estimated
using the adjusted Nadaraja–Watson estimator and the bootstrap method proposed by
[24]
F˜ (y|x) =
T∑
t=1
1{Yt≤y}wt(x)KH(Xt − x)
T∑
t=1
wt(x)KH(Xt − x)
(1.3)
with Yt := V
buy,non-hedge
t , Xt := (|rt|, V buy,non-hedget−1 ), KH(.) being a multivariate kernel
with bandwidth matrix H, wt(x) the weighting function, and rt the stock return at day
t; we refer the reader to e.g. [22] for the implementation of (1.3).
We can now formally test the hypothesis, H0, that hedging does not take place at
day i. Whenever the observed V buyi is large enough, say above the 95% quantile of the
predicted distribution of V buy,non-hedgei , it is likely that a fraction of V
buy
i is bought for
hedging purposes. Hence we reject H0 at day i when
V buyi > q
V buy,non-hedgei
0.95
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where qV
buy,non-hedge
i
α = F˜−1(α|Xi) is the α-quantile of the predicted distribution of
V buy,non-hedgei estimated applying (1.3) to e.g. the last two years of data. Section 1.5.5
discusses the accuracy of the hedging detection method. We remark that the hypothesis
H0 of no hedging when informed trades occur refers to e.g. long positions in newly is-
sued put options which are not hedged taking long positions in the underlying stock and
motivating our hedging detection method. The corresponding short positions in the same
put options might or might not be hedged, taking short positions in the underlying stock,
without any impact on our hedging detection method. It is so because the total volume of
the underlying stock is divided into buyer- and seller-initiated.
1.3.4 Detecting option informed trades combining the three criteria
Two methods are proposed to detect informed trades. The first method relies only on
ex-ante information and is based on (C1) changes in open interest and volume and (C3)
absence of hedging strategy using underlying asset. The second method uses information
available before and after a given transaction, and is based also on (C2) return and gain
generated by the option trade. The first method aims at detecting informed trades as soon
as they take place, while the second method allows for a more stringent assessment of
informed trades. Let kt denote the selected informed trade at day t in option k. The two
methods can be succinctly described using the following sets of events
• Ex-ante criteria C1 and C3:
Ω1 := {kt such that qt ≤ 5%}
Ω2 := {kt such that H0 : non-hedging, not rejected at day t}
• Ex-post criterion C2:
Ω3 := {kt such that rmaxt ≥ qr
max
t
0.90 }
Ω4 := {kt such that Gt ≥ qGt0.98}.
The first method detects an informed option trade when it belongs to the first two sets, i.e.
kt ∈ Ω1 ∩ Ω2, while according to the second method the selected informed trade belongs
to all four sets, i.e. kt ∈ Ω1 ∩Ω2 ∩Ω3 ∩Ω4. The empirical quantiles at day t of rmaxt and
Gt distributions, q
rmaxt
0.90 and q
Gt
0.98, are computed using the last two years of data.
As any other statistical method our detection methods could generate false discover-
ies, i.e. the probability that an option trade could satisfy the three criteria by chance is
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nonzero. It is well-known that this misclassification is not eliminable and corresponds to
the Type I error in hypothesis testing. However our detection method is designed to be as
conservative as possible minimizing the Type I error. As shown in Section 1.5, setting the
input parameters properly only a handful of option trades are identified as informed, for
e.g. less than 0.1%.
1.4 Data
Various databases are used in the empirical study. For KLM and thirteen American com-
panies, options data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as provided
by OptionMetrics. The dataset includes the daily cross section of available put options
for each company from January 1996 to April 2006 and amounts to roughly 1.5 million of
options. We eliminated obvious data errors such as open interest reported at zero for all
existing options by excluding those days from our analysis. Stock prices are downloaded
from OptionMetrics as well to avoid non-synchronicity issues and are adjusted for stock
splits and spin-offs using information from the CRSP database. Intraday transaction prices
and volumes for each underlying stock prices are provided by NYSE’s Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database. This database consists of several millions of records for each stock and is
necessary to classify volumes in buyer- and seller-initiated. Discrepancies among datasets
have been carefully taken into account when merging databases. For example data for
J.P. Morgan from OptionMetrics and TAQ do not match. Whereas the stock volume re-
ported in OptionMetrics for the years 1996–2000 is given by the sum of the volume of
Chase Manhattan Corporation and J.P. Morgan & Co. (Chase Manhattan Corporation
acquired J.P. Morgan & Co. in 2000), TAQ only reports the volume of J.P. Morgan &
Co. Same issue was found for BankAmerica Corporation and NationsBank Corporation,
whose merger took place in 1998 under the new name of Bank of America Corporation.
Fourteen companies from airline, banking and various other sectors are analyzed. The list
of companies includes: American Airlines (AMR), United Airlines (UAL), Delta Air Lines
(DAL), Boeing (BA) and KLM for the airline sector; Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup
(C), J.P. Morgan (JPM), Merrill Lynch (MER) and Morgan Stanley (MWD) for the bank-
ing sector; and AT&T (ATT), Coca-Cola (KO), Hewlett Packard (HP) and Philip Morris
(MO) for the remaining sectors. Sample data range from January 1996 to April 2006.
Options data for DAL and KLM were available only for somewhat shorter periods. For
the analysis of European companies, Swiss Re, Munich RE and EADS, we use daily data
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from the EUREX provided by Deutsche Bank. Intraday data for such European companies
were not available.
1.5 Empirical results
The proposed methods to detect option informed trades are applied to fourteen compa-
nies whose options are traded on the CBOE: AMR, UAL, DAL, BA and KLM (airline
sector); BAC, C, JPM, MER and MWD (banking sector); and ATT, KO, HPQ and MO;
see Section 2.3 for the ticker symbols. The first method which relies only on ex-ante in-
formation is already a powerful tool in order to detect potential informed trades as soon
as they take place. On average, less than 0.1% of the total analyzed trades belongs to
the set Ω1 ∩ Ω2. For AMR, we found for example that the number of trades belonging
to Ω1 ∩ Ω2 is 141, the total number of analyzed options being more than 137,000. For
the remaining companies, comparable numbers have been found. Due to space constrains
we do not report the details of transactions belonging to Ω1 ∩Ω2 but these are available
from the authors upon request. Based on the second method, the number of detected
informed trades decreases substantially. Analyzing all daily cross sections of put options
for all companies from January 1996 to April 2006, in total 37 transactions on the CBOE
have been identified as belonging to the set Ω1 ∩ Ω2 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4; the total number of put
option trades analyzed is roughly 1.5 million. Nearly all the events can be assigned to one
of the following three event categories: merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements,
6 transactions; quarterly financial/earnings related statements, 14 transactions; and the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 13 transactions. 4 transactions could not be identified.
Table 1.1 summarizes the findings. 4 informed trades around M&A announcements are
detected in the airline sector. These option trades have underlying stock American Airlines
and United Airlines. Three informed trades took place on May 10th and 11th, 2000, two
weeks before UAL’s acquisition of US Airways was announced (for details see Footnote 1).
Another informed trade took place on January 9th, 2003 with underlying Delta Air Lines,
a few weeks before a public announcement on January 21st, 2003 related to the planned
alliance among Delta, Northwest and Continental. In both cases, the underlying assets
were strongly affected by the public announcements, generating large gains ($3 and $1
million, respectively) through the exercise of these put options.
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Eight out of 15 of the selected transactions for the airline sector can be traced back to
the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Companies like American Airlines, United Airlines, Boeing
and to a lesser extent Delta Air Lines and KLM seem to have been targets for informed
trading activities in the period leading up to the attacks. The number of new put options
issued during that period is statistically high and the total gains Gt realized by exercising
these options amount to more than $16 million. These findings support the results in [40]
who also reports unusual activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks.
In the banking sector 14 informed trading activities are detected, 6 related to quarterly
financial/earnings announcements, 5 to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and 3 not
identified. For example the number of new put options with underlying stock in Bank of
America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch issued in the days before the terrorist
attacks was at an unusually high level. The realized gains from such trading strategies are
around $11 million.
The last set of companies we analyze includes AT&T, Coca Cola, Hewlett Packard and
Philip Morris. Two informed trades occurred in the pre-announcement period of the M&A
deal between Coca Cola and Procter&Gamble announced on February 21st, 2001 (leading
to gains of more than $2 million), and 5 transactions preceding the publication of quarterly
financial/earnings statements. Information related to earnings shortfalls, unexpected drops
in sales and production scale backs are the most common in this last category. For example
three informed trades in put options with underlying Philip Morris stock are detected.
These trades took place a few days before three separate legal cases against the company
seeking a total amount of more than $50 million in damages for smokers’ deaths and
inoperable lung cancer. The realized gains amounted to more than $10 million. Perhaps
as expected, no informed option trade is detected with underlying the previous companies
in the days leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
To provide a more detailed description of the detected informed trades, two tables are
reported for every sector: Tables 1.2 and 1.3 for the airline sector; Tables 1.4 and 1.5 for
the banking sector; and Tables 1.6 and 1.7 for the last group of companies. Tables 1.2, 1.4
and 1.6 report various information on the informed trades kt ∈ Ω1 ∩Ω3 ∩Ω4, namely the
day on which the transaction took place (Day); identification number of the put options
(Id); the moneyness (St/K); its time-to-maturity (τ); the level of open interest the day
before the informed transaction (OIt−1); the increment in open interest from day t − 1
to day t (∆OIt); its quantile with respect to its empirical distribution computed over the
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last two years (q∆OIt ); the total increment in open interest (i.e. when considering all the
available options at day t and not only the ones which had the highest increment, ∆OItott );
the corresponding volume (Volt); the maximum return realized by the selected option in
a two-week period following the transaction day (rmaxt ); the number of days between
transaction day t and when this maximum return occurs (τ2); the gains realized through
the exercise of the new option issued at time t (Gt); the minimum between the number of
days (starting from the transaction day) needed for the exercise of ∆OIt and 30 days (τ3);
the percentage of ∆OIt exercised within the first 30 days after the transaction (%ex.); the
ex-ante probability (qt); the p-value of the hypothesis that hedging does not take place
at time t; a proxy for the probability of informed trading (1 − pt). Tables 1.3, 1.5 and
1.7 have a more descriptive nature and report the following information for the selected
events: the day on which the transaction took place (Day of transaction); the market
condition at day t given by the average return of the underlying stock during the last two
trading weeks (Market condition); the minimum return of the underlying stock in a two-
week period following the transaction day (Return); when the stock crashed (Crash in the
stock); a short description of the event and why the stock dropped (Event’s description).
In most of the cases this drop in the underlying stock is large enough that its cause is
reported in the financial press such as the business section of the New York Times. We
could not identify the cause of a few events when the movements in the underlying stock
were not significant. Interestingly, in most of these cases the hypothesis of non-hedging
can be rejected at a 5% confidence level, suggesting that those option trades were not
originated by informed traders. For transactions whose days are marked with asterisks the
hypothesis of non-hedging can be rejected at a 5% level; see p-value reported on the last
column of the corresponding tables.
Informed trades in the days leading up to quarterly financial statements might be
somehow expected because the event day is known in advance. By definition, informed
traders have either actively followed and analyzed the company’s performance or are in
possession of private information. Based on this knowledge they might therefore correctly
guess the content of quarterly financial statements and develop profitable trading strate-
gies. By contrast, the detected unusual activities in the options market before the terrorist
attacks of September 11th and M&A public announcements deserve more attention. In
what follows we concentrate therefore on these specific events. We analyze three cases
in detail: the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the acquisition announcement in May,
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2000 involving AMR and UAL, and the delay announcement of the EADS superjumbo
jet A380. For the remaining selected trades one can do a similar analysis. To save space
tables and figures are omitted but are available from the authors upon request.
1.5.1 The terrorist attacks of September 11th
The terrorist attacks have generated many articles, in which political, strategic and eco-
nomic aspects have been considered. The financial dimension has also been discussed by
the press. In particular, the question of whether the terrorist attacks of September 11th
had been preceded by abnormal trading volumes, generated widespread news reports just
after 9/11. As far as official regulators and control committees have been concerned, they
dismiss charges against possible informed traders. The American 9/11 Commission has
stated that “exhaustive investigations by the Security and Exchange Commission, FBI
and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that anyone with advance knowledge of
the attacks profited through securities transactions”.5
From an academic point of view, this topic did not generate much research interest.
The article of [40] is a notable exception. Focused mainly on the airline sector, he com-
putes the distributions of option market volume statistics both unconditionally and when
conditioning on the overall level of option activity, the return and trading volume on the
underlying stocks and the return on the overall market. He finds that “when the options
market activity in the days leading up to the terrorist attacks is compared to the bench-
mark distributions, volume ratio statistics are seen to be at typical levels. As an indicator
of long put volume, however, the volume ratio statistics appear to be unusually high which
is consistent with informed investors having traded in the options market in advance of the
attack”. In the following the informed option trades detected by our method are discussed
in detail.
1.5.1.1 Analysis of options traded in CBOE
In total 13 transactions satisfy our criteria of informed trade and involve five airlines
companies (AMR, UAL, BA and to a lesser extent DAL and KLM) and four banks (BAC,
C, JPM and MER). Concerning the airline sector, AMR and UAL are the two companies
5 The 9/11 Commission Report, Page 172, available on http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
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whose planes were hijacked and crashed by the terrorists. Informed option trade for KLM
might be surprising, but supports the suspicion of “insider trading in KLM shares before
September 11th attacks”, as reported in a Dutch government investigation (Associated
Press Worldstream). The terrorist attacks had indirect implications for BA and DAL, like
a potential decrease in the number of passengers. Based on our methodology, AMR, UAL,
and BA were more likely object of informed trade than DAL and KLM. With respect
to the banking sector, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, and J.P. Morgan were located in
World Trade Center or nearby, and the Travelers Insurance Unit of Citigroup was expected
to pay $500 million in claims.
In the case of American Airlines we will now report the details of the transaction
which took place on September 10th. Additional tables are available from the authors
upon request. The upper graphs in Figure 1.1 show the plot of option volume, Vt, versus
its increment in open interest,Xt. The informed trades are highlighted with the circles. The
left graph covers the period from January 1997 to December 2001, to better visualize the
option market condition up to December 2001. The right graph covers the period January
1997–January 2006. The selected transactions are isolated from the bulk of the data,
suggesting that they are statistically unusual. For September 2001 Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show
the dynamic of three variables: open interest, volume and the option return. As claimed
in several newspaper articles, the volume and open interest of puts had been unusually
high in the days leading up to September 11th. On September 10th 1,535 put contracts
were traded and from September 7th to September 10th the open interest increased of
1,312 contracts (at 99.5% quantile of its two-year empirical distribution, Figure 1.2). The
trading volume was more than 60 times the average of the total daily traded volume
during the three weeks before September 10th. These puts had a strike price of $30 and a
maturity in October. On September 10th, the stock price was $29.7 and the put price was
$2.15. On September 17th, when markets reopened after the attacks, the stock price was
$18 and the put price was $12. Such an investment in put options generated an unusually
high return (458% in one week). Put options were obviously exercised on September 17th,
the open interest decreased of 597 contracts, generating a gain of almost $600,000. A few
days later, another considerable number of put options (475 contracts) were exercised;
see Figure 1.2. Table 1.2 reports the gains (Gt) of such a trade. Twenty-six days later
the sum of exercised options corresponded to the increment observed on September 10th
and lead to a cumulative gain of more than one million (Gt = $1,179,171). The lower
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graph in Figure 1.1 shows the cumulative gain for all transactions selected using the three
criteria. The trade in put options of AMR corresponds to the transaction that leads to
the highest gains in the shortest time interval in the period we are considering. Figure
1.2 shows that the trading volume after September 17th was negligible meaning that the
main gain was realized through exercise and not selling the options. Similar conclusions
can be reached for the other trades selected using our procedure. For example two trading
days before the terrorist attacks 4,179 new put options (at 98.5% quantile of its two-year
empirical distribution) on Boeing were issued. The underlying stock was traded at $45.18
and the option had a strike of $50. On September 17th, the stock was traded at $35.8. Six
days afterwards these options were exercised leading to gains of more than five million.
Concerning Bank of America, a large increment of 3,380 in open interest (at 96.3% quantile
of its two-year empirical distribution) took place on September 7th for an option with a
strike of $60 when the underlying asset had a value of $58.59 (on September 17th, the
underlying stock had a value of $54.35). The exercise of those options in the following
seven days resulted in net gains of almost two million; for Merrill Lynch, on September
10th, 5,615 new put options (at 99.1% quantile of its two-year empirical distribution) with
strike $50 were issued, the underlying stock had a value of $46.85. On September 17th the
underlying stock was traded at $41.48. Less than six days later these options had been
exercised leading to gains of around $4.5 million. For the remaining companies similar
results can be reached from the reported tables. Based on Tables 1.2 and 1.4, the total
gains in the airline sector amount to more than $16 million, whereas in the banking sector
$11 million in gains have been computed. Interestingly, in nearly all cases the hypothesis
of non-hedging cannot be rejected.6
1.5.1.2 Analysis of options traded in EUREX
Several reinsurance companies suffered severe losses from the terrorist attacks of September
11th. Liabilities for Munich Re and Swiss Re—the world’s two biggest reinsurers—were
6 In the article “Not much stock in put conspiracy: the attacks on New York City and Washington have
led to a new urban legend, namely that inside traders used put options on airline stocks to line terrorist
pockets” published on June 3th, 2002 by Kelly Patricia O’Meara in Insight on the News, other repeated
spikes of volumes of put options on American Airlines and United Airlines during the year before 9/11
are highlighted and used as argument that what occurred in the days leading up to 9/11 was not as
unusual as other theories claim. Our method does not select any of those spikes mainly because of the
relatively small gains that they generated.
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estimated to be in the amount of billions of dollars a few days after the attacks. At the
same time, several newspapers reported that trading in shares of these two companies
were at unusual levels in the days leading up to September 11th, divulging some rumors
of informed trading activities. A detailed analysis of transactions on the options market
has however thus far been ignored. Options with underlying Swiss Re and Munich Re
are mainly traded on the EUREX, one of the world’s largest derivatives exchanges and
the leading clearing house in Europe established in 1998 after the merger of Deutsche
Terminbo¨rse (DTB, the German derivatives exchange) and SOFFEX (Swiss Options and
Financial Futures). In this section we use the EUREX database provided by Deutsche
Bank to analyze transactions in put options with underlying Swiss Re and Munich Re.
The database does not contain intraday data and hence the hedging dimension cannot be
investigated.
In the case of Munich Re, 4 informed trades are detected between 1999 and 2008
which belong to the set Ω1 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4, one of which took place on August 30th, 2001.
As we are mainly interested in informed trades surrounding the terrorist attacks in this
subsection, we only discuss the details of this transaction (the others took place on August
29th, 2002; September 2nd, 2002; and October 19th, 2007). The detected put option with
underlying Munich Re matured at the end of September, 2001 and had a strike of €320
(the underlying asset was traded at €300.86 on August 30th). That option shows a large
increment in open interest of 996 contracts (at 92.2% quantile of its two-year empirical
distribution) on August 30th. Its price on that day was €10.22 and the ex-ante probability
qt is slightly lower than 5%. On the day of the terrorist attacks, the underlying stock lost
more than 15% (the closing price on September 10th was €261.88 and on September
11th €220.53) and the option price jumped to €89.56, corresponding to a return of 776%
in 8 trading days. On September 12th, 1,350 put options with those characteristics were
exercised. The gains Gt related to the exercise of the 996 new put options issued on August
30th correspond to more than €3.4 million.
In the case of Swiss Re, 6 informed trades are detected between 1999 and 2008 which
belong to the set Ω1 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4, one of which took place a few weeks before the terrorist
attacks, on August 20th. This option expired at the end of September, 2001, had a strike of
€159.70 and had a large increment in open interest of 3,302 contracts (at 99.8% quantile
of its two-year empirical distribution) on August 20th. That option was traded at €0.8
and exhibits an ex-ante probability qt of 0.4%, meaning that such an event happens on
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average once every year. The Swiss Re closing share price was €177.56 on August 20th. On
September 11th, when the stock price fell from €152.62 to €126.18, the option generated
a return of 4,050% in three trading weeks, when its price jumped to €33.2. Through the
exercise of these new put options in the 9 days following the attacks, the total gains were
more than €8 million. Together with Munich Re, a total gain of €11.4 million had been
realized in less than two trading weeks by using two options with underlying Munich Re
and Swiss Re. To save space the corresponding tables and figures are omitted but are
available from the authors upon request.
1.5.2 The acquisition announcement in the US airline sector in May 2000
Two informed trades detected by our method took place on May 10th and 11th, 2000. They
involved AMR and UAL. On May 10th and 11th, the number of new options issued with
strike $35 and maturity June 2000 with underlying AMR is very large: 3,374 on May 10th
and 5,720 the day after (at 99.7% and 99.9% quantile of their two-year empirical distri-
butions, respectively). These transactions correspond to those which exhibit the strongest
increments in open interest during a span of five years; see upper left graph in Figure 1.1
and Figure 1.3. On May 10th, the underlying stock had a value of $35.50 and the selected
put was traded at $2.25. For UAL 2,505 new put options (at 98.7% quantile of its two-year
empirical distribution) with strike $65 and the same maturity as those of AMR were issued
on May 11th at the price of $5.25 when the underlying had a value of $61.50. The market
conditions under which such transactions took place do not show any particularity: the av-
erage return of the stock the week before is, in both cases, positive and less than 0.5%. The
days of the drop in the underlying stock are May 24th and May 25th, 2000, with the first
day corresponding to the public announcement of United Airline’s regarding a $4.3 billion
acquisition of US Airways. As reported in the May 25th, 2000 edition of the New York
Times, “shares of UAL and those of its main rivals crashed” (for details see Footnote 1).
The stock price of AMR dropped to $27.13 (−23.59% of value losses when compared to
the stock price on May 11th) increasing the value of the put options to $7.88 (resulting
in a return of 250% in two trading weeks). The same impact can be found for UAL: the
stock price after the public announcement dropped to $52.50 (−14.63% when compared
to the value on May 11th) raising the put’s value to $12.63 (corresponding to a return of
140% in two trading weeks). In the case of AMR, the decline in the underlying stock can
be seen in Figure 1.3, where the option return largely increased. On the day of the public
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announcement 4,735 put options of AMR were exercised; see Figure 1.3. After this large
decrement in open interest, 1,494 and 1,376 additional put options were exercised in the
following two days respectively (reflected in additional drops in open interests in Figure
1.3). The unusual increments in open interest observed on May 10th and May 11th are
therefore off set by the exercise of options when the underlying crashed. The corresponding
gains Gt from this strategy are more than $1.6 million within two trading weeks. These are
graphically shown in the lower graph in Figure 1.1, from which we can see how fast these
gains were realized. In the case of UAL similar conclusions can be reached; see Tables 1.2
and 1.3. Based on these trades, a total gain of almost $3 million was realized within a few
trading weeks using options with underlying AMR and UAL. The non-hedging hypothesis
cannot be rejected suggesting that such trades are naked option positions.
1.5.3 The delayed delivery announcement of EADS superjumbo A380 in
May 2006
At the time of the writing of this paper, European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS),
a large European aerospace corporation and the parent of plane maker Airbus, is under
investigation for illegal insider trading activities. On July 2nd, 2006, co-CEO Noe¨l Forgeard
and Airbus CEO Gustav Humbert resigned following the controversy caused by the June
14th, 2006 announcement that deliveries of the superjumbo jet A380 would be delayed by
a further six months. Mr. Forgeard was one of a number of executives who sold his stake in
EADS a few months before the public announcement. In June shares of EADS exhibited
a 26% fall (the closing price of EADS shares on June 13th was €25.42 and on June 14th
€18.73) wiping more than €5 billion from the company’s market value. He and 21 other
executives are currently under investigation as to whether they knew about the delays
in the Airbus A380 project and sold their stock on the basis of this private information,
constituting therefore illegal insider trading. In the financial press, the profits resulting
from this strategy are estimated to total approximately €20 million.7
Based on reports in the financial press, French authorities’ investigations have con-
centrated thus far on stock sales and stock options exercised before the announcement day.
Apparently, trading strategies based on put options were ignored, despite their appealing
features for investors in possession of private information. We apply our method to put
7 The New York Times edition of June 18th, 2008: “Executive Questioned in EADS Insider Trading Case”.
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options on EADS and detect various informed trades on the EUREX in the period lead-
ing up to the announcement day. Obviously our study does not constitute proof of illegal
activities.
For the period 2003–2009 our procedure detects six informed trades in put options
belonging to the set Ω1∩Ω3∩Ω4, all of which took place between April 6th and May 19th,
2006.8 Table 1.8 summarizes the findings. Four of these six options had maturity at the end
of June 2006, the remaining two end of May 2006 and end of July 2006. The four options
maturing in June 2006 exhibited large increments in open interest and volume on April
7th (3,855 contracts), on April 20th (1,000 contracts), on May 8th (810 contracts) and
on May 18th (2,518 contracts). These increments correspond to the 99.8%, 93.4%, 92.2%,
and 99% quantiles of the corresponding two-year empirical distributions. The options had
strikes of €32, €30, €30 and €31 and the underlying traded at €31.88, €31.30, €31.36
and €27.59 respectively on the transaction days. The maximum returns generated from
these trades are large: for example, the option selected on May 8th traded at €0.71 on that
day and on June 14th its price jumped to €11.27 when the stock crashed. This corresponds
to a return of 1,487% within five trading weeks. On the announcement day 760 contracts
of that option were exercised, generating a net profit of €802,560. The option selected
on May 18th, traded at €3.46 on that day and at €12.27 on June 14th, resulting in a
return of 255% within four trading weeks. On June 16th 2,667 contracts were exercised.
Assuming that the 2,518 options issued on May 18th were exercised on that day, a net
gain of €1.7 million is reached. The option with a large increment in open interest on
May 19th and maturity end of July was bought for €0.71 on that day and had a strike of
€26 when the underlying traded at €27.39. On the announcement day its value increased
to €7.27, corresponding to a net return of 924% within four trading weeks. After the
announcement day, these options were exercised and generated a net gain of almost €1.5
million. Similar patterns are observed for the options traded on April 7th (strike €32 and
underlying value €31.88): the large increment of 3,855 contracts generated total gains of
almost €1.7 million. For the remaining options, a similar analysis can be made. Figure 1.5
shows the corresponding realized gains. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show relevant variables for the
8 OnMay 12th, 2006, a meeting of the company board took place in Amsterdam in order to discuss possible
solutions to the management crisis triggered by the future announcement day. This was planned to take
place the following month. According to the New York Times edition of June 29th, 2006, 13 people were
present, including Noe¨l Forgeard and Gustav Humbert. The delay in A380 deliveries was likely to cost
EADS €2 billion over the following four years.
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transactions which took place on April 20th and May 19th, 2006; see also Table 1.8. Based
on the six detected transactions, a total gain of €7.5 million had been realized within 60
trading days after the announcement.9
1.5.4 Robustness checks
The input parameters in our detection procedure are: the length N of the estimation
window, chosen to be N = 500 trading days, used for the computation of the ex-ante
probability qt, the conditional distribution of V
buy,non-hedge
t , and the quantiles q
rmaxt
α and
qGtα′ ; the time period after the transaction day used for the computation of Rt, chosen to
be 10 trading days; the time horizon τt used for the calculation of the gains Gt, chosen to
be 30 trading days; the quantile levels α and α′ in qr
max
t
α and qGtα′ used for the computation
of the sets Ω3 and Ω4, chosen to be α = 90% and α′ = 98%; the probability level based
on which we select trades belonging to the set Ω1, chosen to be 5% in our selection
procedure. In what follows we set the input parameters to different values and we repeat
all previous analysis for all companies. To save space we report only some of the results
but the remaining ones are available from the authors upon request.
When varying the length of the estimation window N between 200 and 1,000, (all
other parameters being unchanged) the number of selected transactions does not change
significantly. For example in the case of AMR, we selected 5 informed trades when consid-
ering the last two trading years (N = 500 days); forN ∈ [200, 1000] the number of detected
informed trades ranges between 4 and 6; for UAL this number remains unchanged with
respect to the original choice for N > 450 and decreases by one when N ∈ [200, 450]. In
the case of BAC and AT&T, the deviation from the original number of selected trades
is less than 2. With respect to the choice of the time period used for the computation of
Rt and τt, our results are also robust. We let the length of the first period vary in the
range [1, 30] days and the second one in [1,40] days. In the case of AMR, the number of
transactions ranges from 2 to 8, being therefore centered around the original number and
with a small deviation from it. For UAL, the corresponding range is from 1 to 4, for BAC
from 2 to 8 and for AT&T from 1 to 6. The number of detected trades is obviously a
9 Options contracts with underlying EADS are traded at the EURONEXT in Paris as well. Using a
database provided by EURONEXT NYSE, we were able to apply the first two criteria of our detection
procedure. Six informed put options trades were identified in Spring 2006. The total gains collected
amount at €25.6 million.
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decreasing function of α and α′ (all other parameters being unchanged). In the case of
AMR, when {α, α′} ∈ [0.85, 0.95]× [0.96, 1], the number of transactions selected does not
exceed 15. For UAL, the number of selected trades varies between 1 and 10, for BAC be-
tween 5 and 25, and for AT&T between 1 and 18. Finally, with respect to the probability
level used to determine the set Ω1, our findings are very robust as well. When increasing
the level from 1% to 10%, the number of trades selected for AMR varies between 1 and
6; for UAL it ranges between 2 to 4, for BAC and AT&T from 1 to 7. We simultaneously
changed several parameters and found that the number of detected transactions does not
change significantly and in almost all cases in steps of one. We recall that approximately
1.5 million of options are analyzed. Based on these results, we conclude that our findings
are robust.
1.5.5 Accuracy of the hedging detection method
In this section we provide an assessment of the accuracy of our hedging detection method
introduced in Section 2.2.3. Recall that the hypothesis H0 of no hedging when informed
trades occur at day i is rejected whenever V buyi > q
V buy,non-hedgei
α , suggesting that a sizable
component of buyer-initiated trades in the stock is due to hedging. We measure the ac-
curacy of the method by computing the probability of rejecting H0 when the latter does
not hold, i.e. the power of the test. Let V buyi = (1 + hi) V
buy,non-hedge
i , where hi ≥ 0. The
hi represents the ratio between buyer-initiated volume due to hedging and buyer-initiated
volume due to non-hedging. By construction H0 is equivalent to hi = 0 meaning that
volume trades due to hedging is zero. The hypothesis H0 should be rejected when hi > 0,
and the higher the rejection rate the more accurate the hedging detection method. Let
qα := q
V buy,non-hedgei
α , the measure of accuracy A(hi) reads therefore
A(hi) := P
[
V buyi > qα|hi
]
= P
[
V buy,non-hedgei > qα/(1 + hi)|hi
]
. (1.4)
The hedging detection method is accurate whenever A(hi) increases fast enough in hi. The
probability in (1.4) can be calculated as (1−F˜ (qα/(1+hi)|Xi)), where F˜ is estimated using
(1.3) and α = 0.95 as in our empirical analysis. We computed A(hi) for several stocks,
sample periods, estimation windows, and different values of hi and of the conditioning
variables Xi = (|ri|, V buy,non-hedgei−1 ). Table 1.9 gives numerical values of A(hi) for Citigroup
on the random day December 17th, 2001. Corresponding results for other stocks are fairly
similar and available upon request from the authors. When hi = 0, A(hi) is very close
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to 0.05 = (1 − α), which is the non-eliminable size of the test. When hi increases, A(hi)
increases as well although certain combinations of the conditioning variables are more
favorable than others to reject the hypothesis of no hedging. Overall the power of the
test is fairly satisfactory. For example when hi = 0.20, A(hi) can be as high as 20%.
When A(hi) does not increase fast enough, our method does not detect potential option
informed trades. In this respect the results documented in the empirical section should be
interpreted in a conservative manner.
1.6 Conclusion
Informed trading activities in stock markets have been extensively investigated in the
finance literature. Our paper contributes to this literature in two directions: it studies
informed trading activities in option rather than stock markets and provides a statistical
method to detect informed trades in option contracts. According to our method, an option
trade is identified as informed when it is characterized by a large increment in open
interest and volume, induces large gains, and is not hedged in the stock market. This
method is applied to each put option contract on 14 companies in various business sectors
traded in the Chicago Board Options Exchange from January 1996 to April 2006 analyzing
approximately 1.5 million of options. In total 37 transactions are identified as informed
trades the vast majority of which can be assigned to one of the following three event
categories: merger and acquisition announcements, quarterly financial/earnings related
statements, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th. For example two informed trades
involve American Airlines and United Airlines on May 10th and 11th, 2000, namely two
weeks before UAL’s acquisition of US Airways was announced. Three informed trades
on put options with underlying Philip Morris stock are detected a few days before three
separate legal cases against the company seeking a total amount of more than $50 million
in damages for smokers’ deaths and inoperable lung cancer. Our method is also applied to
each put option on Swiss Re, Munich Re and EADS traded on EUREX from January 1999
to January 2008. For example in the case of EADS, the parent of plane maker Airbus, six
informed option trades are identified between April and June 2006. These trades precede
the June 14th, 2006 announcement that deliveries of the superjumbo jet A380 would be
delayed by a further six months, causing a 26% fall in the underlying stock, and a total
gain of €7.5 million in these option trades.
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Our results have also policy, option pricing, and market efficiency implications. If some
of the detected informed trades are indeed illegal, for example originated by insiders, it
might be optimal for regulators to expend relatively more monitoring efforts on the options
markets. Option pricing models should account for all relevant information available at
time t. However nearly all option prices involved in informed trades according to our
method do not show any specific reaction to the large increments in open interest and
volume. The strong increases in these put option prices are simply due to subsequent large
drops in stock prices originated for example by merger and acquisition announcements.
From an efficient market perspective, our findings suggest that certain put option trades
might predict large price drops. Trading strategies built on such predictions might generate
potentially large gains.
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Accuracy of the hedging detection method for Citigroup on 17 Dec 2001
hi
0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Percentiles
20 20 0.051 0.052 0.077 0.089 0.094 0.124 0.151 0.193 0.227 0.277 0.306
20 40 0.046 0.058 0.079 0.106 0.116 0.174 0.196 0.235 0.287 0.290 0.299
20 60 0.051 0.063 0.070 0.100 0.131 0.156 0.157 0.210 0.210 0.265 0.282
20 80 0.069 0.072 0.072 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.095 0.125 0.180
40 20 0.055 0.057 0.064 0.087 0.117 0.124 0.168 0.185 0.198 0.207 0.223
40 40 0.053 0.055 0.090 0.096 0.147 0.158 0.167 0.182 0.219 0.239 0.272
40 60 0.056 0.064 0.081 0.120 0.125 0.159 0.183 0.218 0.253 0.284 0.298
40 80 0.041 0.104 0.188 0.190 0.201 0.231 0.254 0.265 0.282 0.291 0.306
60 20 0.051 0.052 0.059 0.078 0.098 0.102 0.161 0.180 0.198 0.200 0.217
60 40 0.049 0.066 0.070 0.098 0.119 0.125 0.136 0.161 0.161 0.249 0.253
60 60 0.051 0.051 0.062 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.097 0.114 0.125 0.126 0.138
60 80 0.050 0.055 0.074 0.075 0.099 0.114 0.151 0.153 0.157 0.192 0.208
80 20 0.049 0.088 0.131 0.147 0.153 0.156 0.166 0.178 0.189 0.195 0.210
80 40 0.049 0.056 0.063 0.075 0.116 0.136 0.158 0.179 0.183 0.192 0.195
80 60 0.049 0.071 0.085 0.085 0.092 0.100 0.110 0.136 0.150 0.183 0.183
80 80 0.033 0.070 0.070 0.080 0.084 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.151 0.154 0.231
Table 1.9. Entries are the probabilities of rejecting the hypothesisH0 of no hedging when informed
trades occur for the Citigroup stock on day i = December 17th, 2001, i.e. A(hi) in (1.4), for
various levels of hi and Xi. hi is the ratio between volume due to hedging and volume due to
non-hedging. Xi = (|ri|, V buy,non-hedgei−1 ) are the conditioning variables, i.e. stock return on day i
and buyer-initiated volume due to non-hedging on day i−1, respectively. Percentiles are the levels
of percentiles for the distributions of |ri| and V buy,non-hedgei−1 , respectively, used as values of the
conditioning variables in (1.4).
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Figure 1.2. Selected put option for informed trading with underlying stock American Airlines
(AMR) in the days leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The solid line
shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bars show the corresponding trading volume (left
y-axis) and the dash-dot line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the
transaction, the filled circle (partially covered by the highest bar) is the day when the market
reopened after the terrorist attacks. This put option had a strike of $30 and matured at the end
of October 2001.
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Figure 1.3. Selected put option for informed trading with underlying stock American Airlines
(AMR) before the United Airlines (UAL) announcement of $4.3 billion acquisition of US Airways
in May 2000. Same variables as in Figure 1.2. The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the
filled circle is the day of the announcement (partially covered by the highest bar). This put option
had a strike of $35 and matured at the end of June 2000.
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Figure 1.4. Increment in open interest and volume for various put options with underlying EADS.
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Figure 1.5. Cumulative gains, Gt, in € for detected informed trade options on EADS. Gains
correspond to those realized by exercising the options (daily drop in open interest).
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Figure 1.6. Selected put option for informed trading with underlying stock EADS before the
delayed delivery announcement of the superjumbo A380 on June 14th, 2006. The option trade
takes place on April 20th, 2006. The solid line shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bars
shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line the option return (right
y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the filled circle is the announcement day,
June 14th, 2006. This put option had a strike of €30 and matured at the end of June 2006.
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Figure 1.7. Selected put option for informed trading with underlying stock EADS before the
delayed delivery announcement of the superjumbo A380 on June 14th, 2006. The option trade
takes place on May 19th, 2006. Same variables as in Figure 1.6. This put option had a strike of
€26 and matured at the end of July 2006.
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2Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets during
the Financial Crisis
Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, Loriano Mancini
Summary. Option trading strategies with underlying financial and insurance institutions strongly
affected by the ongoing financial crisis are analyzed. We explore three various options markets:
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), with companies such as AIG, Lehman Brothers,
Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among others; Eurex (Zurich and Frankfurt), with
United Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse Group and Deutsche Bank; and Euronext (Paris and
London), with Societe´ Ge´ne´rale, BNP Paribas and HSBC. Our empirical findings suggest that
periods leading up to key events such as the takeovers of AIG and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, the
collapse of Bear Stearns Corporation and public announcements relating to large losses/write-
downs are preceded by profitable trading activities in put and call options. The realized gains
amount to several hundreds of millions of dollars.
Keywords: Put/Call Options, Open Interest, Informed trading, Financial Crisis
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14, G17, G34, C61, C65
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2.1 Introduction
Despite the catastrophic implications associated with the ongoing financial crisis (2007
- present), the behavior of financial markets over the past three years has presented an
interesting background for academic research in many areas due to the huge losses/write-
downs announced in the financial press, and the unprecedented measures adopted by many
governments. Bailout programs are one type of measure carried out in the attempt to save
institutions from bankruptcy or insolvency. The term bailout has only recently acquired
prominence and is not yet even listed in the Oxford English Dictionary. In the following
paper the term bailout is used to denote the act of providing an institution with capital
in order to prevent bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation. As a result of the ongoing fi-
nancial and economic crisis, the United States Department of the Treasury announced its
voluntary Capital Purchase Program designed to encourage U.S. financial institutions to
increase their capital in order to strengthen the U.S. economy by increasing the flow of
financing to U.S. businesses and consumers. The program, under which the Treasury was
willing to purchase up to $250 billion in senior preferred shares, was available to qualifying
U.S. controlled banks and savings associations. According to the terms of the program,
each financial institution was able to obtain a maximum of $25 billion Tier 1 capital.
Along with the obligation to pay an interest rate as high as 5% per annum during the
first five years and 9% p.a. thereafter, each financial institution willing to participate in
the program had to adopt the Treasury Department standards for executive compensation
and corporate governance for the period during which the Treasury holds equity issued
under the program . Due to the unprecedented volume of the Capital Purchase Program
and the huge losses/write-downs seen over the past two years, stocks of many companies
have been subject to astonishing ups and downs as well as huge amounts of equity value
erased over a remarkably short period of time. It might have been tempting for informed
agents to exploit private information concerning default risk and bailout programs before
its public release in order to take advantage of those large stock movements.
Due to the leverage effect offered by the options market, these robust movements
in the underlying asset might have generated large gains if a suitable trading strategy
using put/call options had been carried out. In this paper we aim primarily to detect such
profitable informed trading activities based on options strategies. We discuss and analyze
data from, among others, financial institutions that have obtained several billions under the
56 Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, Loriano Mancini
terms of the program, and other companies severely affected by the financial crisis. Three
different options markets are explored: the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE),
with companies such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, among others; Eurex (Zurich and Frankfurt), with United Bank of Switzerland,
Credit Suisse Group and Deutsche Bank; and Euronext (Paris and London), with Societe´
Ge´ne´rale, BNP Paribas and HSBC.
Numerous financial instruments can be used to exploit trading strategies based on
private information. In the following, we briefly present two cases reported in the financial
press in which stocks and CDOs are used as trading instruments.
The first case was reported in the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday, April 15, 2010.
It stated that prosecutors were examining whether Goldman Sachs Group Inc. director
Rajat Gupta gave inside information about the bank to Galleon Group hedge fund founder
Raj Rajaratnam. It was believed that Raj Rajaratnam and others used private informa-
tion to trade the banks’ shares at the height of the financial crisis. Mr. Rajaratnam, one
of America’s most successful technology investors, was one of 21 people charged in their
alleged role in two overlapping groups that were thought to have made $50 million from
illegal share trading. U.S. Attorney’s office prosecutors said they believed that Mr. Ra-
jaratnam and some co-conspirators traded shares in at least 22 companies, rather than in
the 12 initially named in the case. In a March 22, 2010 letter filed with a New York court,
prosecutors wrote that evidence from wiretaps and intercepted and recorded phone calls
showed that the hedge fund boss and others executed securities transactions on the basis
of nonpublic information on at least 22 companies. The letter said that Goldman Sachs
shares were traded in or about June 2008 through in or about October 2008, when the
worst of the financial crisis caused the bank’s stock to plunge.
The second case was announced in the financial press on Monday, April 19, 2010 and
is known under the name of Abacus mortgage-backed CDOs. The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc. was charged with deceiving clients by selling them mortgage securities secretly de-
signed by a hedge fund firm run by John Paulson, who made a fortune betting on the
housing market’s collapse. Regulators say Goldman allowed Mr. Paulson’s firm, Paulson
& Co., to help design CDOs created from a specific set of risky mortgage assets, essentially
setting up the CDOs for failure. Paulson then bet against it while investors in the CDOs
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weren’t told of Paulson’s role or intentions. According to the Guardian dated Monday,
April 19, 20101, Paulson made $20bn by piling into credit default swaps against mort-
gages, effectively insurance policies that would pay out if homeowners defaulted. His fund
made $15bn in a single year, $4bn of which Paulson took for himself.
Interestingly, we couldn’t find any article in the financial press reporting suspicious
activities relating to options trading despite their appealing nature as trading instruments.
The purpose of the following paper is therefore to analyze trading activities using put and
call options during the ongoing financial crisis. We concentrate on banks and insurance
companies which have been severely affected by the crisis. Their daily returns time-series
are characterized not only by unusually large negative values, but large rises as well. Quar-
terly results, write-downs, bank run and sold off of stocks easily lead to daily returns of
more than ±20%. Due to the symmetry in large stock movements, we apply the procedure
for detecting informed trading activities using put options developed in [1], and extend
it to call options. In the following we briefly summarize the detection procedure while
referring to the original paper for details. Obviously our study does not constitute proof
of illegal activities. Legal proof would require trader identity and motivations, information
which is not contained in our database. Therefore, whenever we refer to informed trades,
we think of suspicious trading activities.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we summarize the detection procedure
developed in [1] and extend it to call options. In Section 2.3 we describe the data used
and Section 2.4 shows our empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Detecting option informed trading activity
A suspicious informed trade in put/call options is defined using three different criteria:
C1) an aggressive trade in an option contract, C2) which is made a few days before the
occurrence of a specific event and generates large gains in the following days, and C3) the
position is not hedged in the stock market and not used for hedging purposes. These three
characteristics, Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, lead to the following method which detects informed trading
activities: first, on each day we identify the put/call option contract with the largest
1 http : //www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/19/bear − stearn− spurned− paulson− deal
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increment in open interest relative to its volume, we then calculate the rate of return and
gain generated by this transaction through exercise, and finally, we study whether hedging
demands were at the origin of the trades. Option trades which are delta hedged are not
regarded as suspicious informed trades.
2.2.1 The first criterion: Increment in open interest relative to volume
For every put/call option k available at day t we compute the difference ∆OIkt := OI
k
t −
OIkt−1, where OIkt is its open interest at day t. In the case that the option does not exist at
time t− 1, its open interest is set to zero. Since we are interested in unusual transactions,
only the option with the largest increment in open interest is considered
Xt := max
k∈Kt
∆OIkt (2.1)
where Kt is the set of all put/call options available at day t. Let Vt denote the trading
volume corresponding to the put option selected in (2.1). We focus on transactions for
which the corresponding volume nearly coincides with the increment in open interest. The
positive difference Zt := (Vt−Xt) provides a measure of how often the newly issued options
are exchanged: the smaller the Zt, the less the new options are traded during the day on
which they are created. In that case the originator of such transactions is not interested in
intraday speculations, but has reasons for keeping her position for a longer period, possibly
waiting for the realization of future events.
This first criterion already allows us to identify single transactions as potential candi-
dates for informed trading activities. Let qt denote the ex-ante joint historical probability
of observing larger increment Xt in open interest and lower values of Zt
qt := P[X ≥ Xt, Z ≤ Zt] = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Xi≥Xt,Zi≤Zt}
where N represents the length of the estimation window, e.g. N = 500 days, and 1{A}
is the indicator function of event A. By construction, low values of qt suggest that these
transactions are unusual.
2.2.2 The second criterion: Relative return and realized gain
The second criterion takes into consideration the ex-post relative returns and realized
gains from transactions with a low ex-ante probability qt. Due to the non-availability of
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the signed volume in our database, we are not able to identify gains realized by selling
options. We concentrate therefore on gains made through exercise, the latter reflected by
a decrease in open interest. Let Rt denote the maximum return generated in the following
two trading weeks, for puts
rputt := max
j=1,...,10
Pt+j − Pt
Pt
(2.2)
where Pt denotes the price of the selected option at day t, and similarly for calls
rcallt := max
j=1,...,10
Ct+j − Ct
Ct
, (2.3)
with Ct being the price of the selected option.
When rputt resp. r
call
t is unusually high, an unusual event occurs during the two trading
weeks. In the case of put options, the stock sharply decreases. For call options, a strong
increase in the underlying’s value takes place.
For the computation of realized gains we use decrements in open interest. Whenever
the daily change in open interest of a specific option k, ∆OIkt , is negative, at least an
amount of |∆OIkt | options were exercised.
Let Gt denote the corresponding cumulative gains realized through the exercise of put
options
Gputt :=
τt∑
t˜=t+1
[(K − St˜)+ − Pt] · (−∆OIt˜) · 1{∆OIt˜<0}
resp. call options
Gcallt :=
τt∑
t˜=t+1
[(St˜ −K)+ − Ct] · (−∆OIt˜) · 1{∆OIt˜<0}
where τt is such that t < τt ≤ T , with T being the maturity of the selected option.
Time τt is defined for put as well as call options as follows
τ∗t := arg max
l∈{t+1,...,T}
{ l∑
t˜=t+1
(−∆OIt˜) · 1{∆OIt˜<0} ≤ Xt
}
τt := min(τ∗t , 30)
giving the informed trader no more than 30 days to collect her gains. Generally, the sum
of negative decrements till time τt in the curly brackets will be smaller than the observed
increment Xt. In that case, we add to Gt the gains realized through the fraction of the
next decrement in open interest. Hence the sum of all negative decrements in open interest
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considered will be exactly equal to the increment Xt. Calculating Gt for each day t and
each option in our database provides information on whether or not option trades with a
low ex-ante probability qt generate large gains through exercise.
2.2.3 The third criterion: Hedging option position
Option trades for which the ex-ante probability qt is small cannot be immediately classified
as exclusive information vehicles: it can be the case that such transactions were hedged
by traders using the underlying asset. Without knowing the exact composition of each
trader’s portfolio, it is a delicate step to assess whether a transaction with a high increment
in open interest is hedged or not. For days having a small ex-ante probability qt, we
attempt to assess indirectly whether these unusual trades in put options are actually delta
hedged using the underlying asset. The idea is to compare the total number of shares
bought for non-hedging purposes and the total volume of buyer-initiated transactions in
the underlying stock. If the latter is significantly larger than the former, then it is likely
that some of the buyer-initiated trades occur for hedging purposes. In the opposite case we
conclude that the new option positions are naked. Following the model developed in [1],
we formally test the hypothesis, Ht0, that hedging does not take place at day t. Whenever
the observed V buyt is large enough, i.e. above the 95% quantile of the predicted distribution
of V buy,non-hedget , it is likely that a fraction of V
buy
t is bought for hedging purposes. Hence
we reject H0 at day t when
V buyt > q
V buy,non-hedget
0.95 ,
where qV
buy,non-hedge
t
α is the α-quantile of the predicted distribution V
buy,non-hedge
t estimated,
e.g., using the last two years of data (we refer to the original paper [1] for a more technical
description of the third criterion).
2.2.4 Detecting option informed trades combining the three criteria
In this paper we apply the second method developed in [1], which uses information available
before and after a given transaction. The implementation of the first method is straight
forward, but not considered in this paper.
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Let kt denote the selected informed trade at day t in option k. The second method
can be succinctly described using the following sets of events
• Ex-ante criteria C1 and C3:
Ω1 := {kt such that qt ≤ 5%}
Ω2 := {kt such that H0 : non-hedging, not rejected at day t}
• Ex-post criterion C2:
Ω3 := {kt such that rput/callt ≥ qr
put/call
t
0.90 }
Ω4 := {kt such that Gt ≥ qGt0.98}.
The selected informed trade belongs to all four sets, i.e. kt ∈ Ω1 ∩ Ω2 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4. The
empirical quantiles at day t of rmaxt and Gt distributions, q
rmaxt
0.90 and q
Gt
0.98, are computed
using the last two years of data.
2.3 Data
We analyze several American and European companies from the banking and insurance
sectors. Various databases are used in the empirical study. For American companies,
options data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as provided by
OptionMetrics. Stock prices are downloaded from OptionMetrics as well to avoid non-
synchronicity issues, and are adjusted for stock splits and spin-offs using information from
the CRSP database. Intraday transaction prices and volumes for each underlying stock
price are provided by the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. This database consists
of several millions of records for each stock and is essential in the classification of volumes
in buyer and seller-initiated trades in order to complete the analysis related to the third
criterion. For European companies, options data as well as intraday transaction prices and
volumes for the underlying stock are obtained from EUREX provided by Deutsche Bank,
and from EURONEXT provided by NYSE Euronext database. All datasets include the
daily cross section of available put and call options for each company and intraday data for
the underlying assets from January 1996 to September 2009. We eliminate obvious data
errors such as open interest reported at zero for all existing options by excluding those
days from our analysis. The list of American companies includes (in alphabetical order):
American International Group (AIG), Bank of America Corporation (BAC), Bear Stearns
62 Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, Loriano Mancini
Corporation (BSC), Citigroup (C), Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), Goldman
Sachs (GS), JP Morgan (JPM), Lehman Brothers (LEH), Merrill Lynch (MER), Morgan
Stanley (MS), Wachovia Bank (WB) and Wells Fargo Company (WFC). Most of these
companies belong to the list of banks which were bailed out and, in which, the American
Treasury Department invested approximately $200 billion through its Capital Purchase
Program in an effort to bolster capital and support new lending. Furthermore we analyze
six European banks: United Bank of Switzerland (UBS), Credit Suisse Group (CS) and
Deutsche Bank (DBK) whose options are traded on EUREX, and Societe´ Ge´ne´rale Cor-
porate (GL), HSBC (HSB) and BNP Paribas Bank (BN) with options listed on Euronext.
All analyzed options are American style.
2.4 Empirical results
In this section we discuss our empirical findings. We apply the procedure described and
developed in the previous sections to the above-mentioned American and European com-
panies. We reveal most of the results in tabular form, and discuss the most interesting
results in detail. Some graphical representations are also given. Tables 2.1-2.13 offer an
overview of the put/call options belonging to the intersection of Ω1∩Ω2∩Ω3∩Ω4 for the 13
American companies we consider, Tables 2.14-2.16 for European companies with options
listed on Eurex and finally Tables 2.17-2.19 for European companies with options traded
on Euronext. We report the following variables: the day on which the selected transaction
in Ω1 ∩ Ω2 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4 took place (Day); the market condition at day t measured by the
average return of the underlying stock over the last two trading weeks (Mt); the option
strike (K); the option’s price (Pt); the stock value (St); the option’s time to maturity (τ);
the (abnormal) increment in open interest from day t − 1 to day t (∆OIt); its quantile
with respect to its empirical distribution computed over the last two years (qt); the cor-
responding volume (Vt); the maximum (for calls) and minimum (for puts) return realized
by the underlying stock during the two-week period following the transaction day (rst); the
number of days between transaction day t and when this maximum return occurs (τ1); the
maximum return realized by the selected option during the two-week period following the
transaction day (rot ); the number of days between transaction day t and when this maxi-
mum return occurs (τ2); the gains realized through the exercise of the new option issued
at time t (Gt); a short description of the event and why the stock drops/rises (Event’s
description). In our tables we report only the selected transactions falling into the time
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window 2007-2009. The total number of detected options for the whole sample period
1996-2009 is given in brackets immediately after the option specification (put or call).
One of the crucial differences with respect to the empirical findings in [1], is the sample
period. In the latter work, we consider the time window 1996 and 2006. The majority of the
detected transactions are related to idiosyncratic events having a major effect only on the
company which is directly involved, and possibly on some close competitors. International
events such as the Asian crisis and September 11 are exceptions which impacted several
other sectors. Neither of these global events is however comparable with the incredible
violence that has hit stock markets and financial institutions during the current financial
crisis. The high volatility and strong correlation between financial institutions marking the
breakout of the crisis have important implications for our empirical findings: in turbulent
times, large drops/rises in the underlying stocks are more frequent than in tranquil times,
making it challenging to always find a tangible explanation for them. This was not the
case in [1], where a drop by more than 10% in share value was considered an unusual
event. In most cases this drop in the underlying stock was significant enough that its
cause was reported in the financial press such as the business section of the New York
Times. In several cases detected in this empirical study, the cause of large drops/rises
cannot always be identified using financial reports, even though the movements in the
underlying stock exceed ±10%. This could partially be related to investor behavior which,
in view of the unexpected magnitude of the crisis, was totally irrational. Examples of such
large price changes in the underlying stock can be found on Tables 2.1-2.19, on the tenth
column reporting the maximum (for calls) and minimum (for puts) return realized by the
underlying stock during the two-week period following transaction day (rst ).
In the following subsections, we separately analyze our empirical findings for the three
markets. We comprehensively discuss a small number of particular cases. Additional tables,
graphical representations and comments are available from the authors upon request. We
start with some general remarks: although our sample period covers almost 15 trading
years, the percentage of transactions that fall into the ongoing financial crisis (2007-2009)
is remarkably high. This indicates that the transactions selected using our procedure are
not uniformly distributed over the whole sample period. Rather, a large majority took place
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in recent years. There may be several reasons for this: firstly, in spite of the high volatility
present in the markets, huge and frequent gain opportunities might have been generated,
and the high leverage effect offered by option trading has been explored by many market
participants; secondly, due to the dramatic and rapid collapse of the financial system, the
number of corporate and governmental decisions made has sharply increased, giving rise
to numerous potential information leakages and informed trading activities; finally, trades
made before scheduled announcements could be based on speculative bets, the latter being
facilitated by several rumors already present in the market. With respect to realized gains,
the numbers are generally higher than the ones found in [1] during the period 1996-2006:
by virtue of the leverage effect, large drops/rises in the underlying stock lead relatively
quickly to net profits of more than 1 million through option trading. With respect to the
option type, we find that the number of detected put trades is usually larger than the
number of detected call trades.
It is important to mention that due to the high level of information flow present in the
market, it can be difficult to classify informed trading activities during an intense period
such as the ongoing financial crisis. Based on the model of [1], potential informed activities
are detected by looking at the abnormality of several market variables. The model does
not however take into account the market conditions under which a given option trade
took place. One can argue for example that in bear market conditions -those often seen
between 2007 and 2009- buying protective put options is a rational decision. If market
conditions do not change and stock prices continue to decline, huge gains can be realized
in the following days. Whether these kinds of transactions can be classified as potential
informed activities is, however, questionable. We attempt to gauge this effect by computing
a measure for the market condition at day t given by the average return of the underlying
stock during the last two trading weeks (Mt). Unusually high put/call option trades which
take place under negative/positive values of Mt are less suspicious. To analyze this last
point, we emphasize the important role and informational content of option moneyness:
in our empirical results, we detect several put transactions for which the variable Mt
exhibits negative values. This might suggest that these transactions are not based on
private information, but are a natural reaction to ongoing market conditions. We argue
however that option moneyness brings a new dimension into our analysis: if the trading
was mainly concentrated in deep out-of-the money (OTM) options, a reasonable suspicion
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still arises. We found for example several trades in put options with an OTM of more
than 50% and negative market condition Mt. By definition, the exercise of those options
leads to gains only if the stock value drops by more than 50% which indeed happened a
few days later. Theoretically one could slightly amplify the three criteria proposed in [1]
and account for these new dimensions in the detection procedure as well. This, however,
is let for future research. When discussing some of the detected transactions, we describe
market conditions and moneyness, as well. In the following section we analyze some of
these cases in detail.
2.4.1 Trading activities on the CBOE
2.4.1.1 The case of American International Group (AIG)
We start with a concise chronological summary of key events impacting the destiny of
AIG, and discuss thereafter our empirical findings. In October 2007, when the stock was
at 68.59$, AIG entered a turbulent period. The company reported that its swaps portfolio
lost $352 million. A month later, that figure was revised to $1.1 billion. Between early
October and mid-November 2007, AIG’s stock price fell 25%. In February 2008, AIG
announced estimated losses of $11.5 billion, and that it had posted $5.3 billion in collateral,
pushing down the stock to under 50$. In summer 2008, it was reported that the Justice
Department was investigating AIG for possible criminal fraud. The UK’s Serious Fraud
Office would later announce its own probe. At the beginning of September 2008, when
the stock was at 21.96$, AIG executives learned that the ratings agencies planned to
downgrade the company’s rating again. That would trigger more collateral calls, which
AIG knew it could not begin to cover. Desperate negotiations to keep the company afloat
– including a possible $75 billion bridge loan from Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, both
major counterparties on the credit default swaps – ensued. Tim Geithner, Head of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was called in. It became clear that AIG’s level of
exposure to its credit default swap losses was higher than anyone had yet understood. On
September 16, 2008 the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would take a nearly 80%
equity stake in AIG – effectively taking over the firm – and provide an $85 billion loan.
On that day, AIG stock was at 3.75$.
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Applying our detection procedure, we selected a total of 17 transactions in put options
and 17 in call options for the whole sample period, with 7 and 2, respectively, falling into
the financial crisis (Jan 2007-Sept 2009). We now discuss some particular cases in detail.
Information regarding the remaining transactions can be found in the reported tables.
The first transaction in put options took place on October 5, 2007. The underlying
stock was at 69.39$ and the market condition measure Mt was slightly positive (0.18%).
This indicates that the market was not in decline and the strong request in new at-the-
money put options with a value of $1.9 and a maturity of November 2007 (7,594 contracts,
corresponding to 95.7% of the historical distribution) was hard to justify. This transaction
precedes the first AIG reported losses concerning its business activities in CDS. In the
following weeks, the underlying stock fell sharply, increasing the option’s value to levels
above $7. Many of these options were sequentially exercised which led to net gains of
approximately $7 million. An interesting sequence of transactions took place in the days
leading up to the takeover of AIG on September 16, 2008. On September 10, 11 and 12,
large increments in new put options were observed on the CBOE. The maturities of these
options were October and November 2008. The market was bearish during the preceding
trading weeks (Mt was negative) and a large demand for protective put options seemed
to be a plausible, rational consequence. The moneyness of the requested options gives
however important details about these transactions: On September 10 for example, the
stock traded at $17.50 and 23,137 new put options with strike $18 were requested on
the market. These options were at-the money with a price of $3.40. The following day,
the stock traded at $17.55 and 14,494 new put options with strike $8 were bought on
the CBOE. These options were deep out-of-the money and therefore quite cheap ($0.69).
Furthermore, on September 12, 14,249 new out-of-the money put options with strike $10
were bought on the CBOE. Their price was $1.465. The first two options matured in
November 2008, whereas the latter matured at the end of September. Three trading days
later, on September 16 and just one day after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Federal
Reserve announced that it would take over AIG. The stock price dropped to $3.75, pushing
those put options deep in-the-money and increasing their value to more than $14 in the
first case, $5 in the second and third case. On the same day, 12,931 options of the first
type, 13,924 of the second and 1,974 of the third type were exercised, leading to a net
profit of more than $13 million, $6 million and $1 million, respectively. On September 17
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and 18, when the underlying stock decreased further in value to $2, a large number of these
options were exercised, leading to unusually high profits. The total realized gains through
exercise Gt amounted to $24mio, $4.5mio and $7.9mio., respectively. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
report the dynamics of these transactions. The solid line shows the daily dynamic of open
interest, the bars show the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot
line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction and
the filled circle is the announcement day, September 15, 2008.
We now discuss in detail a detected transaction in call options which took place on
July 30, 2009. The stock traded at $13.13 with the market condition Mt being at -2.21%.
The market was therefore bearish and it was difficult to find plausible justification for the
2,806 new out-of-the money (strike K=15) call options requested on July 30 with a price
of $0.95. A few days later, on August 7, a quarterly profit announcement increased the
stock value to $27.14, raising the value of the call options to $12.375. This represents a
net profit of more than 1,200% in less than two trading weeks. The stock recovered quite
quickly and on August 28 it reached the level of $50.23, increasing the option’s value to
$35. In the time period between July 30 and maturity, September 2009, exercise of the call
options led to net gains of more than $5.5 million. The remaining out-of-the money call
option detected on August 18, shows similar behavior and the total net gains amounted
to $5.3 million. Additional information can be found in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3.
2.4.1.2 The case of Bear Stearns Corporation (BSC)
As in the previous subsection, we give a short chronological events description and discuss
thereafter our empirical results. The financial crisis began spreading more widely in Au-
gust 2007 with the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds which had heavily invested
in subprime-related securities. On December 20, 2007 Bear Stearns posted fourth quarter
losses of $854 million after mortgage related write-downs of $1.9 billion. It was the first
quarterly loss in its 85-year history. In Spring 2008, Bear Stearns was the subject of a
multitude of market rumors regarding its liquidity. Early in the week of March 10, 2008
rumors swirled around Wall Street that European firms had suspended fixed income trad-
ing with Bear Stearns. U.S. traders began to stop trading with Bear, hedge funds pulled
money from prime brokerage accounts, money market funds reduced their investment in
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short-term Bear issued debt. The company then suffered a cash crunch. On Thursday,
March 13, Bear shares fell more than 7% to $57 even as the Standard & Poor’s 500 in-
dex rose 0.5%. Bear called JPMorgan, its clearing bank, to warn that it might not have
enough cash to meet its obligations on Friday and needed emergency help. It also called
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In
an evening conference call among the New York Fed, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Fed Board of Governors and the U.S. Treasury, the SEC said Bear Stearns
might file for bankruptcy the next morning. On Friday, March 14 the New York Fed, the
Fed Board of Governors and the Treasury held a conference call to discuss the options.
They decided to issue an overnight non-recourse loan to JPMorgan so that the bank could
then loan money to Bear Stearns. The loan was intended to get Bear Stearns through to
the weekend while the companies and government officials explored Bear Stearns’ options
and ways to contain potential damage. Bear shares fell 46 percent to $30.85. Credit rat-
ing agencies downgraded Bear Stearns debt and customers continued to pull funds to the
point where Bear Stearns officials feared the bank would be insolvent by the time Asian
markets opened on Sunday evening. On Sunday evening, March 16, JPMorgan announced
that it would acquire Bear for about $2 a share and that the Fed would provide JPMorgan
with a $30 billion loan backed by Bear assets. JPMorgan guaranteed billions of dollars in
Bear trading obligations. The deal was announced just before Asian markets opened. On
Monday, March 17 Bear shares started the day with a drop of nearly 90 percent to $2.86.
For the period 1999-2009, our procedure detected 16 transactions in put options and
11 in calls. 9 trades in puts and 2 in calls, respectively fall into the time period 2007-2009.
We now concentrate on a series of trades in put options which took place in the days
leading up to the collapse of Bear Stearns. We detected 6 large trades in put options from
March 4 till March 14, most of them involving deep out-of-the money options. Since the
dynamics of such trades are similar, we do not report all details for every detected trans-
action, but concentrate on a few examples.
On March 10, Bear Stearns stock traded at $62.30 and the market conditions measure
Mt was at −0.60%. On that day, an impressive 11,757 new contracts of new put options
with strike $30 and maturity end of March were created on the CBOE. Due to the deep
out-the-money moneyness, these options were traded at the cheap price of $0.625. Such
2 Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets during the Financial Crisis 69
an increment corresponds to the 99.70% quantile of its historical distribution. The same
options exhibited another unusually high increment the following day when its open in-
terest increased by an additional 22,809 contracts. The price of the option even decreased
to $0.25 as the stock price increased slightly in value. On March 17, when the market
reopened after the intense negotiations marathon between Bear Stearns, JPMorgan and
the Fed, the stock dropped nearly 85% to $2.86, increasing the value of these put option
to $25.30. Interestingly, the day of the announcement corresponds to the exercise date
of 8,150 option contracts. On March 18, an additional 9,310 put options were exercised,
leading to net gains of more than $50 million. On March 12, the put option with strike $40
and maturity April, were subject to an impressive large increment in open interest: on that
day, the stock traded at $61.58, making the option deep out-of-the money and tradable at
$1.875. On the day of the announcement, its value increased to $35.3, resulting in a net
profit of more than 1,700% in three trading days. The sequential exercise of these options
over the following weeks generated net gains of more than $6 million. Another extremely
profitable trade in put options was detected on March 13: market condition Mt on that
day was −1.21%, indicating that the rumors regarding Bear Stearns’ liquidity already had
an impact on the underlying stock, which, on that day, traded at $57. The put option
with strike 25$ and maturity March exhibited an impressive increment in open interest of
26,219 option contracts on March 13. Its price was fairly cheap ($0.275) due to its deep
out-of-the moneyness. On March 17, its price exploded to $20.3, and the exercise of almost
5,000 option contracts on that day had already generated gains of several millions. Five
days later, when the option matured, total realized gains amounted to approximately $50
million. Finally, our procedure detected another transaction in put options on March 14.
As in the other cases, the involved put option (with short maturity March 07) was bought
for a cheap price when it was deep out-of-the money and exhibited an impressive net re-
turn right after the March 17 announcement. After exercise on March 18 and 19, related
gains totaled $28 million. Additional information can be found in Table 2.3.
2.4.1.3 The case of Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE)
For the case of Fannie Mae, our procedure detected 17 transactions in put options, 10 of
which took place in the years 2007-2009, and 13 in call options, 4 of which during the
financial crisis. In the case of Freddie Mac, these include 12 for puts and 15 for calls,
respectively. 5 trades in puts and 6 in calls fall into the period after 2007.
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On July 13, 2008, after a weekend of negotiations, the Treasury and the Federal Re-
serve announced emergency measures to backstop Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two
companies would get access to credit lines, including direct access to Fed money if neces-
sary, and a provision for the Treasury to take an equity stake in the companies if required.
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced measures aimed at stemming the
spread of false rumors. Two days later, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shareholders still
found no overt assurance regarding the fate of common stock in any government bailout.
Freddie Mac shares plunged 26% and Fannie Mae plummeted 27%. In the following days,
Freddie Mac completed its second successful debt sale of the week, and confidence regard-
ing the fate of the rescue effort moving through Congress rose. Fannie Mae shares rose
more than 18% and Freddie Mac added nearly 22%. On July 23, the House of Repre-
sentatives approved a housing market support package including a mandate for the U.S.
Treasury to provide equity or debt to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The White House
dropped opposition to other measures in the broad housing bill and pledged to sign it into
law. Fannie Mae shares rose almost 12% to $15, their highest close since July 9. Freddie
closed up more than 11% at $10.80, its highest close since July 8. On August 8, Fannie
Mae posted a second quarter loss of $2.3 billion before preferred dividend payments, or
$2.54 a share. It was the fourth straight quarterly loss, bringing its cumulative loss over
12 months to $9.44 billion before preferred dividends. Fannie cut its dividend and said it
would raise loss reserves. Based on an article published on August 17 in Barron’s magazine,
the Treasury Department was increasingly likely to recapitalize Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in the coming months using taxpayer’s money. The following day, share prices for
mortgage finance companies dropped, with Fannie Mae’s price plunging 22% to a 16-year
low of $6.15 and Freddie Mac’s down 25% to $4.39. The New York Times and Washington
Post newspapers reported late on Friday, September 5, that in what could be the largest
financial bailout in the nation’s history, the U.S. government planned to put government
sponsored mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under federal control.
The closing share price on that Friday was $7.04 for Fannie Mae and $5.1 for Freddie Mac.
On Sunday, September 7, 2008 the Federal Government announced its takeover of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, effectively nationalizing them. At that point Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac owned or guaranteed about half of the U.S.’s $12 trillion mortgage market. This
led to panic as almost every home mortgage lender and Wall Street bank relied on them to
facilitate the mortgage market; investors worldwide owned $5.2 trillion of debt securities
backed by them. On Monday, September 8, when the market reopened, the stock price
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of Fannie Mae crashed by almost 90% to under $1, and Freddie Mac stock fell to $0.88,
decreasing its value by more than 80%.
Our procedure detected a series of transactions in put options starting on August
11, the month leading up to the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 6 abnormal
increments in put options were found for the underlying Fannie Mae and one for Freddie
Mac. In all cases, the acquired put options were deep out-of-the money, making them
available at a cheap price. On September 7, when both underlying stocks lost more than
80% of their value, these options went deep in-the-money and, through a sequential exercise
in the following days, several millions in net gains were collected. We now discuss a few of
these transactions in detail. Additional information for the remaining ones can be found
in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and Figures 2.5 and 2.6.
For Fannie Mae, on August 11, 2008 the put option with strike $6 and maturity
September saw an impressive increment in open interest of 10,164 contracts. The underly-
ing stock traded at $8.40, the market condition variables were slightly negative (-0.21%)
and the put price was $0.675. Before this strong increment, the level of open interest was
almost zero. In the following weeks, the open interest of these options continuously in-
creased, reaching a maximum number of 31,824 contracts on September 4, where another
strong increment of 5,774 contracts was detected by our procedure. On that day, the price
of the underlying stock was $6.42 and the price of the put option $0.75. On Monday,
September 8, the day after the announcement that the Fed would take over Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, the value of the put options increased by more than 600%, reaching a
value of $5.3 per option contract. On the same day, 7,162 contracts were exercised, leading
to net gains of more than $3 million. Furthermore, another large number of options (11,730
contracts) were exercised a few days later. The net gains from this exercised amount were
more than $5 million. Another put option with underlying stock Fannie Mae was heavily
traded on August 28. Figure 2.5 provides a graphical representation of it. The increment
in open interest totaled 15,178 contracts, the strike price was $7 and the option had a
time-to-maturity of 114 days. The underlying stock traded at $7.95 and the put option
had a value of $2.6. Before this large demand, its open interest was almost zero. Until
September 9, the level of open interest remained constant. The day after, 14,701 contracts
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were exercised when the option’s price was $6.2. The net gains amounted to more than
$5 million. In the case of Freddie Mac, our methodology detected only one transaction
in put options on September 3, 2008. Its strike was $3 with a time-to-maturity of 136
days. The underlying asset traded at $5.38 and the put had a value of $0.9. The strong
increment in open interest observed on September 3 (2,260 contracts) was offset by the
exercise of 2,430 options on September 10, when the option had a value of $2.35. The
net gains from this transaction amounted to approximately $300,000. With respect to the
detected transaction in call options, both companies were subject to heavy trade in calls
in March 2008. Our procedure detected three trades for Fannie Mae on March 5, 7 and
11, and three for Freddie Mac on March 10, 11 and 18. All these options were almost at-
the-money and matured at the end of March. Interestingly, the market condition variable
was between -1% and -2%, indicating that these call options had been bought during a
bearish period. We do not provide the details of these transactions in this paper. They
are, however, available upon request from the authors. The dynamics behind these trades
are the same as those described in the previous examples: the observed increments in open
interest are all above their 94% historical quantile and occurred during the days leading
up to March 20, 2008 when U.S. regulators eased capital requirements for the two firms in
order to provide up to $200 billion in immediate liquidity for stressed mortgage markets.
On that day, shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac jumped by approximately 26%. In
both cases, a considerable number of call options were exercised in the subsequent days
leading to net gains of several million. Additional details can be found in Tables 2.5 and
2.6.
2.4.1.4 Final remarks on the CBOE transactions
For the remaining companies with options traded on the CBOE, we do not report de-
tailed results and discussions, but refer to the corresponding tables for additional infor-
mation. Without going into extensive detail, we collect and mention a list of cases, which,
through option trading, realized substantial gains. The dynamics of these trading strate-
gies are the same as in the previous extensively discussed examples: a large increment in
put/call is observable a few days before a specific event occurs, thereby substantially de-
creasing/increasing the underlying asset; due to the leverage effect offered by the options
market, option prices rise and, through subsequent exercise of the options, large gains are
made.
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For Bank of America Corporation, on November 14, 2008 and January 14, 2009 two
large transactions in put options were detected. Both trades were followed by a stock crash
of more than 20% due to the announcements of 35,000 and 1,000 job cuts, respectively.
The resulting gains through exercise amounted in the first case to $5.4 million, and $3.3
million in the second one. Quarterly profits announced on July 22, 2008 (with a stock value
increase of 22.4%), were preceded by a series of transactions in call options resulting in
total net gains of more than $8 million. For Citigroup, our method detected a transaction
on Friday, November 21, 2008 in a deep out-of-the money call option with short time-to-
maturity. The increment in open interest amounted to 61,927 option contracts, i.e. the
99.7% quantile of its historical distribution. The market condition was at -2.41%. On
the following Monday, the government’s plan to help Citigroup by buying $20 billion of
preferred stock was announced. The stock value increased in the following days by more
than 50% and a large number of call options were exercised, leading to net gains of more
than $7 million. The substantial losses reported in the financial press on January 16, 2009
which induced a drop in the underlying stock of more than 23%, were preceded by three
transactions in out-of-the money put options traded on the CBOE on January 7, 8 and
12. The total realized gains after the stock crashed amounted to more than $9 million.
In the case of Goldman Sachs, the events leading to the (relatively small) movements in
the underlying stock were difficult to identify. For this reason, we do not offer any details.
The profit drop of 76% announced by JP Morgan on January 15, 2009 was preceded by
three large trades in put options on December 31, January 2 and 6. On these days the
market condition Mt was close to zero. Realized gains totaled more than $17 million. The
strong rise in stock value between March 9 and March 18 (from $15.9 to $27.11) was
preceded by unusually high increments in out-of-the money call options between March 5
and 9. Realized gains from options exercise totaled more than $16 million. For Lehman
Brothers and Merrill Lynch, we refer to Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for our empirical findings. For
Morgan Stanley, we found two large transactions in deep out-of-the money call options on
October 9 and 10, 2008. These precede the announcement on Monday, October 13 that
a Japanese bank intended to buy 1/5 of Morgan Stanley. The stock value nearly doubled
that day, resulting in net gains of more than $12 million through the exercise of those
call options. An interesting series of transactions in put options with underlying stock in
Wachovia Bank was detected during the month of September 2008, the period leading
up to the announcement on September 29 that the bank would be taken over due to its
uncertain situation. On that day, the stock plummeted by more than 81%, pushing these
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put options deep in-the-money. The subsequent exercise of these options led to realized
gains of more than $23 million. For the last company analyzed on the CBOE, Wells Fargo,
the underlying stock had been sharply loosing value during the first two months of 2009:
the stock was traded around $30 in January 2009, and on February 27, it was worth $12.1.
We detected a large number of new issued put options during this period on January 6,
7, 8 and 28. For the first three days, the market conditions were positive, whereas for the
last one, a level of -2.31% was observed, indicating the bearish market situation already
mentioned. The subsequent exercise of these put options led to substantial gains.
2.4.2 Trading activities on Eurex (Frankfurt and Zurich)
Option contracts with underlying German and Swiss companies are traded on Eurex, one
of the world’s largest derivatives exchanges and the leading clearing house in Europe estab-
lished in 1998 after the merger between Deutsche Terminbo¨rse (DTB, the German deriva-
tives exchange) and SOFFEX (Swiss Options and Financial Futures). In this section we
use the EUREX database provided by Deutsche Bank to analyze option transactions with
underlying United Bank of Switzerland (UBS), Credit Suisse Group (CS) and Deutsche
Bank (DBK). Our empirical findings are summarized in Tables 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16. In the
case of UBS, our procedure detected 16 transactions in put options, 13 of which fell into
the period 2007-2009. The proportion of call options is smaller, with 3 out of 13 transac-
tions taking place during the financial crisis. For CS, we detected 16 trades in puts and
13 trades in calls for the entire sample period. The proportion falling into the period after
2007 is around one third. For DBK, we identified a total of 16 transactions in put and 3
in call options. More than half of these put trades took place in the last two years of our
data sample, whereas only one call was found for the years 2007-2009. In the following
section we discuss some particular cases and refer to the corresponding tables for further
details. Related figures are available from the authors upon request.
2.4.2.1 The case of United Bank of Switzerland (UBS)
Our detection procedure identified three trades in put options which took place in October
2007, maturing in October, December and June 08. Two of the three acquired options
were out-of-the money. These trades preceded the October 30 announcement that UBS,
Europe’s largest bank by assets, reported its first quarterly loss in almost five years.
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Declines in the U.S. subprime mortgage market led to $4.4 billion in losses and write-
downs on fixed-income securities. Third quarter net loss was 830 million Swiss francs ($712
million). In the following weeks and months, UBS stock started an impressive decline, and
through the exercise of these puts options net gains of more than CHF 24 million were
collected. On February 14, 2008 UBS saw its shares fall to a four-year low after it produced
the worst quarterly loss in the bank’s history and revealed new details of its full exposure
to the sub-prime and credit crises. Its stock fell more than 8% in Zurich and New York
as executives failed to rule out further write-downs - which already totaled $18.1 billion -
or give a date for a return to profitability. The fall accelerated after U.S. Federal Reserve
Chairman, Ben Bernanke, said investment banks would have further write-downs. UBS
confirmed that it lost CHF 12.5 billion in the final quarter of 2007, with full-year losses of
CHF 4.4 billion - the first in the decade since it merged with the Swiss Bank Corporation
- and had written off $13.7bn in the final quarter of the preceding year. Interestingly, our
method was able to identify three transactions in put options on January 30, and February
11 and 12, 2008. All options had short-term maturities and generated high returns after
the stock crash on February 14. Collected gains amounted to nearly CHF 7 million. With
respect to call options, we identified three trades falling into the period 2007-2009, whose
gains amounted to more than CHF 10 million. The rise in the underlying stock price
leading to high options returns could not be seen in the financial press.
2.4.2.2 Final remarks on EUREX transactions
For Credit Suisse Group and Deutsche Bank, the remaining companies that belong to our
database with options traded on EUREX, we do not report detailed results and discus-
sions, but refer to the corresponding tables for additional information. We discuss one
specific event related to CS that, due to its strong impact on the underlying asset, was re-
ported in the financial press. On October 13, 2008 Israeli holding company Koor Industries
(KOR.TA) invested CHF 1.2 billion in Credit Suisse in exchange for a 3 percent stake in
the bank. On that day, CS jumped by more than 27%. Furthermore, on October 16, 2008
Credit Suisse raised approximately CHF 10 billion, or about 12 percent of its outstand-
ing equity, from private investors. The Qatar Investment Company increased its stake in
Credit Suisse to 8.9%, while Saudi conglomerate Olayan increased its stake to 3.6%. Our
procedure detected a trade on September 18 in deep out-of-the money call options with
maturity Dec 2008. The increment in open interest amounted to 10,010 contracts, being
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at the 93% quantile of its historical distribution. Due to the remarkable rise in stock value
observed a few weeks later, these options went in-the-money and saw gains through ex-
ercise of approximately CHF 1.5 million. In the case of Deutsche Bank, we found several
trades in put options whose gains correspond to several million. In the majority of the
cases, however, it was difficult to attribute a specific event to these transactions. One ex-
ception represents the three last trades on September 18 and 19 and October 1, 2008 where
the large increment in put open interest and the subsequent large drop in the underlying
stock can be a consequence of the Lehman Brothers collapse which had occurred a few
days earlier.
2.4.3 Trading activities on Euronext (London and Paris)
Options with underlying French and British companies are traded on Euronext in Paris
and London. In this subsection we report our empirical findings for Societe´ Ge´ne´rale (GL),
BNP Paribas (BN) and HSBC (HSB). We discuss some specific cases, and information
regarding the remaining transactions can be found in the corresponding Tables 2.17-2.19.
2.4.3.1 The case of Societe´ Ge´ne´rale (GL)
On January 24, 2008 the bank announced that a single futures trader at Societe´ Ge´ne´rale
had fraudulently lost the bank €4.9billion, the largest such loss in history. Je´rome Kerviel,
a relatively junior futures trader, allegedly orchestrated a series of bogus transactions that
spiraled out of control amid turbulent markets in 2007 and early 2008. Executives said the
trader acted alone and that he may not have benefited directly from the fraudulent deals.
The bank announced it would be immediately seeking €5.5 billion Euros in financing.
On Tuesday, January 22, 2008 the French stock market regulator said that it had begun
a formal investigation into Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale. It was not clear whether the inquiry was
related to the revelation that Robert Day, a member of Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale’s Board, had sold
shares in the bank worth €45 million on January 18, the day Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale explained
that management had first been alerted to Mr. Kerviel’s unauthorized trading, and two
days before the bank’s audit committee was informed of a planned €2.05 billion write-
down linked to the bank’s exposure to the United States subprime lending market. Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale and a spokesman for Mr. Day said in separate statements that the share sales by
Mr. Day and his family’s trusts occurred in several transactions from December 2007 to
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January 18, 2008 during a predetermined window when directors were allowed to exercise
options. Both statements said all required disclosures had been made, and ”no inside
information was used in any way” with respect to these sales. Our detection procedure
detected two abnormal trades in put options on January 9 and 16, 2008. Both options were
out-of-the money with short maturity. Relatively large increments in open interest were
observed. Their exercise led to gains of more than €1.7 million. In addition, the February
12, 2008 announcement that Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale planned to raise $8 billion in capital was
preceded by two unusually large increments in open interest in deep-out-of the money call
options. After the substantial stock rise, the exercise of these options led to a total gain of
more than €9 million. Other profitable trades in put as well as call options can be found
in Table 2.17.
2.4.3.2 Final remarks on Euronext transactions
For BNP Paribas and HSBC, the remaining companies that belong to our database with
options traded on Euronext, we do not report detailed results and discussions, but refer
to the corresponding tables for additional information (Tables 2.18 and 2.19). For BNP
Paribas, we briefly emphasize a series of transactions which took place between January 14
and 18, 2008. The involved put options were deep out-of-the money with short maturity.
On January 30, the announcement that quarterly profit would slump over 40% had a
strong impact on the underlying asset. The exercise of these put options led to a net profit
of more than €2 million.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we extend the model developed in [1] to call options in order to capture prof-
itable informed trading strategies arising when the underlying stock increases in value. Op-
tion trading strategies with underlying financial and insurance institutions hardly affected
by the ongoing financial crisis are analyzed. Three different option markets are considered:
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), with companies such as AIG, Lehman
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among others; Eurex (Zurich and
Frankfurt), with United Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse Group and Deutsche Bank;
and Euronext (Paris and London), with Societe´ Ge´ne´rale, BNP Paribas and HSBC. We
find that the detected option trades are not uniformly distributed over our sample period
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(1996-2009), but that the great majority falls into the period 2007-2009. Our empirical
findings suggest that periods leading up to key events such as the takeovers of AIG, Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac, the collapse of Bear Stearns Corporation and public announcements
relating to large losses/write-downs are preceded by unusual trading activities in options.
Profitable option strategies in put as well as call options are detected. The realized gains
amount to several hundreds of millions of dollars. This paper empirically shows that despite
all the catastrophic consequences of the ongoing financial crisis, the crisis has simultane-
ously presented profitable trading strategies to market participants. Obviously our study
does not constitute proof of illegal activities. Legal proof would require trader identity and
their motivations, information which is not contained in our database.
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Figure 2.1. Selected put option with underlying stock AIG before the Federal Reserve Board
announced that it would take a nearly 80% equity stake in AIG - effectively taking over the firm
- and would provide an $85 billion loan on September 15, 2008. The solid line shows the daily
dynamic of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the
dash-dot line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the
filled circle is the announcement day, September 15, 2008. This put option had a strike of $8 and
matured at the end of October 2008.
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Figure 2.2. Selected put option with underlying stock AIG before the Federal Reserve Board
announced that it would take a nearly 80% equity stake in AIG - effectively taking over the firm
- and would provide an $85 billion loan on September 15, 2008. The solid line shows the daily
dynamic of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the
dash-dot line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the
filled circle is the announcement day, September 15, 2008. This put option had a strike of $10 and
matured at the end of September 2008.
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Figure 2.3. Selected call option with underlying stock AIG before the August 7, 2009 quarterly
profit announcement that almost doubled the stock value. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot
line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the filled circle
is the announcement day, August 7, 2009. This call option had a strike of $15 and matured at the
end of September 2009.
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Figure 2.4. Selected put option with underlying stock BSC before the collapse of Bear Stearns
on March 17, 2008. The option trade takes place on March 10, 2008. The solid line shows the daily
dynamic of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the
dash-dot line, the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the
filled circle is Monday, March 17, the day Bear Stearns shares dropped nearly 90 % to $2.86. This
put option had a strike of $30 and matured at the end of March 2008.
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Figure 2.5. Selected put option with underlying stock FNM before the federal takeover on Septem-
ber 5, 2008. The option trade takes place on August 28, 2008. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot
line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, August 28,
2008, and the filled circle is Monday, September 8, when the stock price of Fannie Mae crashed by
almost 90% to under $1. This put option had a strike of $7 and a time-to-maturity of more than
100 days.
104 Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, Loriano Mancini
Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
4
O
p
e
n
 I
n
te
re
st
/V
o
lu
m
e
Open Interest
Volume
29. Aug 2008
8. Sept 2008
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
 t
h
e
 o
p
tio
n
 in
ve
st
m
e
n
t
Return on the option investment
29. Aug 2008
8. Sept 2008
Figure 2.6. Selected put option with underlying stock FNM before the federal takeover on Septem-
ber 5, 2008. The option trade takes place on August 29, 2008. The solid line shows the daily dynamic
of open interest, the bar shows the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot
line the option return (right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, August 29,
2008, and the filled circle is Monday, September 8, when the stock price of Fannie Mae crashed by
almost 90% to under $1. This put option had a strike of $3 and a maturity at the end of October
2008.
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3Informational Content of the Daily Imbalance Between Put
and Call Options
Remo Crameri
Summary. We study the informational content of open interest when the linkage between option
market variables and subsequent price movements in the underlying stock are investigated. A daily
statistic which measures the imbalance between new issued puts and calls is defined. Conditional
on it we estimate non-parametrically the whole cumulative distribution of several indicators of
future market activities. Differences between the unconditional and conditional distribution are
used as a measure for the predictive power of our statistic. We empirically show that whenever
the imbalance between new issued puts and calls takes extreme values, the conditional distribution
exhibits significant changes with respect to its unconditional counterpart: when the number of new
issued put options is large compared to the number of new call options, the conditional distribution
functions of the idiosyncratic return noise process becomes heavier on the left side and a large drop
is more likely to follow. In the opposite scenario, when the statistic exhibits a large imbalance in
favor of call options, the idiosyncratic return noise tends to be higher than after calm days. Our
findings confirm the informational content of large daily changes in open interest.
Keywords: Options, Information Content, Open Interest.
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14, G17, G34, C61, C65
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3.1 Introduction
Option contracts have been widely accepted as one of the most useful derivative securities
of the last decades. As in the stock market, daily trading volume, bid-ask quotes, prices
and volatility are considered to be the driving components in the analysis of trading ac-
tivity in the options market. However, unlike in the stock market in which there is a fixed
number of shares to be traded, option trading can involve the creation of new positions
whenever a new party agrees to underwrite a new contract and another one is disposed
to take the opposite position. Therefore the number of existing (not yet exercised) option
contracts can be quite volatile and may significantly change from one day to the other.
This fact is confirmed by historical daily data from the CBOE (Chicago Board Options
Exchange). The technical term used for the total number of option contracts for a specific
underlying asset, strike price and expiration date that are currently open at the end of a
trading day is Open Interest. This concept is widely used among options traders and is one
of the data fields on every option quote display. Together with daily trading volume, the
dynamic (daily changes) of open interest might be considered as an indicator of different
activities in the options market and might have predictive power on the future develop-
ment of the underlying’s price. For example, the liquidity of an option can be described
by its corresponding open interest, and trading in an (existent) option can be considered
unusually and exceptionally high whenever the daily volume far exceeds the existing open
interest on a given day. In addition, daily changes in open interest may contain/reveal
what other investors think/know about the future value of the underlying stock. Finally,
daily increments of open interest can help in determining how much new money is flowing
into or out of a market.
Daily changes in open interest play the main role in this paper. As already noted
in several papers, option market anomalies (in terms of unusually high volumes or open
interest) are an important indicator of new information flowing into the market. [19]
compare for example stock and option market activities and first observe that there are
abnormal activities in both markets before the M&A announcement day. These activities
turn out to be more intense in the options market. They find a dramatic and significant
increase in both variables, open interest and volume, and point out that using open interest
as an indicator has two decisive advantages: first of all, it is much less volatile than volumes
and, secondly, daily volume can be affected by short-term speculation (a trader opens a
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position in the morning and closes it in the evening). Therefore the (total) daily increment
in open interest corresponds to the number of new option contracts issued on the market
at that specific day. The dynamic of such a variable might provide new insight into the
information process on several levels which is not available when analyzing the stock
market.
It is important to analyze the informational content of unusual activities in the options
market as it enhances our understanding of how (or if) new information is possibly reflected
in asset prices. The analysis presented in this paper investigates therefore the linkage
between option market variables and subsequent price movements of the underlying stock.
In this paper we study the informational content of daily changes in open interest.
First we define a daily statistic which represents the imbalance between new issued put
and call options. Second, we compute three different measures of future market activities:
the mean, the maximum and the minimum of the idiosyncratic noise of the return process
over a time period of 5 trading days. We then analyze the predictive power of our statistic
on these three measures by comparing the conditional distribution functions with their
unconditional counterparts. Our findings suggest that the predictive power of our statistic
is appreciable: when conditioning on high/low levels of imbalance, the distribution func-
tions of all three measures show significant changes compared to the unconditional ones.
These differences turn out to be more pronounced when looking at the minimum and max-
imum idiosyncratic noise: when the number of new issued put options is large compared
to the number of new calls, the conditional distribution function becomes heavier on the
left side and a large drop in the idiosyncratic return noise is more likely to follow. In the
opposite scenario, when the statistic exhibits a large imbalance in favor of call options,
the idiosyncratic return noise tends to be higher than after calm days.
Our paper is related to existing literature in several ways. We share the idea with a
number of previous studies that option markets are attractive to informed traders. [11] and
[8] focus on option trading volumes. In the first article, their model predicts an informa-
tion role for the volume of specific types of option trades. Empirical analysis of the model
confirms the predictions. The second paper provides evidence that due to non-public in-
formation possessed by options traders, transaction volume in options markets generates
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information concerning future stock prices. [21] present strong evidence that options trad-
ing volume and open interest contain information about future stock prices. [18] provide
detailed descriptive statistics on purchased and written open interest and on open buy and
sell volumes of several classes of investors. [22] analyzes option market activities around
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and concludes that several anomalies are observable.
Most of these papers use unique databases with publicly and non-publicly available infor-
mation. Their analysis takes place in a standard linear regression framework. [9] develop
a procedure for the detection of informed trading activities in the options market. This
paper has important similarities to [22] and [9], such as using open interests to investigate
the impact and the transmission of information from the options market to the under-
lying asset market and vice versa. As in [22] we perform unconditional and conditional
analysis. There are also important differences from [22] concerning the data, methodology
and aims. [22] takes advantage of a rich database where option trades are separated in
long and short positions and classified according to the agents who initiated them. Such a
database allows for an in-depth analysis, but is, unfortunately, not easily accessible to the
public. We use publicly available data such as total daily open interest and stock returns
so that our methodology can be readily applied elsewhere. The data used in this paper
partially corresponds to the data analyzed in [9]. From a methodological point of view,
there are however important differences: in this paper we simultaneously analyze call and
put options, whereas [9] study transactions on the options market which are characterized,
among others, by an unusually high increment in put open interest exclusively. Call options
are not considered. We construct a (daily) statistic which measures the imbalance between
new issued puts and calls, and, conditional on this, we estimate non-parametrically the
whole cumulative distribution of several indicators of future market activities. The dif-
ference between unconditional and conditional distribution is used as a measure of the
predictive power of our statistic. Obviously, the use of high frequency data would permit
a more detailed analysis. From a conceptual point of view, our paper is related to [13]
which tests the informational content of trading in option strategies. In both papers, the
predictive power of options trading is analyzed using daily statistics. [13] examine the
information content of the daily order flow in option strategies by taking the difference
between the total number of contracts of buyer-initiated trades and the total number
of contracts of seller-initiated trades on a given day. They construct separate daily order
flow measures for directional strategies, which include all option strategies with large delta
and small vega exposure, and volatility strategies, which include all option strategies with
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small delta and large vega exposure. Evidence that the order flow in volatility strategies
predicts next day realized volatility (consistent with traders having some non-public infor-
mation about volatility) is reported. No corresponding evidence of directional strategies
and the next day’s index return is found. The classification of buyer- and seller-initiated
transactions is of crucial importance in [13] and is only possible due to the availability of
options high frequency data. In our paper, we find empirical evidence of our daily statistic
even when considering a less rich data base.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we introduce our open interest statis-
tic. Section 3.3 describes the database. Section 3.4 shows our empirical results. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Open interest statistic
This section introduces a new open interest statistic that we use to analyze the linkages
between option and stock markets. Let OIt denote the sum of open interest at the end
of day t of all available option contracts for a given company. Clearly when OIt+1 >
OIt the number of outstanding options increases. However, if for instance the number of
outstanding puts increases, it can be due to an increase in the demand for protective puts,
hedging possible drops in stock prices or due to liquidity (noise) trading. To disentangle the
two types of trading a quite sophisticated database would be necessary.1 In this paper we
try to achieve this challenging goal by using publicly available data. Hence all our results
should be interpreted in a conservative way. It is reasonable to expect that by using a
richer database more stringent results could be achieved. Unfortunately, these data are
not easily available to the public.
Our basic idea is to measure the imbalance between the increments in put and call
open interests. Assuming that hedging and noise trading equally involve puts and calls,
when we observe a relatively large increment in put options compared to the change in
call option positions, we can expect that the trading in put options is mainly undertaken
by informed agents. The impact on the stock market is expected therefore to be more
1 Model based approaches could be used to classify the transactions; see for instance [11]. However, these
approaches can only provide an approximate classification of trades.
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pronounced and a fall in the underlying asset is likely to occur in the near future. Our
open interest statistic, It, is as follows
It :=
OIP,t −OIP,t−1
OIP,t−1
− OIC,t −OIC,t−1
OIC,t−1
, (3.1)
where OIP,t and OIC,t denote the sum among different strikes and maturities of put and
call open interest on day t for the company we are interested in. We will compute statistic
It for 20 companies with options traded on the CBOE. When we need to emphasize the
dependence of It on the specific stock i we use the notation Ii,t. The difference OIP,t −
OIP,t−1 is the increase in the number of outstanding put option contracts, and similarly
OIC,t−OIC,t−1 for call options. The interpretation of It is as follows. When It is sufficiently
large we expect the stock price i to fall and vice versa. When informed traders act on
privileged information, the corresponding large positions are reflected in a strong increase
or decrease in It. By construction, we focus therefore only on abnormal trades that increase
open interest. Whether or not a large demand for put or call options is able to increase the
corresponding open interest is dependent on the dealers’ inventories. If a large buy order
comes in at a time when the dealer holds a large positive inventory, then the corresponding
open interest will not change. Thus, our approach must be interpreted in a conservative
way: a large demand for put or call options that can be satisfied without the creation
of new positions is therefore neutralized by our statistic. The It are also affected by the
baseline activity in the options market which might not equally impact put and call open
interests. We try to filter out this effect using a regression model. The impossibility of
accounting exactly for this phenomenon reduces the predictability of our method. Hence,
also in this respect, our results should be interpreted in a conservative manner.
Our statistic It has three main advantages over the put-call volume statistic widely
used in the financial press and discussed in [22]. Firstly, It is constructed using publicly
available data and hence it can be readily computed for any option of interest. Secondly,
as in [22] we consider increments in open interests OIt−OIt−1, but, as he points out, such
a difference is likely to depend on the number of option contracts associated with a given
underlying asset. The ratios in equation (3.1) account for this dependence and allows us to
meaningfully compare the different statistics It across different stocks and periods. Finally,
taking the difference as opposed to the ratio between relative increment of put and call open
interest avoids explosive behaviors of statistic It when the increment in call open interest
is approximately zero. This phenomenon occurs with less liquid options. Controlling the
range of variation of It is important if we wish to achieve meaningful statistical results
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when It is regressed on explanatory variables. For this reason we transform the statistic
It as follows:
It := Φ
(It −mean(It)
std(It)
)
, (3.2)
where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
By construction, It falls into the unit interval. In the case in which the imbalance between
new issued put and call options is around zero, the statistic It will be near to 0.5. The
first open interest statistic investigated by [22] is related to the put-call ratio. However,
over the last decades daily open interest has dramatically increased. Hence statistics based
on absolute differences of open interests such as the above-mentioned statistic are more
noisy than statistics based on relative differences as we propose. This is the main reason
for which we use It in (3.2) instead of the first Poteshman statistic. The upper graph in
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the statistic It for the underlying stock American Airlines
(AMR). By construction, the time series It oscillates around 0.5. The days in which It
is high indicate that the relative increment in put options was larger than the one in call
options. In the same figure we marked five different days. These correspond to the days
detected in [9] in which potential informed trading activities using put options took place.
The high value of our statistic It confirms the strong asymmetry in the demand for new
put and call options during these days and supports the choice of our statistic It.
3.2.1 Predictive power of open interest statistic on return innovation
It is reasonable to expect that both It and stock return rt are affected by a number of
factors. From a rational point of view, the imbalance between put and call open interests
It can be affected by past stock returns as a consequence of hedging strategies. In a bear
market for example, a large hedging demand for protective puts will dominate the demand
for call options. This might therefore increase the value of statistic It. In the opposite case,
a bullish trend in the stock market may possibly decrease statistic It as a consequence of
high demand for call options. For comparative purposes, during times of high volatility,
uncertainty of the directional movements of the underlying assets or disagreement among
traders on future price movements, statistic It is likely to take a neutral value around 0.5.
In order to take into account possible factors which might have an impact on the behavior
of statistic It, we concentrate on the filtered statistic ηt computed as
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It = a0 +
n∑
j=1
(bj rt−j + cj r2t−j + dj It−j) + ηt. (3.3)
By construction, the innovations ηt represent the (transformed) imbalance between new
issued put and call options at day t which cannot be attributed to stock returns or volatility
trends (approximated by the squared returns) of the last n trading days. A graphical
representation of ηt is given in the second graph in Figure 3.1. Aside from the down shift,
the behavior is qualitatively the same as in the first graph. This is confirmed by the
regression coefficients reported in Table 3.1. The estimated constant term aˆ0 in equation
(3.3) is around 0.5 and in all cases statistically significant. In the majority of cases, the
coefficients related to the one lag past returns (bˆ1) is negative and significant at the 5%
level. This could be an indication that in periods of bearish/bullish times, investors tend
to augment their demand for protective puts/calls with a one-day delay. Consequently, a
day with a large positive/negative return decreases/increases the level of the statistic It in
the following day. The coefficient of the two-day lagged return (bˆ2) does not seem to have
a significant impact on the statistic: it is significant in some cases but with a changing
sign. With respect to past squared returns, statistic It does not react uniformly across the
analyzed companies. The same conclusion holds for the lagged statistic values. Overall,
the null hypothesis that the R2-statistic of the regression model (3.3) is equal to zero is
rejected due to the high F−test values reported in Table 3.1.
According to standard CAPM-type models stock returns are driven by systematic and
unsystematic shocks, among others. Moreover, a substantial amount of empirical evidence
suggests that daily stock return volatility is stochastic and mean reverting. It also responds
asymmetrically to positive and negative returns (see for instance [14]). Stochastic volatil-
ity is often modeled using extensions of the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(ARCH) model proposed by [12].2 To model stock returns we use an asymmetric GARCH
specification with an empirical innovation density. The GARCH model of [3] accounts
for stochastic, mean reverting volatility dynamics. The asymmetry term is based on [15]
(GJR). The empirical innovation density captures potential non-normalities in the true
innovation density.
2 Comprehensive surveys of ARCH and related models are [4] and [5]. In a continuous time setting,
stochastic volatility diffusion models are commonly used; surveys of this literature are for instance [14]
and [23].
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Let rt = St/St−1 − 1 be the daily return of the stock we are analyzing with price St
at time t, then the asymmetric GJR GARCH model is
rt = a+ b rM,t + εt,
σ2t = ω + βσ
2
t−1 + αε2t−1 + γJt−1ε2t−1,
(3.4)
where rM,t is the market return (thereafter approximated by the S&P 500), εt = σt zt,
zt ∼ f(0, 1) and Jt−1 = 1, when εt−1 < 0 and Jt−1 = 0, otherwise. When γ > 0 the
model accounts for the leverage effect,3 that is, bad news (εt−1 < 0) raises future volatility
more than good news (εt−1 ≥ 0) of the same absolute magnitude. We estimate the model
parameters using maximum likelihood. Under quite general conditions [6] show that this
technique provides consistent parameter estimates even when the true innovation density
f is non-normal. In the last case the parameter estimates are pseudo maximum likelihood
(PML) estimates. The scaled return innovations zt is obtained by dividing each estimated
return innovations εˆt by its estimated conditional volatility σˆt. zt is an estimate of the id-
iosyncratic noise of the underlying stock. Hence, market changes do not explain the sign of
the shock zt, and changing stock volatility does not affect the size of the shock. Accounting
for this phenomenon allows us to disentangle those variations in stock returns due simply
to market conditions from those which are unexplained by them (the innovations zt). This
constitutes a major difference between our approach and those in previous literature. Fig-
ure 3.2 and Table 3.2 summarize the result of the GARCH model presented in equation
(3.4). The two graphs in Figure 3.2 represent the effect of extracting the idiosyncratic
noise zt from the row return process rt. Some extreme returns in the first graph are not in
the second one, suggesting that on these days either market changes or high volatility were
the main cause for such an extreme return. Later we test the predictive power of high/low
values of the filtered statistic ηt on future values of zt. Table 3.2 displays the estimated
coefficients of the asymmetric GARCH model (3.4): as expected, the coefficient aˆ does not
statistically differ from zero, whereas βˆ is significant for all companies and takes values
between 0.4 and 1.7. The coefficient γˆ related to the leverage effect in (3.4) is positive for
almost all companies.
3 [2] introduced the name leverage effect and suggested that a large negative return increases the financial
and operating leverage, and raises equity return volatility; see also [10]. [7] suggested an alternative
explanation based on market risk premium and volatility feedback effects; see also the more recent
discussion by [1]. We shall use the name leverage effect as it is commonly used by researchers when
referring to the asymmetric reaction of volatility to positive and negative return innovations.
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3.2.2 Predictability of filtered statistic
In this section we empirically test the predictability of the (filtered) statistic ηt on the
future return innovations zt. The main interest is focused on the differences between the
conditional distribution and its unconditional counterpart. We test the predictive power
at several levels when considering future movements of the idiosyncratic noise zt. More
precisely, for every company in our sample, we first measure the future idiosyncratic ac-
tivities of the return process during a time-window of n days by computing indicators z¯t
such as
z¯t :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
zt+i, z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n}, z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n}. (3.5)
We now test the impact of the statistic innovations ηt on the future return innovations
zt by comparing F uncond(z¯t) := P[Z¯t ≤ z¯t], the unconditional distribution of z¯t, with
F cond(z¯t|ηt) := P[Z¯t ≤ z¯t|ηt], the conditional distribution of z¯t, when conditioning on the
filtered statistic ηt. We estimate unconditional probability distributions using standard
quantile regression methods as used in [17], whereas we estimate conditional probability
distributions non-parametrically using the local polynomial regression model of the ad-
justed Nadaraya Watson estimator and the bootstrap method proposed by [16]. This last
procedure, which is less common than quantile regression, is recalled in the appendix.
Define furthermore
T highα := {t; ηt > qηα} , T lowα := {t; ηt < qηα}, (3.6)
with qηα being the α-quantile of the filtered statistic innovation ηt. Intuitively, for high
values of α, say 90%, the set T highα contains all days on which the (filtered) imbalance
between new issued puts and calls was unusually high. In the opposite case, when α is
low, say 10%, days on which the number of new calls massively prevails over the number
of new puts belongs to the set T lowα .
In order to get a measure of how the distribution of z¯t changes when moving from the
unconditional to the conditional setting, we proceed as follows: we define the unconditional
distribution F uncond(z¯t) as being the benchmark distribution. Next, we divide its domain
into four regions:
R1 := (−∞, qFuncond0.40 ], R2 := (qF
uncond
0.40 , q
Funcond
0.50 ], (3.7)
R3 := (qF
uncond
0.50 , q
Funcond
0.60 ], R4 := (q
Funcond
0.60 ,∞), (3.8)
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where qF
uncond
α denotes the α-quantile of the unconditional distributions. For F
cond(z¯t|ηt)
we compute now the probability mass falling into the regions Ri, i = 1, ..., 4. By construc-
tion, 40%, 10%, 10% resp. 40% of F uncond(z¯t) will fall into R1, R2, R3, resp. R4. Intuitively,
if the statistic It has predictive power on future stock returns, R1 should contain more
probability mass for days in T highα and less for days in T lowα . For the region R4 the opposite
should hold. In the next section we discuss our results.
3.2.2.1 Test on the causality direction
Before testing the predictability of our statistic ηt on the future values of zt, we check
whether the causality direction we are conjecturing is correct: it might be the case that
predictive power is induced by reverse causality, that is past returns innovations zt, might
explain future behavior of the filtered statistic ηt. To investigate this point we proceed as
follows. First we filter ηt using an AR(5) model
ηt = a0 +
5∑
j=1
bj ηt−j + ²t
and then we regress the filtered statistic ²t on past returns innovations
²t = α0 +
5∑
j=1
(βj zt−j + γj z2t−j) + µt.
The first regression is necessary to remove possible autocorrelations in ηt which could bias
the results. The second regression investigates whether past returns innovations influence
the future development of ηt. This procedure is repeated for each stock in our database.
The corresponding t-statistics and F-test for the null hypothesis of insignificant regression
coefficients are reported in Table 3.3. Overall past stock returns innovations do not appear
to explain future values of the filtered open interest statistic. These findings confirm the
causality direction we are interested in4.
3.3 Data
Options data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and provided by
OptionMetrics. Stock prices are downloaded as well from OptionMetrics to avoid non-
synchronicity issues between options and stock prices. Stock splits and spin-offs are elimi-
nated using information from the CRSP database. We eliminate obvious data errors such
4 Note that this can be traced back to the different filtering procedures as well.
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as open interest reported at zero for all existing options by excluding these days from our
analysis. The companies analyzed belong to several industrial sectors. In alphabetical or-
der these are: American Airlines (AMR), AT&T (ATT), AXA (AXA), Boeing (BA), Bank
of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Delta Air Lines (DAL), Hewlett Packard (HPQ), J.P.
Morgan (JPM), KLM (KLM), Coca-Cola (KO), Lockheed Martin (LMT), Merrill Lynch
(MER), Marsh & McLennan Companies(MMC), Philip Morris (MO), Monsanto (MON),
Morgan Stanley (MWD), Rockwell Automation, Inc. (ROK), United Airlines (UAL) and
United Technologies Corp. (UTX). Most sample data range from January 1996 to April
2006. Options data for DAL and KLM are available only for somehow shorter periods. In
equation (3.4), the S&P500 is taken as an approximation for the market.
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Predictability on the mean of the return innovation
We investigate whether or not our filtered statistic ηt conveys information on the future
unsystematic shocks of returns. Before applying the procedure described in the previous
section, we test the predictive power of the statistic ηt on z¯t := 1n
n∑
i=1
zt+1 as a preliminary
result, by looking at its conditional mean for days belonging to T highα and T lowα . Intuitively,
if the statistic ηt conveys information about future movements of the idiosyncratic return
zt, we expect the mean of the time-series z¯t˜ to be negative for t˜ ∈ T highα and α high, and
positive when t˜ ∈ T lowα for low values of α. Formally, the null hypothesis that filtered ηt
has no impact on the filtered stock returns zt can be formalized as
H0 : E[z¯t|ηt > qηα] = 0, (3.9)
where qηα is α-quantile of ηt. In our empirical application we set n = 5, corresponding
to a trading week. Under the GARCH model (3.4), the innovations zt are approximately
iid, and we can then test the null hypothesis (3.9) by simply regressing the conditional
innovations, z¯t|ηt > qηα, on a constant, and testing whether the constant is significantly
away from zero. We also study whether low values of the filtered statistic ηt have an impact
on future idiosyncratic shocks, testing H0 : E[z¯t|ηt < qηα] = 0.
Table 3.4 shows the conditional average of the innovations and the p-values of the
regressions for each stock in our database when conditioning on ηt takes place. With
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respect to the unconditional mean, all values are statistically non-different from zero (high
p-values). The conditional means tend to exhibit a different behavior: after days belonging
to T highα , the mean of the innovations computed over a window of five trading days tends to
be negative and vice versa when we look at days in T lowα . Hence our statistic seems to have
predictive power for the expected value of future idiosyncratic shocks of most companies.
As a robustness check we repeat the previous analyses testing the null hypothesis (3.9) for
different values of n. We obtain similar results which are not reported here, but available
from the authors upon request. All additional analyses confirm that the previous results
are quite robust with respect to the choice of the filtering procedure for ηt and the length
of the time window n.
3.4.2 Predictability on the whole distribution of the return innovation
In the previous subsection, the predictability of the (filtered) open interest statistic ηt
on the mean of zt has been tested. In the following section we analyze the impact of
the statistic on the whole distribution function of zt. We are therefore interested in the
impact of ηt not only on the mean, the location parameter, but especially on the shape
and scale properties of the conditional distribution. In particular, the main interest is on
the behavior of the conditional distribution with respect to the unconditional one, and
how key characteristics of the involved distribution functions change when conditioning
on the filtered statistic ηt. For the three measures of activities in the idiosyncratic process
zt defined in equation (3.5), we compute the unconditional distribution F uncond(z¯t) via
quantile regression and its conditional distributions F cond(z¯t) using the non-parametric
method of local polynomial regression model and the bootstrap method proposed by Hall,
Wolff, and Yao (1999). We use the bootstrap procedure for the choice of the optimal
bandwidth. In quantile regression, one needs to start with an arbitrary grid of points
qk in the unit interval (having the meaning of the quantiles qk := F (z¯kt )), and compute
the corresponding z¯kt , k = 1, ...,K. We choose equidistant points qk, such that q1 =
0.001, q1000 = 1 and ∆q := qk − qk−1 = 0.001. The non-parametric method of local
polynomial regression model computes the corresponding quantiles qk, k = 1, ...,K for a
given grid of points z¯kt . For technical reasons, we truncate the domain of attainable values
for z¯kt even though this would be the whole real line. Clearly, the graphical representation
of the cumulative distribution function is given by the plot (z¯k, qk)k=1,...,K . Our main
results are described by several statistical quantities of the unconditional and conditional
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distributions. For the unconditional and conditional distributions, we report the percentile
values in steps of 10%, the probability mass falling into the regions R1, ..., R4 and key
values such as the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. Approximations for the latter are
computed by substituting integrals through Riemann sums. Generally, for a given function
G, we have
E[G(Z¯)] :=
∞∫
−∞
G(z¯)dF (z¯) =
1∫
0
G(F−1(q))dq ≈
K∑
k=1
G(z¯k)(qk+1 − qk). (3.10)
For the mean estimation of µˆ, one needs to choose G(x) := x, for the variance σˆ2 G(x) :=
(x− µˆ)2, for the skewness G(x) := (x− µˆ)3/σˆ3 and for the kurtosis G(x) := (x− µˆ)4/σˆ4.
We can easily do the calculations in equation (3.10) once we have computed the series of
estimated points (z¯kt , qk)k=1,...,K , as previously described.
Tables 3.5 and 3.7 report our results when using the three measures of activities in
the idiosyncratic process zt defined in equation (3.5). We show the complete and detailed
results for a small number of companies only. Tables for the missing companies are avail-
able upon request from the authors and do not significantly differ from the ones shown
here. In order to efficiently present and summarize our findings, we compute in Tables 3.6
and 3.8 the average difference across companies between the statistical quantities (per-
centiles, probability mass falling into the regions R1, ..., R4 and key values as the mean,
variance, skewness and kurtosis) when moving from the unconditional to the conditional
distribution.
3.4.3 Predictive power of the statistic ηt on z¯t := 1n
n∑
i=1
zt+i
Following the procedure described in the previous section, we report the result of our
analysis when looking at the impact of ηt on the first measure defined in equation (3.5),
z¯t := 1n
n∑
i=1
zt+i. Table 3.5 displays the results for companies AMR, ATT, DAL, LMT and
MWD. By conditioning on four different levels of ηt, we estimated the whole distribution
function non-parametrically using the local polynomial regression method. The first four
companies are quite representative of our conjecture with respect to the impact of the
statistic ηt on the future values of the idiosyncratic shocks zt. For some of the companies
analyzed the results are less indicative, as in the case of MWD. For the majority of the
companies analyzed, lower percentiles of the conditional distribution functions tend to be
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smaller than their corresponding unconditional counterparts after days belonging to T highα .
Skewness and mean are lower as well, meaning that high values of ηt tend to be followed on
average by low values of the idiosyncratic noise zt. After days in T lowα , the opposite holds
for high percentiles, which are generally above their corresponding values of the uncondi-
tional distribution. As a consequence, skewness of the conditional distribution increases,
thereby shifting some probability mass into the region R4. LMT represents this behavior
well: when conditioning on the 5% quantiles of the statistic ηt, the probability mass falling
into R1 decreases from 40% to 29.3%. The difference of 10.7%, together with a decrease of
3.5% in R3, goes almost completely in favor of R4, which increases by 13.8% and reaches
the value of 53.8%. Mean and skewness increase taking values of 0.139 resp. 0.241 in the
conditional case. In the opposite situation, when conditioning on the 90% quantile of ηt,
there is an exchange of probability mass from R4 together with R2 into R1: R4 and R2 cede
together 7.8% of probability mass, the majority of which moves into the left part of the
distribution and increases R1 by 6%. The mean of the conditional distribution moves away
from its unconditional counterpart and becomes negative. Skewness passes from its uncon-
ditional value of 0.215 to −1.013. For the majority of the remaining companies the results
are similar. Obviously, in some special cases, the differences between the unconditional
and conditional distribution are weaker and less indicative. This can be seen on Table 3.6
where we summarize our result: for all statistic quantities analyzed (percentiles, mean,
skewness, variance, kurtosis and probability mass falling into the regions Ri), we compute
the absolute difference with their corresponding unconditional counterparts and calculate
the average changes across the companies analyzed. On average, percentiles of the condi-
tional distributions tend to be above/below the unconditional ones after days belonging
to T lowα /T highα . The average changes for the mean and variance are positive/negative when
ηt is low/high. With respect to the probability mass falling into the regions Ri, the upper
region R4 increases when ηt is low. The corresponding probability mass comes form R1
and R3 which decrease in value. In the opposite case, when ηt is high, R4 and R2 cede
some of their probability mass, the majority of which goes in favor of R1 thereby increasing
its value. All the given results support the conjecture that the statistic ηt has predictive
power on the future values of the idiosyncratic noise zt. At the bottom of Table 3.6, we
present the results of a simulation study. This simulation aims to analyze whether our
results are coincidental or indeed due to the predictive power of our statistic. The main
idea is to compute the differences in percentiles between the unconditional distribution of
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z¯t and the “conditional” distribution based on 260 randomly chosen days in our sample
5. Therefore we simply substitute the values computed for days in T lowα resp. T highα with
arbitrary values of our sample and analyze the consequences. If the differences between the
unconditional and “conditional” distribution exhibit the same patterns as when analyzing
days belonging to T lowα resp. T highα , we have to conclude that the impact of the statistic
ηt on the idiosyncratic noise zt was a coincidence. In Table 3.6 we show the result of this
simulation study when repeating N = 1000 times this simulation for every company and
finally averaging across all companies. The differences obtained in percentiles are negligi-
ble. These results confirm therefore that after days in T lowα resp. T highα , the distribution
of the mean of the statistic z¯t indeed changes significantly. Our results are therefore not
coincidental, but due in fact to the predictive power of the statistic ηt.
3.4.4 Predictive power of the statistic ηt on z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n} resp.
z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n}.
The analysis of the previous sections suggests that our statistic ηt has an impact on the
future values of zt. In particular, when the filtered imbalance ηt between new issued puts
and calls is high, the mean of the idiosyncratic noise zt over a time-window of five trading
days tends to be negative and vice versa when ηt is low. The reason for which the time
series z¯t exhibits such behavior remains an open question. We can think of at least two
different scenarios: in the first one, the reason for the negative average after a high value
of ηt could be a consequence of the fact that the majority of the five subsequent noises
tend to be negative. In the second scenario, the negative mean could be attributed to one
(or a few) unusually low negative level, whereas the remaining values could be positive as
well. In the case that the statistic ηt is low, the opposite situation could occur. In the first
scenario, we would conclude that high values of the statistic ηt are able to predict a series
of (small) negative noises zt. In the second case, a high level of ηt tends to be followed
by an extremely low value of zt. When the statistic ηt reaches a low value, our conclusion
is reversed. We find empirical evidence for the second scenario. For both measures of
future activities z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n} resp. z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n} we estimate both
unconditional distributions (for the minimum and maximum noise zt in a subsequent
trading window of five days) and their counterparts when conditioning on statistic ηt (the
5 When conditioning on the 10% resp. 90% quantile of ηt, the selected days are approximately 260, since
the total observations in our sample corresponds to 2600.
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conditional distribution of the minimum for days belonging to T highα and the conditional
distribution of the maximum for days in T lowα ). As in the previous section, we compute the
same statistic quantities and measure the predictive power of ηt by analyzing the changes
between unconditional and conditional distributions. We summarize our results in Table
3.7 where we show the concrete computations for the cases of AMR, ATT and AXA, and in
Table 3.8 which displays the average behavior across all companies analyzed. The effect of
conditioning on ηt is appreciable. After days with a strong imbalance between new issued
put and call options, the minimum resp. maximum of the idiosyncratic noise zt over the
following five trading days tends to change probability distribution. After days belonging to
T highα , an extremely low value for zt is more likely to occur than in the unconditional case.
The opposite holds for days belonging to T lowα , which tend to be followed by a higher value
of zt than in their unconditional counterpart. Here we briefly discuss some results found for
AXA. Corresponding Tables 3.7 provides numerical details and additional interpretations
for the remaining companies. When observing the distribution of z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n}
after days belonging to T lowα , the (high) percentiles tend to be above their unconditional
counterparts thus shifting the mean to the right and moving a significant probability mass
from R1 to R4, thereby increasing its value to 52.80%. In the conditional case, values of
z¯t over the 60% percentiles of the unconditional distribution are therefore likely to occur
12.80% more often than during normal times. When looking at z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n},
the opposite behavior can be observed after days belonging to T highα : when ηt is at its
90% quantile, R4 is ceding 11.9% of its probability mass, the majority of which goes in
favor of R1. Its value increases by 8.8%, making low values of z¯t more likely to occur
in the conditional case than in the unconditional case. Low percentiles of the conditional
distribution tend to be lower than their unconditional counterparts. We report the average
changes across the different companies in Table 3.8. After days in T lowα , the probability
of z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n} exceeding the 60% percentile of its unconditional distribution
increases on average by 10%, whereas values under the unconditional 40% percentiles are
less likely to occur. In the opposite case, after days in T highα z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n}
tends to reach values under the 40% unconditional percentile with an average probability
of 51%. Such values are therefore 11% more likely to occur in the conditional case than
in the unconditional scenario. All these results support the conjecture that days with a
strong imbalance between new issued put and call options are likely to be followed by
an unusually low idiosyncratic noise in case of T highα , respectively high level after days
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belonging to T lowα . In order to test the reliability of our results and the predictive power
of statistic ηt, we repeat the same simulation study as proposed in the previous section for
the case of z¯t := min{zt+1, ..., zt+n} resp. z¯t := max{zt+1, ..., zt+n}. We report these results
at the bottom of Table 3.8 and indicate that after days belonging to T lowα resp. T highα , the
distributions of the statistics z¯t indeed change significantly. Our results are therefore not
coincidental, but due in fact to the predictive power of the statistic ηt.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the informational content of daily changes in open interest. We
first defined a daily statistic which represents the imbalance between new issued put and
call options. Second, we computed three different measures for future market activities: the
mean, the maximum and the minimum of the idiosyncratic noise of the return process over
a time-window of 5 trading days. We then analyzed the predictive power of our statistic
on these three measures. We found sufficient informational content of our statistic: when
conditioning on high/low levels of imbalances between new puts and calls, the distribution
functions of all three measures showed significant changes compared to their unconditional
counterparts. These differences turned out to be more pronounced when looking at the
minimum and maximum idiosyncratic noise over the following 5 trading days: when the
number of new issued put options is large compared to the number of new calls, the
conditional distribution function becomes heavier on the left side and a large drop in
the idiosyncratic return noise is more likely to follow. In the opposite scenario, when the
statistic exhibits a large imbalance in favor of call options, the idiosyncratic return noise
tends to be higher than after calm days. Our findings confirm the informational content of
large daily changes in open interest. Results based on high frequency data are likely to lead
to deeper and more detailed results, enhancing our understanding of how new information
is possibly reflected in asset prices and how option market variables and subsequent price
movements are linked to each other.
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aˆ t-stat bˆ t-stat ωˆ βˆ αˆ γˆ
AMR 0.0004 0.5194 1.4431 22.2172 0.0000 0.9675 0.0047 0.0447
ATT -0.0006 -1.3389 0.9178 23.5497 0.0000 0.8679 0.1001 0.0639
AXA 0.0003 0.6842 1.5150 33.9267 0.0000 0.9442 0.0423 0.0171
BA 0.0002 0.5636 0.8684 27.0752 0.0000 0.9819 0.0062 0.0208
BAC 0.0002 0.8012 1.0653 40.6914 0.0000 0.9568 0.0426 0.0000
C 0.0003 1.1289 1.4175 54.6943 0.0000 0.9487 0.0402 0.0221
DAL -0.0014 -1.9927 1.2682 21.6157 0.0000 0.9637 0.0000 0.0577
HPQ 0.0001 0.1270 1.3615 33.1175 0.0000 0.9813 0.0112 0.0046
JPM 0.0000 -0.0285 1.4395 47.6717 0.0000 0.9686 0.0299 0.0031
KLM -0.0008 -1.2120 0.6732 13.0022 0.0000 0.8913 0.0648 0.0435
KO 0.0000 -0.1452 0.6141 23.4202 0.0000 0.9360 0.0409 0.0460
LMT 0.0003 0.8492 0.4178 12.9810 0.0000 0.9831 0.0111 0.0115
MER 0.0005 1.3333 1.5757 50.9392 0.0000 0.9699 0.0213 0.0174
MMC 0.0001 0.4466 1.0225 36.2551 0.0000 0.8004 0.0993 0.0000
MON 0.0012 2.0802 0.6732 13.7436 0.0000 0.9340 0.0424 0.0222
MWD 0.0004 1.0488 1.7076 52.0687 0.0000 0.9336 0.0290 0.0624
ROK 0.0002 0.3990 0.8786 22.2236 0.0000 0.9520 0.0000 0.0960
UAL -0.0013 -1.2928 1.0383 12.7934 0.0001 0.7129 0.1112 0.2960
UTX 0.0005 1.6596 0.9553 35.0925 0.0000 0.9840 0.0160 0.0000
MO 0.0004 0.9509 0.5022 14.5554 0.0000 0.9497 0.0189 0.0536
Table 3.2. Extrapolation of the return innovations zt using the asymmetric GARCH specification
as described in equation (3.4): rt = a+ b rM,t+ εt, εt = σtzt, σ2t = ω+βσ
2
t−1+αε
2
t−1+ γJt−1ε
2
t−1.
The coefficient aˆ does not statistically differ from zero, whereas βˆ is significant for all companies
and takes values between 0.4 and 1.7. The coefficient γˆ related to the leverage effect in (3.4) is
positive for almost all companies.
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αˆ0 βˆ1 γˆ1 βˆ2 γˆ2 βˆ3 γˆ3 βˆ4 γˆ4 βˆ5 γˆ5 F-test
AMR -0.427 -0.663 -0.149 0.562 1.203 1.383 0.365 -0.770 -1.742 -0.338 2.416 1.313
ATT -0.281 -0.221 0.423 0.300 -0.338 -0.299 0.399 -0.215 0.120 1.310 0.646 0.288
AXA 0.511 1.525 -0.989 -0.512 -0.010 -0.251 -0.958 0.242 -0.632 -0.400 1.309 0.673
BA -0.405 0.409 -0.159 -0.106 0.704 0.185 0.404 -0.075 0.150 1.940 0.238 0.463
BAC -0.067 0.825 0.241 0.290 -0.149 -0.003 0.364 -0.103 -0.702 1.074 0.486 0.248
C 0.486 0.900 -0.351 0.502 0.473 0.602 -1.273 -0.096 0.212 2.150 -1.045 0.765
DAL -0.789 -0.003 0.514 0.972 0.718 0.485 1.122 -0.118 1.256 -0.744 1.778 0.990
HPQ -0.163 0.062 0.635 -0.370 -0.942 -0.141 0.907 0.915 -0.031 -0.850 0.102 0.389
JPM -0.275 1.884 0.848 -0.525 0.256 0.601 0.798 1.549 0.967 0.356 -1.229 0.945
KLM -0.335 -0.239 1.686 -0.313 -0.741 -0.143 0.181 0.103 -1.102 0.946 1.147 0.691
KO -0.891 0.659 0.176 -0.009 1.341 0.147 -0.330 0.435 0.300 2.878 1.084 1.212
LMT 0.216 0.195 -1.400 -0.194 0.218 -0.214 0.644 0.409 -1.154 -1.026 0.847 0.509
MER 0.090 2.110 -1.183 -0.632 0.783 -0.118 -0.294 -0.635 1.455 1.165 -1.023 1.031
MMC -0.135 1.178 0.174 0.355 -0.489 0.480 -0.447 -0.126 0.893 -0.650 0.905 0.554
MON -0.448 0.560 1.778 -1.876 -1.385 1.348 1.088 0.764 0.284 0.794 -0.330 1.092
MWD -0.541 0.732 1.588 -0.306 1.156 -0.097 1.496 -0.004 -1.796 0.796 -0.568 1.141
ROK 0.026 -0.531 -0.130 -0.632 -0.553 0.054 0.066 0.909 0.509 -0.467 -0.225 0.182
UAL -0.538 -0.024 0.666 0.157 -1.357 2.013 3.709 0.875 0.330 0.321 0.068 1.784
UTX -0.180 0.873 0.506 0.255 0.154 0.598 0.536 0.910 0.267 0.382 -0.362 0.242
MO 0.752 0.427 -1.496 0.452 -0.285 -0.264 0.313 -0.159 0.227 -1.473 -1.328 0.690
Table 3.3. Causality direction test: we first use the regression model ηt = a0 +
5∑
j=1
bjηt−j + ²t in
order to remove possible autocorrelations in ηt which could bias the results. With the model ²t =
α0+
5∑
j=1
(βjzt−j +γjz2t−j)+µt we investigate whether past returns innovations influence the future
development of the statistic ηt. The corresponding t-statistics and F-test for the null hypothesis
of insignificant regression coefficients are reported. Overall, past stock returns innovations do not
appear to explain future values of the filtered open interest statistic.
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Unconditional mean Conditional mean
Q-5% Q-10% Q-90% Q-95%
mean p-value mean p-value mean p-value mean p-value mean p-value
AMR -0.019 0.029 0.042 0.041 0.071 0.055 -0.125 0.039 -0.107 0.048
ATT 0.001 0.919 0.054 0.001 0.076 0.035 -0.063 0.096 -0.081 0.044
AXA -0.002 0.794 0.071 0.016 0.059 0.009 -0.035 0.155 -0.024 0.454
BA 0.001 0.879 0.122 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.082 0.002 0.084 0.018
BAC -0.002 0.775 -0.016 0.523 0.034 0.062 -0.004 0.847 -0.003 0.912
C -0.003 0.588 0.017 0.448 0.022 0.362 -0.025 0.144 -0.034 0.185
DAL -0.002 0.837 0.063 0.057 0.072 0.003 -0.034 0.138 -0.044 0.220
HPQ -0.002 0.812 -0.010 0.152 -0.075 0.268 -0.119 0.000 -0.101 0.002
JPM 0.001 0.882 -0.001 0.981 0.040 0.077 0.022 0.347 0.034 0.253
KLM -0.005 0.648 -0.033 0.021 -0.021 0.042 -0.075 0.034 -0.122 0.017
KO 0.000 0.968 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.005 -0.039 0.047 -0.005 0.860
LMT 0.002 0.701 0.139 0.000 0.112 0.000 -0.115 0.000 -0.096 0.005
MER -0.002 0.796 -0.027 0.327 -0.005 0.811 0.029 0.157 0.004 0.891
MMC -0.003 0.668 0.077 0.008 0.078 0.000 -0.022 0.079 -0.008 0.788
MON 0.003 0.769 -0.078 0.031 -0.054 0.023 -0.037 0.062 -0.057 0.016
MWD -0.004 0.584 -0.013 0.679 0.018 0.393 0.009 0.635 0.025 0.380
ROK -0.003 0.748 0.026 0.011 0.060 0.021 -0.020 0.039 -0.047 0.083
SPX 0.000 0.463 -0.015 0.485 0.000 0.669 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.137
UAL 0.008 0.430 0.081 0.053 -0.078 0.008 0.032 0.072 0.058 0.042
UTX -0.004 0.524 -0.053 0.028 0.019 0.318 -0.019 0.293 -0.003 0.906
MO 0.000 0.945 -0.014 0.048 -0.010 0.047 0.073 0.004 0.086 0.028
Table 3.4. Regression analysis: zmeant when conditioning on several levels of ηt. We test the null
hypothesis that filtered ηt has no impact on the filtered stock returns zt: H0 : E[z¯t|ηt > qηα] = 0,
where qηα is α-quantile of ηt. We can test the null hypothesis by simply regressing the conditional
innovations, z¯t|ηt > qηα, on a constant, and testing whether the constant is significantly away
from zero. We also study whether low values of the filtered statistic ηt have an impact on future
idiosyncratic shocks, testing H0 : E[z¯t|ηt < qηα] = 0. We report the conditional average of the
innovations and the p-values of the regressions for each stock in our database when conditioning
on ηt takes place. With respect to the unconditional mean, all values are statistically significant
non-different from zero (high p-values). The conditional means tend to exhibit a different behavior:
after days belonging to T highα , the mean of the innovations computed over a window of five trading
days tends to be negative and vice versa when we look at days in T lowα .
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Average results for conditional mean
percentiles
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Q-5% 0.087 0.072 0.058 0.034 0.023 0.028 0.041 0.062 0.089
Q-10% 0.114 0.081 0.057 0.034 0.020 0.031 0.047 0.075 0.093
Q-90% -0.124 -0.067 -0.045 -0.029 -0.009 -0.030 -0.057 -0.077 -0.116
Q-95% -0.116 -0.094 -0.053 -0.037 -0.008 -0.026 -0.042 -0.065 -0.085
descriptive statistics cond. vs. uncond. distribution
mean variance skewness kurtosis R1 R2 R3 R4
Q-5% 0.062 -0.005 0.771 -5.426 -6.32% 4.87% -1.19% 2.64%
Q-10% 0.076 -0.012 1.009 -5.130 -6.55% 4.10% -0.96% 3.41%
Q-90% -0.078 -0.001 -0.599 -3.856 5.55% -2.39% 2.28% -5.44%
Q-95% -0.082 0.019 -0.400 -5.663 4.27% -2.90% 2.39% -3.76%
Robustness checks for mean
percentiles
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
4.4E-06 0.000765 0.000422 -0.00017 0.000315 -0.00036 0.000049 -0.00063 0.000392
Table 3.6. Summary of distribution of zmeant when conditioning on several levels of ηt. We report
the average differences across companies between the statistical quantities (percentiles, probability
mass falling into the regions R1, ..., R4 and key values as the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis)
when moving from the unconditional to the conditional distribution. The robustness check consists
of computing the differences in percentiles between the unconditional distribution of z¯t and the
“conditional” distribution based on 260 randomly chosen days in our sample. Therefore, we simply
substitute the values computed for days in T lowα resp. T highα with arbitrary values of our sample
and analyze the consequences.
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Average results for conditional min/max
percentiles
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Q-5% 0.123 0.130 0.142 0.152 0.158 0.171 0.175 0.210 0.186
Q-10% 0.127 0.122 0.133 0.135 0.140 0.161 0.174 0.205 0.192
Q-90% -0.257 -0.176 -0.178 -0.153 -0.205 -0.131 -0.125 -0.115 -0.107
Q-95% -0.344 -0.220 -0.200 -0.171 -0.214 -0.142 -0.134 -0.130 -0.116
descriptive statistics cond. vs. uncond. distribution
mean variance skewness kurtosis R1 R2 R3 R4
Q-5% 0.167 0.050 -0.532 -5.556 -10.43% -0.97% 0.55% 10.85%
Q-10% 0.167 0.094 -0.207 -2.968 -9.89% -0.79% 0.28% 10.40%
Q-90% -0.170 0.153 1.867 -37.715 11.05% 0.04% -0.48% -10.61%
Q-95% -0.207 0.356 2.259 -42.478 11.84% -0.40% -0.15% -11.29%
Robustness checks for min/max
percentiles
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
max 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0015 0.0002 0.0012 0.0024 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0013
min 0.0003 0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0017 0.0012
Table 3.8. Summary of distribution of zmint , resp. zmaxt when conditioning on several levels of ηt.
We report the average differences across companies between the statistical quantities (percentiles,
probability mass falling into the regions R1, ..., R4 and key values as the mean, variance, skewness
and kurtosis) when moving from the unconditional to the conditional distribution. The robustness
check consists of computing the differences in percentiles between the unconditional distribution
of zmint , resp. zmaxt and the “conditional” distribution based on 260 randomly chosen days in our
sample. Therefore, we simply substitute the values computed for days in T lowα resp. T highα with
arbitrary values of our sample and analyze the consequences.
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Figure 3.1. Imbalance statistic It := Φ
(
It−mean(It)
std(It)
)
, with It :=
OIP,t−OIP,t−1
OIP,t−1
− OIC,t−OIC,t−1OIC,t−1 ,
and statistic innovations ηt, where It = a0 +
∑n
j=1(bj rt−j + cj r
2
t−j + dj It−j) + ηt for American
Airlines (AMR). OIP,t and OIC,t represent the total option open interest at day t across all available
maturities and strikes. During the marked days, according to Chesney, Crameri and Mancini (2009),
informed trading activities take place on the options market.
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Figure 3.2. The first plot shows the daily raw returns rt of MER stock. The second plot shows the
idiosyncratic noise zt of MER stock estimated using model (3.4), which filters out market influence
and volatility clustering from the raw returns: rt = a + b rM,t + εt, σ2t = ω + βσ
2
t−1 + αε
2
t−1 +
γJt−1ε2t−1, where rM,t is the market return (thereafter approximated by the S&P 500), εt = σt zt,
zt ∼ f(0, 1) and Jt−1 = 1, when εt−1 < 0 and Jt−1 = 0, otherwise.
134 Remo Crameri
References
[1] G. Bekaert and G. Wu. Asymmetric volatility and risk in equity markets. Review of
Financial Studies, 13:1–42, 2000.
[2] Fisher Black. Studies of stock market volatility changes. In Proceedings of the 1976
Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistic
Section, pages 177–181, 1976.
[3] Tim Bollerslev. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of
Econometrics, 31:307–327, 1986.
[4] Tim Bollerslev, R. Y. Chou, and K. F. Kroner. Arch modeling in finance—a review
of the theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Econometrics, 52:5–59, 1992.
[5] Tim Bollerslev, Robert F. Engle, and D. B. Nelson. Arch models. In Robert F.
Engle and D. L. McFadden, editors, Handbook of Econometrics, pages 2959–3038.
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1994.
[6] Tim Bollerslev and J. M. Wooldridge. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation and in-
ference in dynamic models with time varying covariances. Economics Letters, 12:143–
172, 1992.
[7] John Y. Campbell and Ludger Hentschel. No news is good news: An asymmetric model
of changing volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 31:281–318,
1992.
[8] Kalok Chan, Peter Chung, and Wai Fong. The informational role of stock and option
volume. Review of Financial Studies, 15:1049–1075, 2002.
[9] Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri, and Loriano Mancini. Detecting informed trading
activities in the options markets. Working paper, 2009. University of Zurich.
[10] A. Christie. The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: Value, leverage and
interest rate effects. Journal of Financial Economics, 10:407–432, 1982.
[11] David Easley, Maureen O’Hara, and P. Srinivas. Option volume and stock prices:
Evidence on where informed traders trade. Journal of Finance, 53:431–465, 1998.
[12] Robert F. Engle. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the
variance of united kingdom inflation. Econometrica, 50:987–1007, 1982.
[13] Ruediger Fahlenbrach and Patrik Sandasz. Does information drive trading in option
strategies’. Working paper, 2006. Ohio State University, University of Virginia.
3 Informational Content of the Daily Imbalance Between Put and Call Options 135
[14] Eric Ghysels, A. C. Harvey, and Eric Renault. Stochastic volatility. In G. S. Mad-
dala and C. R. Rao, editors, Handbook of Statistics, pages 119–191. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1996.
[15] Lawrence R. Glosten, Ravi Jagannathan, and David E. Runkle. On the relation
between the expected value and the volatility of the nominal excess return on stocks.
Journal of Finance, 48:1779–1801, 1993.
[16] Peter Hall, Rodney Wolff, and Qiwei Yao. Methods for estimating a conditional
distribution function. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94:154–163,
1999.
[17] Roger Koenker and Kevin Hallock. Quantile regression. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 15:143–156, 2001.
[18] Josef Lakonishok, Inmoo Lee, Neil Pearson, and Allen Poteshman. Option market
activity. Review of Financial Studies, 20:813–857, 2007.
[19] T. Launois and H. Van Oppens. Informed trading around corporate event announce-
ments: Stock vs. options. Working paper, 2003. Louvain school of management.
[20] Adrian Pagan and Amman Ullah. Non parametric econometrics. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 1999.
[21] Jun Pan and Allen Poteshman. The information in option volume for future stock
prices. Review of Financial Studies, 19:871–908, 2006.
[22] Allen Poteshman. Unusual option market activity and the terrorist attacks of septem-
ber 11, 2001. Journal of Business, 79:1703–1726, 2006.
[23] Neil Shephard. Statistical aspects of arch and stochastic volatility. In D. R. Cox, Ole E.
Barndorff-Nielsen, and David V. Hinkley, editors, Time Series Models in Economet-
rics, Finance, and other Fields, pages 1–67. Chapman & Hall, London, 1996.
[24] M. Wand and M. Jones. Kernel smoothing. Chapman&Hall, CRC, 1995.
A Non-parametric estimation of conditional distribution function
Non-parametric regression is often used as an alternative to ordinary least squares regres-
sion when the relationship between Y andX exhibits nonlinearity. Although this technique
is mostly used for the estimation of the conditional mean of Y given that the exogenous
variable X takes on a particular value x, making use of the fact that the expected value
of an indicator function equals its probability, Nadaraya and Watson derived an estimator
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for the conditional distribution function. For our purposes we use the so-called adjusted
Nadaraya-Watson estimator, which differs slightly from the original estimator by introduc-
ing the weights wi. The main reason for this choice is that the estimator for the conditional
distribution F (y|x) must be monotonic in y and takes value in the unit interval, proper-
ties which are no longer guaranteed when using the unmodified and original version of the
estimator. We introduce the bivariate estimator in the following section.
A.1 The adjusted Nadaraya-Watson estimator
Let {Xt, Yt}Tt=1 be observations from a strictly stationarity process where Yt is a scalar
variable and Xt := (X1,t, X2,t) a vector of exogenous variables. Defining Zt := 1{Yt≤y}, the
conditional distribution function F (y|x) := P(Yt ≤ y|x) can be computed as E[Zt|Xt =
xt]. Following [16], the adjusted Nadaraya-Watson reads
F˜ (y|x)NW =
T∑
t=1
Ztwt(x)KH(Xt − x)
T∑
t=1
wt(x)KH(Xt − x)
. (3.11)
where {wt(x)}Tt=1 are chosen to maximize
T∏
t=1
wt(x) under the restrictions that wt(x) ≥
0,
T∑
t=1
wt(x) = 1 and
T∑
t=1
wt(x)(Xm,t− xm)KH(Xt−x) = 0 for m = 1, 2. Here the function
KH(.) denotes a multivariate kernel with bandwidth matrixH, which needs to be specified
later on. As noted by [16], it is useful to view the estimator as the local linear estimator of
F (y|x) with weights KH(Xt − x) replaced by wt(x)KH(Xt − x). Therefore we can easily
show that the adjusted Nadaraya-Watson corresponds to the coefficient a of the following
maximization problem derived when using the standard local linear estimator procedure:
max
a,b
T∑
t=1
(Zt − a− (Xt − x)b)2wt(x)KH(Xt − x). (3.12)
Some properties of this estimator (such as bias and variance) can be found in [20] pp.
96-104.
The implementation of the estimator F˜ (y|x) requires a number of practical issues that
must be analyzed. In particular, we need to compute the weights wt(x) and specify the
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(bivariate) kernel function KH(x) := |H|−1K(H−1x). We carry out the computation of
wt(x) by using the standard Lagrange Multiplier methodology. More precisely, given the
objective function
T∏
t=1
wt(x) and its constraints (see above) the Lagrangian reads
L =
T∑
t=1
lnwt(x)− λ0
( T∑
t=1
wt(x)− 1
)
(3.13)
−
2∑
m=1
λm
T∑
t=1
wt(x)(Xm,t − xm)KH(Xt − x). (3.14)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to wt(x), we get the first order condition
1
wt(x)
− λ0 −
2∑
m=1
λm(Xm,t − xm)KH(Xt − x) = 0, (3.15)
holding for t = 1, ..., T .
It can be easily shown (using the conditions
T∑
t=1
wt(x) = 1 and
T∑
t=1
wt(x)(Xm,t −
xm)KH(Xt − x) = 0) that λ0 = T . Furthermore, λm for m = 1, 2 satisfies (eliminating
wt(x) by using the same conditions)
T∑
t=1
(Xm,t − xm)KH(Xt − x)
T +
2∑
m=1
λm
T∑
t=1
(Xm,t − xm)KH(Xt − x)
= 0. (3.16)
These equations are solved numerically. Note that the solution (λ1, λ2) depends on the
level of conditioning x, even though this was not explicitly expressed in the above calcu-
lations. Having now λm for m = 1, 2, the weights wt(x) are computed using the first order
condition. It follows
wt(x) =
1
T +
2∑
m=1
λm(Xm,t − xm)KH(Xt − x)
, (3.17)
for t = 1, ..., T .
For the kernel function we choose the bivariate normal distribution K(x) := N2(0,1).
It is often noted that the choice of the kernel in smoothing problems is not usually crucial
(for details please consult [24]). In contrast, the choice of the bandwidth matrix H =
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diag(h1, h2) has an important impact on the results of non-parametric regression. Several
procedures have been proposed in the literature. One can choose the bandwidth according
to the bivariate Silverman’s rule (also known as the bivariate normal reference rule).
Specifically, for the exogenous variable i the bandwidth is chosen as hi = T−1/6σˆXi . Note
that this is an objective bandwidth selection procedure which reflects the volatility of
each explanatory variable, denoted by σˆXi for conditioning variable i. Another approach,
based on [16], consists of choosing H(x) = h(x)1M , where 1n is the identity matrix of
dimension n. As this procedure uses effectively only one bandwidth for multiple regressors,
it is advisable to always scale the regressors to a common variance before the estimator
is implemented. The optimal value of h(x) is computed using the bootstrap bandwidth
selection method suggested in [16]. Note that this approach uses a variable bandwidth
dependent on the level of the conditioning variable x. Based on the conclusions made in
[16], we implement the latter approach in this paper and briefly discuss it as follows: Let
us define Xt := (Xt, Zt). Assume that we want to estimate the conditional distribution of
Y on a grid space (y1, ..., yN ) conditioning on X and Z being for example at one of their
20%, 40%, 60% or 80% percentiles. Let us fix the level of conditioning and denote it by
xk := (xk, zk). In the following we explain how the optimal bandwidth h(xk) is selected
for this specific choice of xk.
First, we fit a simple parametric model to the observable data (Yt,Xt), t = 1, ..., T . In
this preliminary version, we choose the simple model
Yt = a0 + a1Xt + a2Zt + a3XtZt + a4X2t + a5Z
2
t + σ²t, (3.18)
where ²t is standard normal and a1, ..., a5, σ are estimated from the observable data
(Yt,Xt). Having estimates aˆ1, ..., aˆ5, σˆ, we compute Fˆ (yn|xk)par for every grid point
yn ∈ (y1, ..., yN ) based on the assumption that ²t ∼ N (0, 1). This leads to the parametric
estimator
Fˆ (yn|xk)par = Φ(yn, µˆk, σˆ), (3.19)
with µˆk = aˆ0+ aˆ1xk+ aˆ2zk+ aˆ3xkzk+ aˆ4x2k+ aˆ5z
2
k and Φ(y, µ, σ) being the cdf of a normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ evaluated at the point y.
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ByMonte Carlo simulations from this model and using the observations (Xt, Zt)t=1,...,T ,
we compute R bootstrap versions (Y ∗1,r, ..., Y ∗T,r)r=1,...,R via
Y ∗t,r = aˆ0 + aˆ1Xt + aˆ2Zt + aˆ3XtZt + aˆ4X
2
t + aˆ5Z
2
t + σˆ²t,r, (3.20)
for t = 1, ..., T . The error term ²t,r is simulated using the empirical error distribution
computed via the observations (Yt, Xt, Zt) and the parametric model previously intro-
duced. For every version of this bootstrap (and for a given value of h, arbitrarily chosen
in advanced), we estimate the conditional distribution Fh(yn|xk) using the implemented
adjusted Nadaraya-Watson estimator giving an estimate F˜h(yn,r|xk)NW (simply replace
the observations (Yt, Xt, Zt) by (Y ∗t,r, Xt, Zt)). Here yn,r indicates that we estimate the con-
ditional probability on the grid point yn using the bootstrap r. For every single grid point
yn we now take the sample average of the absolute deviation errors between the paramet-
ric model Fˆ (yn|xk)par and the adjusted Nadaraya-Watson estimator F˜h(yn,r|xk)NW over
all bootstraps and weight them using the estimate of the parametric model. The optimal
bandwidth hk for the grid point xk is finally defined to be
hk = argmin
h
[ N∑
n=1
Fˆ (yn|xk)par ·
( 1
R
R∑
r=1
∣∣∣Fˆ (yn|xk)par − F˜h(yn,r|xk)NW ∣∣∣)]. (3.21)
4Portfolio Business Activities, Le´vy Returns and
Multivariate Stochastic Risk
Remo Crameri, Markus Leippold, Fabio Trojani
Summary. Multivariate returns of financial assets feature a number of important characteristics.
First, they can jump, leading to multivariate non-normal behavior. Second, their volatilities and
correlations can vary stochastically over time. Third, returns co-move with their volatilities and
correlations, often negatively for equities. Fourth, returns, volatilities and correlations can co-jump,
leading to self-exciting market behavior. We propose a general family of multivariate time changed
Le´vy processes that can simultaneously address these issues using a new class of multivariate time
changes based on a matrix subordination approach. This framework includes as special cases many
models in the literature, gives rise to a variety of new multivariate models and it is similarly simple
to apply using the characteristic function methodology as in the univariate context.
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fusions, Wishart processes, Le´vy processes
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4.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of [9], Brownian motion has been considered the benchmark process
for modeling asset returns in continuous time. However, a number of important departures
from the Brownian motion assumption have been identified since [9] work, both for uni-
variate and multivariate time series of assets returns. First, returns of financial assets can
contain a jump component, leading to non-normal (multivariate) returns; second, returns
volatilities and correlations are not constant and vary stochastically in a persistent way;
third, equity returns exhibit negative correlation with their volatilities and correlations,
reflecting the well-known leverage effect. Fourth, returns, volatilities and correlations can
co-jump, leading to self-exciting behavior. In the context of univariate models for returns,
a number of authors has proposed important model extensions in order to parsimoniously
and simultaneously capture some of these important characteristic. In particular, it has
been shown in [12] that time-changed Le´vy processes provide a convenient and tractable
general framework to model financial returns. First, Le´vy return innovations can be used to
specify non Gaussian returns. Second, by running the Le´vy process under a stochastic clock
one can easily model stochastic risk behavior. Third, the leverage effect can be well accom-
modated by correlating the innovations in the Le´vy process and the ones in the underlying
time-change process. In this way, many well-known univariate models with stochastic risk
in the literature are obtained as special cases of [12]. The usefulness of a financial model
is enriched and confirmed whenever its validation and implementation is sufficiently fast.
It is well-known that closed form characteristic functions and the technique of measure
change are useful instruments to preserve tractability in the context of time-changed Le´vy
processes. In particular, [12] show that the complexity introduced by specifying the lever-
age effect can be neutralized trough an appropriate measure change from the risk-neutral
to the so called leverage-neutral measure. Under this new (complex-valued) measure, cal-
culations are shifted into a world where expectations can be computed as if there was no
leverage: The problem of finding the characteristic function of the time-changed Le´vy pro-
cess in presence of leverage effects is reduced to the computation of the Laplace transform
of the random time under the (complex-valued) leverage-neutral measure. Whenever the
time-change is an integrated instantaneous activity rate this transform has the same form
as in many well-studied problems in bond-pricing. Thus, the corresponding theory and
techniques can be borrowed from the wide range of available literature.
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In this paper, we focus on a class of multivariate time change procedures that are
convenient for specifying multivariate stochastic risk in the context of models with multi-
variate Le´vy returns. Multivariate models for returns featuring multiple stochastic risks are
well-established in the econometrics literature; see, e.g., [8] for a review on the multivari-
ate GARCH approach. Recently, a new class of continuous-time models for multivariate
stochastic risk have been proposed by a number of authors, by directly specifying stochastic
processes for symmetric positive-definite covariance matrices. [7] introduce matrix-valued
positive definite Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, while [20] propose a family of matrix affine
jumps diffusions (AJD) with finite activity as a convenient framework for specifying mul-
tivariate risks in finance. Applications of these settings to different problems in finance are
given in [16], [10], [14], [17] and [24].
The extension of [12] approach to a general and tractable multivariate setting with
multiple sources of stochastic risk, multivariate leverage effects and general stochastic de-
pendence between returns is difficult. A major issue is that in order to properly model mul-
tivariate stochastic risks with Le´vy processes one needs an appropriate multivariate time
change procedure, i.e., different time changes, or subordinators, for different assets, which
has to be consistent with the properties of a stochastic covariance matrix of returns, like,
e.g., symmetry and positive definiteness.1 These features pose serious challenges for the
extension to multivariate time-change techniques and do not arise in the one-dimensional
case, in which Heston-type volatility models can always be rephrased as time-changed
Brownian motion using as a time-change process the integrated variance; see, e.g., [3].
Our paper introduces a multivariate subordination methodology that is convenient to
specify a family of dependent time-changes that can be consistent with the properties of
a stochastic covariance matrix of returns. In our approach, multivariate time-changes are
defined based on increasing processes of positive definite and symmetric matrices. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first approach in the literature presenting this idea. In
this way, we extend in a natural way the general approach in [12] to a potentially broad
multivariate setting with multiple sources of stochastic risk, multivariate leverage effects
and stochastic dependence between returns. The more specific contributions to the liter-
ature are the following. First, we can specify multivariate Le´vy processes with stochastic
1 Multivariate time changes appeared recently in the literature. Independent multivariate subordinators
have been considered, among others, in [4] and [13]. [21] introduce a single-factor multivariate time
change that implies a constant correlation between returns of different assets.
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dependence between returns, in contrast to the constant correlation implied by previous
multivariate time change procedures; see, e.g., again [21]. Second, we derive natural ex-
tensions of univariate subordinated Le´vy processes to their matrix-valued subordinated
processes. For instance, we introduce multivariate counterparts of well-know univariate
models, including the VG model in [23] and [22] and the NIG model in [2]. Third, we can
account for multivariate leverage effects by correlating the multivariate shocks in returns
and our multivariate time changes. In this context, we derive the relevant expressions for
the leverage-neutral measure arising under our approach. Fourth, we show how to specify
our multivariate time-changes in order to preserve an affine structure and closed form
transform expressions under the (multivariate) leverage neutral measure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the framework and defines
our multivariate time-changes. In a second step, the leverage-neutral probability measure
is derived. In Section 4.3, we show how one can use our methodology for generating new
classes of multivariate Le´vy processes. Section 4.4 defines portfolio time-changes based
on matrix AJD, for which the Laplace transform under the leverage-neutral measure is
derived in closed form. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Multivariate Financial Modeling Using Families of Le´vy Processes
The model framework is presented in this section. For brevity of exposition and simplicity
of notation, we consider a market with two price processes (S1t, S2t)t≥0 defined on a prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with a standard complete filtration F := (Ft)t≥0, which
is generated by a Markov process X := (Xt)t≥0, i.e., Ft = σ(Xt). The extension of our
approach to higher dimensions can be carried out at the cost of notational complexity. The
bivariate log return process is defined by Rt := (R1t, R2t) := (log(S1t/S10), log(S2t/S20)).
We denote by u′Rt := u1R1t+ u2R2t, where u ∈ R2, any linear combination of log returns
with weights u = (u1, u2)′.
In order to develop a multivariate model for returns based on time-changed Le´vy
processes, we need to specify a family of well-defined conditional transition densities for
bivariate return process (Rt)t≥0. [12] model asset prices as exponential affine functions of a
given vector of Le´vy shocks, time-changed by a fixed business time. We propose to extend
this approach by specifying a parametric family of time-changed Le´vy processes, parame-
terized by u ∈ R2, that models the multivariate features of the underlying stochastic risk
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structure. To this end, we specify the joint distribution of (Rt)t≥0 indirectly, by modeling
the distribution of any process (u′Rt)t≥0 for arbitrary u ∈ R2.
4.2.1 The Basic Approach
The main insight of our approach is to specify a family of time-changed Le´vy processes,
parameterized by u ∈ R2, modeling the stochastic properties of process {(u′Rt)t≥0 : u ∈
R2}, in a way that at the same time ensures a family of well-defined joint conditional
distributions for bivariate return process (Rt)t≥0. We focus on bivariate stationary Markov
processes, implying a family of conditional characteristic functions defined by:
ΦR1,R2(u, t, t+∆,x) := E
[
exp(iu′Rt+∆)
∣∣∣Xt = x] = E [exp(iu′R∆)∣∣∣X0 = x] (4.1)
=: ΦR1,R2(u,∆, x) , (4.2)
where the equality follows from the stationarity assumption. The next assumption intro-
duces our family of time-changed Le´vy processes for modeling multivariate returns.
Assumption 4.1. Let processes (Rt(u))t≥0, u ∈ R2, be defined by:
Rt(u) :=
d∑
i=1
θiL
u
iTuit
:= θ′LuTut (4.3)
where θ ∈ Rd, {Lut : u ∈ R2} is a parametric family of d−dimensional Le´vy processes,
identically distributed as L, and T := {T ut := (T u1t, . . . , T udt)′ : u ∈ R2} is a suitable family
of d−dimensional time-changes parameterized by u ∈ R2. We denote by
ΨL(θ) = −iµ′θ + 12θ
′Σθ +
∫
Rd0
(
1− eiθ′x + iθ′x1|x|<1
)
ΠL(dx) , (4.4)
the characteristic exponent of L.
Consider the function:
u 7→ Φ(u,∆, x) := E
[
exp(iR∆(u))
∣∣∣X0 = x] . (4.5)
Under appropriate conditions on time-changed process LuTut , Φ(·,∆, x) can be used to spec-
ify a well-defined family of conditional probability densities ΦR1,R2(u,∆, x) for bivariate
return process (Rt)t≥0. Moreover, under straightforward assumptions, Φ(u,∆, x) can be
written as the Laplace transform of time change process (T ut )t≥0.
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Lemma 4.1. Let (Lut )t≥0 and (T ut )t≥0 be independent processes. If either (i) Lut has inde-
pendent components, or (ii) T ut has identical components, then:
Φ(u,∆, x) = E
[
exp(iθ′LuTu∆)|X0 = x
]
= E
[
exp
(
−
d∑
i=1
ΨLi(θi)T
u
i∆
)∣∣∣X0 = x] (4.6)
= LTu(−ΘL(θ),∆, x) , (4.7)
with LTu(·,∆, x) the conditional characteristic function of T u∆ and ΘL(θ) := (ΨL1(θ1), . . . , ΨLd(θd))′.
Equation (4.6) makes explicit that the dependence of Φ(u,∆, x) on u is only via the
parametric dependence of T u on u:
Φ(·, ∆, x) : u 7−→ T u 7−→ LTu(−ΘL(θ),∆, x) .
This simple remark highlights that the multivariate dependence properties implied by
our modeling approach are completely determined by the specification of the family of
multivariate time-changes {(T ut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2}.
4.2.2 Portfolio Time Changes and Matrix Markov Processes
The new insight of our approach derives from the family of time-changes T ut in equation
(4.3). We call such families portfolio time-changes.
Definition 4.1. A portfolio time-change is a family T := {(T ut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} of
d−dimensional time change processes (T ut )t≥0 on probability space (Ω,F ,P), i.e., such
that for any u:
1. Process (T uit)t≥0, i = 1, . . . , d, is positive, increasing, and right continuous with left
limits, satisfying the usual regularity conditions,
2. For any t ≥ 0 and i = 1, . . . .n, {T uit ≤ t} is Ft− measurable,
3. T uit →∞ almost surely, as t→∞, for all i = 1, . . . , d.
Essentially, in order to generate well-defined portfolio time-changes, we need to in-
troduce parametric families of increasing positive semi-martingales. A convenient and sys-
tematic way of achieving this task is by means of families of 2× 2 matrix-valued positive
definite and increasing Markov processes generating filtration {Ft : t ≥ 0}.2
2 Examples of such processes are matrix subordinators. Finite activity compound Poisson-type matrix
subordinators can be easily constructed using any finite probability distribution on the cone S+n of
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Assumption 4.2. {(Xut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} is a family of symmetric and positive definite 2×2
matrix-valued processes adapted to (Ft)t≥0 such that:
1. (Xut )t≥0 is increasing, and right continuous with left limits, satisfying the usual regu-
larity conditions,
2. tr(Xut )
u →∞ as t→∞.
Condition 2. ensures that any quadratic for in Xut converges to ∞ as t→∞.
The next example illustrates a useful way of specifying portfolio time-changes based
on Assumption 4.2.
Example 4.1. Let V ut be the unique symmetric positive definite square root of process X
u
t
in Assumption 4.2 and define T uit := tr(uu
′
(V uit )(V
ui
t )
′
), where V uit is the i-th column of
matrix V ut . By construction, {T ut := (T u1t, T u2t)t≥0 : u ∈ R2} is a portfolio time-change such
that T u1t + T
u
2t = tr(uu
′
Xut ). Under the conditions of Lemma 4.1, this way of specifying
T ut allows for a direct computation of function Φ(u,∆, x) using the conditional Laplace
transform LX(·,∆, x) of X∆. Indeed, by choosing Lut such that ΨL1 = ΨL2 and letting
Rt(u) = Lu1Tu1t + L
u
2Tu2t
, then:
Φ(u,∆, x) = E
[
exp(−ΨL1(1)tr(uu′X∆)|X0 = x
]
= LX(−Γ,∆, x) , (4.8)
where Γ = ΨL1(1)uu
′.
4.2.3 Portfolio Time-Changed Brownian Motion
In principle, the family of Le´vy processes {(Lut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} can be arbitrarily chosen.
Based on Monroe’s theorem and the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, a large class of
arbitrage-free continuous-time models can be specified using a dynamics implied by time-
changed Brownian motion. Moreover, many univariate Le´vy processes broadly used in
financial modeling are derived from a time-changed Brownian motion.3 As a consequence,
we consider in more detail in this section the Brownian motion setting.
symmetric positiv definite matrices for the jump size; see e.g., [18], for some concrete examples. [5]
and [6] introduce matrix subordinators that generalize stable, tempered stable, Gamma and Inverse
Gaussian subordinators, and which can allow for high-frequency matrix-valued jumps.
3 Based on the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, price processes are semimartingales. Monroe’s
theorem states that every semimartingale Zt can be rewritten as a time-changed Brownian motion BTt
for a family of stopping times Tt defined on a suitably extended probability space. For example, the
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Assumption 4.3. {(But )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} denotes a parametric class of Brownian motions
in Rd indexed by u.
In order for function Φ(u,∆, x) in equation (4.5) to define a well-defined family of
conditional characteristic functions for a bivariate return process, i.e.,
Φ(u,∆, x) = ΦR1,R2(u,∆, x) ,
for some bivariate return distributions, two conditions have to be satisfied. First, the
Chapman-Kolmogoroff equation has to hold:
Φ(u,∆1 +∆2, x) = E
[
Φ(u,∆2, Xu∆1)
∣∣∣Xu0 = x] . (4.9)
Second, Φ(·,∆, x) has to be the characteristic function of a bivariate random variable.
Proposition 4.1. Let the hypotheses of Lemma 4.1 and Assumption 4.2 be satisfied. (i) If
portfolio time-change {(T ut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} and Rt(u) are specified as in Example 4.1, then
the Chapman-Kolmogoroff equation (4.9) is satisfied if and only if (Xt)t≥0 is a Markov
process, i.e., if for Γ ∈ C2×2 the following identity holds:
LX(Γ,∆1 +∆2, x) = E [LX(Γ,∆2, X∆1)|X0 = x] . (4.10)
(ii) If additionally Assumption 4.3 is satisfied, then function Φ(u,∆, x) specifies a well-
defined family of bivariate conditional densities for return process (Rt)t≥0.
Proof. The first statement follows from the definition of Rt(u) under Assumption 4.2
in the context of Example 4.1 and Lemma 4.1. The second statement follows from
the properties of the multivariate characteristic function of a Gaussian variable, since
(ΨL1 , ΨL2) = (1/2, 1/2)
′. By iterated expectations, we obtain:
E[exp(R∆(u))|X0 = x] = LX(12uu
′, ∆, x) = E[exp(u′X∆u/2)|X0 = x], (4.11)
which is the integrated characteristic function (with respect to the conditional density of
X∆) of a bivariate zero mean Gaussian variable with covariance matrixX∆. This concludes
the proof. uunionsq
univariate Variance Gamma model of [23] and [22] and the Normal Inverse Gaussian model of [2] are
obtained by subordinating Brownian motion with univariate Gamma and Inverse Gaussian processes,
respectively.
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4.2.4 Portfolio Business Activities
Increasing matrix processes in Assumption 4.2 can be specified either directly as a matrix
subordinator, i.e., a matrix Le´vy process with positive definite increments, or as a finite
variation matrix process obtained, e.g., by integrating another positive definite matrix pro-
cess. In the latter case, we obtain a systematic way of specifying portfolio business times
with a given local activity, which can follow a state process featuring time dependence.
An example of a matrix subordinator is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type matrix process in-
troduced in [7].4 The matrix AJD setting introduced in the literature by [20] are examples
of matrix processes that can be naturally used to specify a variety of portfolio business
activities with time series dependence.
Example 4.2. Let {(Σut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} be a family of positive definite matrix processes and
define:
T uit = tr
(
uu′
∫ t
0
V uis V
ui
s
′
ds
)
, (4.13)
where V ut is the square root of Σ
u
t . Then, (T
u
1t, T
u
2t) defines a portfolio time-change of
bounded variation with local business activities given by:
tr
(
uu′V uit V
ui′
t
)
, i = 1, 2 . (4.14)
Therefore, {(T u1t, T u2t)t≥0 : u ∈ R2}, can be used to model the stochastic multivariate risk
of Rt(u), as:
V art(dRt(u)) = tr
(
uu′(V u1t V
u1
t
′ + V u2t V
u2
t
′)dt
)
= tr(uu′Σut )dt . (4.15)
4 Let {(Jut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} be a family of matrix valued Le´vy subordinators, with E[ln+ ‖ Jut ‖] <∞, and
M be a fix 2 × 2 matrix of parameters such that σ(M) ⊂ (−∞, 0) + iR. An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type
process Xut is defined as the solution of the stochastic differential equation:
dXut = (MX
u
t +X
u
t M
′)dt+ dJut , (4.12)
with initial condition Xu0 = x ∈ S+n . Technical conditions for existence and uniqueness of an infinitely di-
visible stationary solution of (4.12) are provided in [7]. As in the univariate case, depending on the choice
of the Le´vy characteristics of the subordinators Jut , different types of positive semi-definite Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck type processes are obtained. Second order moment structure and close form solution for the
integrated process can be found in [1].
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The previous example suggests that a number of multivariate models with stochastic
risk can be embedded into our modeling approach, using portfolio business activities.
The next example shows that using portfolio time-changed Brownian motions, we can
encompass (at least) a large class of multivariate Heston-type stochastic volatility models.
Example 4.3. Let Bt = (B1t, B2t)′ be a bivariate standard Brownian motion and consider
the following Heston-type multivariate stochastic volatility model for returns:dS1t
dS2t
 =
S1t(V 11t dB1t + V 12t dB2t)
S2t(V 21t dB1t + V
22
t dB2t)
 (4.16)
where
Vt :=
V 11t V 12t
V 21t V
22
t

is driven by a 2× 2 symmetric matrix diffusion process independent of Brownian motion
B and Σt := VtV ′t . Denote by ei the i−th unit vector. Given this specification, we have:
u′Rt = u′
∫ t
0
VsdBs − 12
∫ t
0
(u1Σ11s + u2Σ
22
s )ds ,
and:
ΦR1t,R2t(−iu) = E
[
exp(u′Rt)
]
= E
[
exp
(
1
2
tr(uu′
∫ t
0
Σsds)− 12 tr
(
(u1e1e′1 + u2e2e
′
2)
∫ t
0
Σsds
))]
= E
[
exp
(
1
2
tr
((
uu′ − u1e1e′1 − u2e2e′2
) ∫ t
0
Σsds
))]
. (4.17)
Let now {(V ut )t≥0 : u ∈ Rn} be a family of matrix processes distributed as (Vt)t≥0 and
define for k = 1, 2 the portfolio time changes:
T ukt = tr(uu
′
∫ t
0
V uks V
uk
s
′
ds) (4.18)
where V ukt is the k−th column of V ut . In particular, note that T u1t+ T u2t = tr(uu′
∫ t
0 Σsds).
Consider now the following time-changed process for the log return portfolio Rt(u):
Rt(u) = Bu1Tu1t +B
u
2Tu2t
− 1
2
(u1(T e11t + T
e1
2t ) + u2(T
e2
1t + T
e2
2t )) . (4.19)
where {(But )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} is a family of bivariate standard Brownian motions independent
of {(V ut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2}. With specification (4.19), we obtain:
ΦRt(u)(−iu) = E
[
exp
(
1
2
(T u1t + T
u
2t)−
1
2
tr
(
(u1e1e′1 + u2e2e
′
2)
∫ t
0
Σsds
))]
= E
[
exp
(
1
2
tr
((
uu′ − u1e1e′1 − u2e2e′2
) ∫ t
0
Σsds
))]
, (4.20)
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because T u1t + T
u
2t = tr(uu
′ ∫ t
0 Σ
u
s ds). Since ΦRt(u)(−iu) coincides with the Laplace trans-
form of Rt under multivariate Heston-type model (4.16) (given in (4.17)), these models are
nested by our modeling approach (4.3) based on families of time-changed Le´vy processes.
4.2.5 Leverage Effect and Complex Leverage-Neutral Measure
Equation (4.6) in Lemma 4.1 holds provided that Lut and T
u
t are independent. In this
context, the computation of the characteristic function of returns is feasible analytically
as soon as the characteristic function LTu(·,∆, x) is tractable. In order to easily capture
the well-known leverage effect in our multivariate approach, it is necessary to consider
settings in which Le´vy processes Lut and portfolio time change T
u
t can be correlated.
Under specification (4.3), the computation of function Φ(u,∆, x) depends on two
sources of randomness, the first linked to Le´vy process Lut and the second linked to the
stochastic time T ut . Using the concept of a leverage-neutral measure, [12] show that it is
possible to simplify the computation of the characteristic function of returns by a simple
bond price-type formula, also when Le´vy shocks and the underlying business times are
correlated. We apply this idea to our multivariate time-change approach and show how
the computation of function Φ(u,∆, x) is similarly easily performed as when Lut and T
u
t are
independent. This is done by using a family of leverage-neutral measures {Q(θ, u) : u ∈ R2}
that incorporates the dependence of the leverage effect on u ∈ R2.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that {(T ut )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} is a portfolio time change of bounded
variation. Let either (i) Lut have independent components or (ii) T
u
1t = . . . = T
u
dt. Then,
under model (4.3), function Φ(u,∆, x) in equation (4.6) is given by the Laplace transform
of portfolio time change T u∆, under a complex-valued portfolio-dependent leverage neutral
measure Q(θ, ·) : u 7→ Q(θ, u), evaluated in ΘL := ΘL(θ):
Φ(u,∆, x) = EQ(θ,u)
[
exp
(−Θ′LT u∆)] =: LQ(θ,u)Tu (−ΘL, ∆, x) , (4.21)
where complex-valued measure Q(θ, u) has density M(θ, u) with respect to P given by:
Mt(θ, u) :=
dQ(θ, u)
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
[
iθ′LuTut +Θ
′
LT
u
t
]
. (4.22)
The expectation in equation (4.21) is the conditional Laplace transform of vector T u∆
under the new measure Q(u,Θ), evaluated at −ΘL. Equation (4.21) is similar to the ex-
pression in the leverage-free case derived in Equation (4.6), with the only difference that
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the expectation is taken under the complex-valued measure Q(θ, u). The proof of Theo-
rem 4.1 proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the process Mt(θ, u) is a well-defined
complex-valued martingale under the original measure P, with respect to the filtration
generated by processes {(Lut , T ut )}. Second, we derive Equation (4.21).
Lemma 4.2. Let the conditions of Theorem 4.1 be satisfied. Then process Mt(θ, u) :=
exp
[
iθ′LuTut + Θ
′
LT
u
t
]
is a well-defined complex-valued P−martingale with respect to the
filtration Fut generated by processes {(Lut , T ut )}.
Proof. Processes Y ukt := exp
[
iθkL
u
t+ΘkLt
]
, k = 1, . . . , d are independent Wald martingales
such thatMt(θ, u) =
∏d
i=k Y
u
kTukt
is a martingale as well. By the optional stopping theorem,
replacing in Y ukt the calendar time t with a locally deterministic time change T
u
kt, k = 1, ..., d,
does not alter the martingale behavior and the conditional orthogonality of these processes.
Hence, density process Mt(θ, u), which is the product of orthogonal martingales Y ukTukt , is
again a (complex-valued) martingale with respect to the filtration Fut . uunionsq
Using Lemma 4.2, equation (4.21) in Theorem 4.1 follows immediately:
Φ(u,∆, x) := E
[
exp
(
iθ′LuTu∆
) ∣∣∣Xu0 = x]
= E
[
M∆(θ, u) exp
(−Θ′LT u∆) ∣∣∣Xu0 = x]
= EQ(θ,u)
[
exp
(−Θ′LT u∆) |Xu0 = x] =: LQ(θ,u)Tu∆ (−ΘL,∆, x) .
A measure change from the risk-neutral to the so called leverage-neutral measure removes
the computational difficulties due to the leverage effect: The leverage effect is embedded
into leverage-neutral measure Q(θ, u) and expectations can be performed as if there was
no leverage. Thus, the characteristic function of the time-changed Le´vy process is the
conditional Laplace transform of the random time under the leverage-neutral measure,
evaluated at −ΘL. Moreover, in cases where portfolio time change T ut is generated by a
portfolio business activity driven by a matrix process, as in Example 4.2, Theorem 4.1
provides a potentially powerful tool for computing function Φ(u,∆, x) by a simple bond
price-type formula:
Φ(u,∆, x) = EQ(θ
?,u)
[
exp
(
− ΨL1(1)(T u1t + T u2t)
)∣∣∣Xu0 = x] (4.23)
= EQ(θ
?,u)
[
exp
(
−tr
(
ΨL1(1)uu
′
∫ t
0
Xus ds
)) ∣∣∣Xu0 = x] , (4.24)
where θ? = (1, 1)′. Interpreting process rut := tr(ΨL1(1)uu′Xus ) as a short interest rate pro-
cess, Equation (4.24) provides a formula similar to the pricing formula of a zero coupon
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bond, parameterized by u ∈ R2. At the same time, Φ(u,∆, x) can be interpreted as the
Laplace transform of the integrated matrix process
∫ t
0 X
u
s ds, under the leverage-neutral
measure Q(θ?, u), evaluated in −Ψ1L(1)uu′. We can therefore borrow existing techniques
for the computation of Φ(u,∆, x) and make closed-form expressions for this function read-
ily available when the leverage-neutral Laplace transform of
∫ t
0 X
u
s ds can be computed
analytically. An important class of matrix processes for which these computations can be
carried out explicitly is the family of matrix AJD, introduced in the literature by [20].
The concrete specification analysis of tractable portfolio time changes {(T ut )t≥0 : u ∈
R2} and corresponding families of time-changed Le´vy processes within our framework is
addressed in Section 4.4.
4.3 Multivariate Le´vy Returns Generated by Matrix Subordination
Subordination of univariate Brownian motion by an independent univariate Le´vy process
has been extensively studied. [15], among others, show that a number of well-known Le´vy
processes can be written as time-changed Brownian motion, where the subordinating Le´vy
process is specified using a specific infinitely divisible distribution. The Normal Inverse
Gaussian (NIG) and Variance Gamma (VG) models, e.g., are obtained by subordinating
Brownian motion with univariate Inverse Gaussian and Gamma processes, respectively.
Extensions of univariate subordinators, like Inverse Gaussian and Gamma subordinators,
to their matrix-valued counterparts have been recently proposed in a number of papers;
see, e.g., [5], [6] and [25].5 It is well-known that a Le´vy process subordinated by a Le´vy
subordinator is again a Le´vy process. In this section, we show how our multivariate time-
change approach combined with a matrix subordination can be used to generate a new
class of multivariate Le´vy processes, featuring known margins and new dependence features
between the single components of the process.
5 A key issue in the construction of matrix subordinators is the specification of a suitable infinitely
divisible matrix distribution. For example, the usual matrix variate extension of the Gamma density
(see e.g. [18]) is not infinitely divisible and one needs to slightly change its definition in order to obtain
a well-defined matrix subordinator. As is the case for standard infinitely divisible distributions in Rn,
infinitely divisible matrix distribution are characterized by their Le´vy-Khinchin representation; see, for
instance, [6].
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4.3.1 Multivariate Le´vy Returns as Portfolio Time-Changed Brownian
Motions
Assumption 4.4. But := (B
u
1t, B
u
2t) is a family of standard Brownian motions in R2
indexed by u ∈ R2. Xut is a family of matrix subordinators, identically distributed according
to an infinitely divisible random variable X, indexed by u ∈ R2and independent of But . KX
denotes the cumulant transform of X. Let T uit := tr(uu
′
(V uit )(V
ui
t )
′
), where V ut is the
unique symmetric positive definite square root of Xut . Rt(u) is specified as the portfolio
time-changed Brownian motion:
Rt(u) = Bu1Tu1t +B
u
2Tu2t
(4.25)
By construction, Rt(u) defines a family of univariate Le´vy process indexed by u ∈ R2,
which are obtained by subordinating a Le´vy process with a quadratic form of a matrix
subordinator. It follows that Φ(u,∆, x) := E[exp(iR∆(u))|Xu0 = x] = Φ(u,∆), given the
iid structure of the matrix subordinator, where:
Φ(u,∆) = E
[
exp
(
1
2
tr(uu
′
X∆)
)]
= LX∆
(
1
2
uu
′
)
= exp
(
−∆KX
(1
2
uu
′))
. (4.26)
This is the general expression for the Laplace transform of a new class of bivariate Le´vy
return processes. This expression is tractable analytically whenever the Laplace transform
of X is known in closed-form. The marginal distributions of the model in equation (4.26)
are characterized by evaluating Φ(·, ∆) in the two unit vectors e1 = (1, 0)′ and e2 = (0, 1)′:
Φ(e1,∆) = exp
(
−∆KX
(
1
2
e1e
′
1
))
, Φ(e2,∆) = exp
(
−∆KX
(
1
2
e2e
′
2
))
. (4.27)
From these expressions, we see that the marginal distributions implied for (Rt(e1)t≥0) and
(Rt(e2)t≥0) are those of a univariate time-changed Brownian motion, with time-changes
T1t := X11t and T2t := X
22
t given by the diagonal elements of matrix subordinator Xt.
6
In the sequel, we consider in more detail concrete examples of new multivariate Le´vy
processes using our approach, based on matrix-valued extensions of well-known univariate
6 Specifying the diagonal elements of a matrix process Xt as univariate subordinators and setting the
off-diagonal elements to zero leads to a simple example of a matrix subordinator, called diagonal matrix
subordinator, see [25]). In the bivariate case, e.g, a Gamma process can be used as the first diagonal
element and an independent Inverse Gaussian process as the second diagonal element. By construction,
in this case Rt(e1) is a variance gamma process, whereas Rt(e2) is an independent normal inverse
gaussian process.
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subordinators, like the Gamma, the Inverse Gaussian and the Compound Poisson processes
with positive jumps. Other examples of matrix-subordinators that could be applied in the
context of our multivariate approach include Bessel matrix-subordinators ([6]) and matrix
subordinators defined by the quadratic variation of multidimensional Le´vy processes ([25]).
4.3.2 Gamma-type, Tempered and Inverse Gaussian Matrix Subordinators
[6] develop Gamma-type and simple tempered matrix distributions that are infinitely
divisible. The corresponding multivariate Le´vy density is given by
hβ(X,Σ) :=
|Σ|−(n+1)/2 exp(−tr(XΣ−1))
tr(XΣ−1)n(n+1)/2+β
, (4.28)
where Σ ∈ S+n and 0 ≤ β < 1. We write X ∼ Gβ(Σ) to indicate that the random matrix X
has the distribution associated to Le´vy density (4.28). β = 0 corresponds to the Gamma-
type distribution: In this case, tr(X) follows a Gamma distribution when Σ = In, and
density (4.28) is the natural (infinitely divisible) extension of the univariate Le´vy density
of a gamma process with unit mean and scaling coefficient σ; see, e.g., Revuz and Yor
(1991, p. 110). For 0 < β < 1 and Σ = In, equation (4.28) parameterizes the family
of β-tempered matrix distributions, in which the special case β = 1/2 is the (infinitely
divisible) matrix extension of the univariate Inverse Gaussian distribution; see [5].
Lemma 4.3. ([6]) By changing to the polar decomposition X = rV , r = tr(X), for which
we have that tr(V ) = 1, one has:
1. For X ∼ G0(Σ): KX(Θ) =
∫
Sn∩S+n
ln(1 + tr(V ΣΘ))−1dV ,
2. For X ∼ Gβ(In), 0 < β < 1: KX(Θ) = −kβ
∫
Sn∩S+n
ln(1 + tr(V Θ))βdV − cn,
where kβ := Γ (1 − β)/β, cn := pin/2[n(n+1)/2−1]! and Sn ∩ S+n is the intersection of the unit
sphere of dimension n× n with the positive definite cone.
Lemma 4.3 implies that when X ∼ G0(Σ) random variable tr(ΣX) follows a one-
dimensional gamma convolution. Generalized gamma convolutions build an important
class of infinitely divisible distributions, firstly introduced by Thorin in 1977. Their char-
acteristic function takes the form
Φ(s) = exp(
∞∫
0
ln(1 + s/t))µ(dt), (4.29)
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where µ(dt) is a nonnegative measure on (0,∞), called Thorin measure. The univariate
Gamma distribution arises as a special case in this class when µ(dt) is the Dirac measure
at 1. When X ∼ G0(In) and 0 < β < 1 the resulting matrix law is related to the
one-dimensional tempered β-stable distributions, introduced in [27], because any one-
dimensional marginal of X follows a tempered β-stable distribution.
4.3.2.1 Marginal Distributions: Gamma Subordinators
Using Lemma 4.3, we can characterize more concretely the specific form of function (4.26)
implied by different matrix subordinators. We start with Gamma-type matrix subordina-
tors.
Corollary 4.1. Let (Xt)t≥0 be a Gamma-type matrix subordinator, i.e. X ∼ G0(Σ). It
then follows:
− 1
∆
lnΦ(u,∆) =
∫
Sn∩S+n
ln
(
1 +
1
2
tr(uu′ΣV )
)−1
dV = (4.30)∫ ∞
0
ln
(
1 +
1
2
v
)−1
νuu′Σ(dv) (4.31)
where νuu′Σ(B) :=
∫
Sn∩S+n IB(tr(uu
′
ΣV ))νV (dV ) is the measure induced on (0,∞) trough
the transformation V → tr(uu′ΣV ).
The last expression in equation (4.31) is the cumulant transform of a one-dimensional
gamma convolution; see, for instance, [6]. Therefore, process Rt(u) follows the distribution
of a univariate time changed Brownian motion BTt , in which the Le´vy subordinator Tt is
such that T1 follows a univariate generalized gamma convolution. There exists a strong link
between random variables distributed as positive Generalized Gamma Convolutions and
so-called Wiener-Gamma integrals; see, e.g., [19] for a survey. Let (γt, t ≥ 0) be a standard
Gamma process and h : R+ → R+ a Borel function such that
∫∞
0 log(1 + h(u))du < ∞.
The random variable Γ˜ (h) defined as
Γ˜ (h) :=
∞∫
0
h(s)dγs (4.32)
is called a Wiener-Gamma integral. Therefore, Γ˜ (h) can be written as the limit of linear
combinations of independent gamma random variables, with weights given by the values
of function h. This feature implies that Generalized Gamma Convolution subordinators
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can be written as Wiener-Gamma integrals, leading to a natural extension of Gamma
subordinators.
Overall, we obtain that Rt(u) follows the same distribution of a univariate Brownian
motion time-changed by a Wiener-Gamma integral process. In this sense, we obtain a
natural multivariate extension of the univariate Variance Gamma process.
4.3.2.2 Marginal Distributions: Tempered Subordinators
The specific form of function (4.26) implied by tempered matrix subordinators is addressed
next.
Corollary 4.2. Let X ∼ Gβ(In), 0 < β < 1. It then follows:
− 1
∆
lnΦ(u,∆) = −kβ

∫
Sn∩S+n
ln
(
1 +
1
2
tr(uu
′
V )
)β
dV − cn

= −kβ

∞∫
0
ln
(
1 +
1
2
v
)β
νuu′ (dv)− cn
 , (4.33)
where νuu′ (B) :=
∫
Sn∩S+n IB(tr(uu
′
V ))νV (dV ) is the measure on (0,∞) induced trough the
transformation V → tr(uu′V ), and kβ, cn are defined in Corollary 4.3.
It follows that − 1∆ lnΦ(u,∆) is the cumulant transform of a one-dimensional tem-
pered β-stable distribution; see [26]. Therefore, Rt(u) follows the same distribution of a
one-dimensional Brownian motion time-changed by a one-dimensional tempered β-stable
subordinator. When β = 1/2, the subordinator is Inverse Gaussian distributed, and Rt(u)
follows a Normal Inverse Gaussian process. Therefore, we obtain a natural multivariate
extension of univariate Normal Inverse Gaussian processes.
4.3.3 Compound Poisson Matrix Subordinators
Matrix compound processes with positive jumps are multivariate compound Poisson pro-
cesses taking values in the cone of positive definite matrices and having positive definite
jumps. Their Le´vy density is the product of a constant jump intensity λ > 0 and a den-
sity g(X), defined on S+n , for the jump size. Without loss of generality, it is possible to
decompose g(X) as g(X) = g˜(r)Γ (V ), for a spectral density Γ , defined on Sn ∈ S+n , and
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a second density g˜ defined on R+. The cumulant transform of matrix compound processes
X takes the form
KX(Θ) =
∫
Sn∩S+n
λ
∞∫
0
(1− e−rtr(ΘV ))g˜(dr)Γ (dV ). (4.34)
The integral with respect to dr in equation (4.34) can be interpreted as the cumulant
transform of a univariate Compound Poisson process with jump-intensity λ and jump size
density g˜, evaluated in tr(ΘV ). Therefore, KX(Θ) can be interpreted as an average of
cumulant transforms of standard univariate Compound Poisson processes, each weighted
by spectral density Γ (dV ). The specific form of function (4.26) for matrix compound
subordinators is as follows.
Corollary 4.3. Let (Xt)t≥0 be a compound Poisson matrix subordinator. It then follows:
− 1
∆
lnΦ(u,∆) =
∫
Sn∩S+n
λ
∞∫
0
(
1− e−
r
2
tr
(
(uu
′
V )
))
g˜(dr)Γ (dV )
=
∫
Sn∩S+n
λ
(
1− φr
(
−1
2
tr
(
uu
′
V
)))
Γ (dV ). (4.35)
where φr(·) is the Laplace transform of the univariate density g˜.
4.4 Specification Analysis
We address in more detail the issue of specifying portfolio time changes and their de-
pendence with Le´vy process Lut in equation (4.3), in order to develop models implying
multivariate leverage effects. A convenient framework in this respect is given by the class
of matrix AJD, introduced in [20], which can be used to specify portfolio business activ-
ities correlated with return shocks, while preserving a good degree of model tractability.
We study in detail an explicit model for the diffusion case and show how to compute the
leverage-neutral measure and the characteristic function of the corresponding multivariate
return process. The next assumption fixes the relevant setting for this section.
Assumption 4.5. W ut := (W
u
1t,W
u
2t) is a family of standard Brownian motions in R2 in-
dexed by u ∈ R2. Xut is a family of symmetric positive definite matrix processes identically
distributed as Xt, indexed by u ∈ R2. Let T uit :=
∫ t
0 tr(uu
′
(V uis )(V
ui
s )
′
)ds, where V ut is the
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unique symmetric positive definite square root of Xut . Rt(u) is specified as the portfolio
time-changed Brownian motion:
Rt(u) =W u1Tu1t +W
u
2Tu2t
(4.36)
Under Assumption 4.5, function Φ(u,∆, x) in Theorem 4.1 reads:
Φ(u,∆, x) = EQ(u)
[
exp
(
−1
2
(T 1∆ + T
2
∆)
)]
= LQ(u)∫∆
0 X
u
s ds
(
−1
2
uu′,∆, x
)
(4.37)
where leverage-neutral measure Q(u) has density with respect to P given by:
dQ(u)
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
[
i(W u1Tu1t +W
u
2Tu2t
) +
1
2
tr
(
uu′
∫ t
0
Xus ds
)]
(4.38)
and LQ(u)∫∆
0 X
u
s ds
(·,∆, x) is the leverage-neutral conditional Laplace transform of integrated
process (Xut )t≥0.
Overall, we see that in the context of Assumption 4.5 analytical tractability of function
Φ(u,∆, x) is granted as soon as the leverage neutral Laplace transform of integrated process
(Xut )t≥0 is available in closed form.
4.4.1 Affine Portfolio Activity Rates
Let Ω,M,Q be 2 × 2 parameter matrices and {(But )t≥0 : u ∈ R2} be a family of 2 × 2
matrices of standard Brownian motions. Xut is a matrix AJD if it follows the (matrix)
stochastic differential equation:
dXut = (ΩΩ
′ +MXut +X
u
t M
′)dt+
√
XtdB
u
t Q+Q
′dBut
′√Xut + dJut , (4.39)
with initial conditions Xu0 = x ∈ S+n , where Jut is a pure jump process with values in S+n
identically distributed across u ∈ R2. Jumps are realized with an intensity λX(Xut ) :=
λX,0 + tr(λX,1Xut ), such that λX,0 ≥ 0 and λX,1 ∈ S+n .7
Since jump size and arrival intensity are separately described, Xut is a matrix-valued
compound Poisson process featuring finite jump activity. For ΩΩ′ À Q′Q symmetric
matrix Xut is positive semidefinite, which gives rise to well-defined portfolio activity rates,
specified as tr(uu′Xut ) in Assumption 4.5. Note that since Brownian motions W ut and
But can be correlated, under Assumption 4.5 we can use the dynamics (4.39) to specify
different types of multivariate return processes featuring leverage effects.
7 Technical conditions for equation (4.39) to have a strong solution are provided, e.g., in [7].
4 Portfolio Business Activities, Le´vy Returns and Multivariate Stochastic Risk 159
The Laplace transform of the integrated process Xut is exponentially affine and is
characterized as follows.
Proposition 4.2. Given the affine dynamics (4.39) for matrix process Xut , the Laplace
transform of the integrated process
∫ ∆
0 X
u
t dt is exponentially affine:
E
exp
tr
−1
2
uu′
∆∫
0
Xut dt
∣∣∣Xu0 = x
 = exp(Bu(∆) + tr(Au(∆)x), (4.40)
with functions Bu(∆) ∈ R and Au(∆) ∈ S+n that solve the following system of matrix
Riccati equations:
dAu(∆)
d∆
= −1
2
uu′ +M ′Au(∆) +Au(∆)M + 2Au(∆)Q′QAu(∆) (4.41)
+λX,1[ΘX(Au(∆))− 1] , (4.42)
dBu(∆)
d∆
= tr(Au(∆)ΩΩ′) + λX,0[ΘX(Au(∆))− 1] , (4.43)
where ΘX is the Laplace transform of jump size J , subject to terminal condition Bu(0) = 0
and Au(0) = 0.
Closed form solutions for the coefficients of the above matrix Riccati equations can be
derived if ΩΩ′ = βQ′Q for some β > 1 and if λX,1 = 0, i.e., jump intensities are constant;
see again [20].
4.4.2 Multivariate Leverage Effects Through Matrix Diffusions
Consider the state dynamics (4.39) for matrix process Xut in the pure diffusion case where
λX(Xut ) = 0. We can specify leverage effects in our multivariate model, by correlating
the Brownian motions W ut and B
u
t driving return and portfolio time-change shocks. It is
convenient to specify a linear correlation structure, as shown in the next assumption.
Assumption 4.6. {(W ut )t≥0 := (W u1t,W u2t)′t≥0 : u ∈ R2} is a family of bivariate standard
Brownian motions given by:
W ut = B
u
t ρ+
√
1− ρ′ρZut , (4.44)
where {Zut : u ∈ R2} is another family of bivariate standard Brownian motions, indepen-
dent of But , and ρ ∈ R2 is a fixed correlation vector such that ρ′ρ ≤ 1.
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Preservation of the affine structure of process Xut under the leverage-neutral measure
is in general not granted. This feature depends on the assumptions about the correlation
structure between Le´vy shocks and business times, as well as the specification of the
multivariate subordination procedure defining returns. The next proposition shows that
Assumptions 4.5 and 4.6 together indeed imply a matrix AJD for Xut under leverage
neutral measure Q(u). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first multivariate result of
this kind in the literature.
Proposition 4.3. Given Assumptions 4.5 and 4.6, the dynamics of Xut under leverage
neutral measure Q(u) is:
dXut = (ΩΩ
′ + M˜Xut +X
u
t M˜
′)dt+
√
Xut dB˜
u
t Q+Q
′dB˜′
u
t
√
Xut , (4.45)
where B˜t is a 2× 2 matrix of Q(u)−Brownian motions and M˜ :=M + i(uρ′Q)′.
Proof. In order to apply Girsanov’s theorem, we rewrite the Radon-Nikodym density given
in equation (4.22) as
dQ(u)
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= E(iWTu1t)E(iWTu2t) (4.46)
where E(·) denotes the stochastic exponential. The transformation of the P-Brownian
motion But into Q(u)-Brownian motion B˜ut can be done by a slight extension of Girsanov’s
theorem to complex-valued measures; see [11].
dB˜kju = dBkju −
[
dBkju, i
(√
tr(uu′V u1V u1′)dW u1 +
√
tr(uu′V u2V u2′)dW u2
)]
=
dBkju −
[
dBkju, i
(√
tr(uu′V u1V u1′)(ρ1dB11u + ρ2dB12u) +
√
tr(uu′V u2V u2′)(ρ1dB21u + ρ2dB22u)
)]
,
which implies dB˜t = dBut − iAtdt, with 2× 2 matrix At given by:
At :=
√tr(uu′V u1tV u1t′)√
tr(uu′V u2tV u2t
′)
 ρ′ =
u1V 11t + u2V 12t
u1V
21
t + u2V
22
t
 ρ′ =√Xut uρ′ . (4.47)
Substituting dBut = dB˜
u
t + iAtdt in equation (4.39) and recalling that λX(X
u
t ) = 0, the
dynamics of Xut under complex measure Q(u) is:
dXut = (ΩΩ
′ + M˜Xut +X
u
t M˜
′)dt+
√
Xut dB˜
u
t Q+Q
′dB˜′
u
t
√
Xut , (4.48)
where B˜u is a 2× 2 matrix of standard Q(u)− Brownian motions parameterized by u and
M˜ :=M + i(uρ′Q)′. This concludes the proof. uunionsq
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The proof of Proposition 4.3 explicitly shows whether or not the affine structure ofXut
dynamics under leverage neutral measure Q(u) is preserved, given a specification of the
chosen time-subordination approach. Obviously, Assumption 4.5 is not the only potential
way in which portfolio time-changes can be specified using matrix AJD process Xut . For
instance, the class of matrix AJD activity rates of the form vt := tr(HiXut ) leads to
well-defined portfolio time-changes, given symmetric positive semi-definite matrices Hi,
i = 1, . . . , d. However, such a portfolio time change does not preserve an affine drift under
leverage neutral measure Q(u) when Assumption 4.6 is applied. This important fact can
be verified from the proof of Proposition 4.3, by noting that in that case the resulting
matrix At in equation (4.47) cannot be rewritten as a multiple of
√
Xt.
The affine structure of Xut under leverage neutral measure Q(u), implied by Proposi-
tion 4.3, allows us to derive simple analytical formulas for function Φ(u,∆, x) also in the
presence of leverage effects specified according to Assumptions 4.5 and 4.6. The detailed
result is presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Under Assumption 4.6, we have:
Φ(u,∆, x) = EQ(u)
[
exp
(
−1
2
tr(
∫ ∆
0
uu′Xus ds)
) ∣∣∣Xu0 = x] (4.49)
= exp((Bu(∆) + tr(Au(∆)x)) (4.50)
where functions Au(∆), Bu(∆) solve the following system of matrix Riccati equations with
complex-valued coefficients:
dAu(∆)
d∆
= −1
2
uu′ + (M + iQ′ρu′)′Au(∆) +Au(∆)(M + iQ′ρu′) (4.51)
+2Au(∆)Q′QAu(∆) , (4.52)
dBu(∆)
d∆
= βtr(Au(∆)Q′Q) , (4.53)
subject to terminal condition Au(0) = 0 and Bu(0) = 0. For ΩΩ′ = βQ′Q, the closed form
solution of these equations is Au(∆) = C22(∆)−1C21(∆), where Cij(∆) is the 2× 2 block
of the matrix exponential,C11(∆) C12(∆)
C21(∆) C22(∆)
 := exp
∆
M + i(uρ′Q)′ −2Q′Q
−12uu′ −(M ′ + iuρ′Q)
 (4.54)
and
Bu(∆) = −1
2
tr
[
β log(C22(∆)− τ(M ′ + iuρ′Q))
]
. (4.55)
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In the context of Proposition 4.4, derivative pricing can be efficiently performed by
transform methods for a broad class of models. Concrete examples and implementation
are left for future research.
4.5 Conclusions
We propose a new family of multivariate time-changed Le´vy processes to model multivari-
ate sources of risk in finance. Using powerful time-change techniques, our approach allows
us to address several well-known characteristics of financial returns in a multivariate con-
text, including joint non-normal behavior, stochastic volatilities and correlations among
different assets, multivariate leverage effects or self-exciting behavior. This framework can
include as special cases a variety of models in the literature, gives rise to several new
multivariate models and it is similarly simple to apply using the characteristic function
methodology as in the univariate context. We specify the distribution of our multivariate
time-changed Le´vy processes based on parametric families of portfolio time-changes driven
by positive matrix state processes. This matrix subordination procedure allows us to ex-
tend in a natural way univariate Variance Gamma and Normal Inverse Gaussian models
to a new class of multivariate Le´vy processes. In order to introduce multivariate leverage
effects between returns, volatilities and correlations, we follow the standard approach of
correlating shocks in the Le´vy processes driving returns and the increments of the under-
lying multivariate time change. We show that, as in the univariate case, the mathematical
complexity introduced by multivariate leverage effects can be neutralized trough an ap-
propriate complex-valued measure change, leading to returns characteristic functions that
satisfy a bond-type pricing formula under an appropriate leverage-neutral measure. Fi-
nally, in the context of matrix affine jump diffusions, we propose concrete specifications
of portfolio time-changes that are convenient in order to preserve affine transform solu-
tions in connection with affine leverage structures. In these settings, derivative pricing can
be performed efficiently for a broad class of contingent claims, using transform and Fast
Fourier Transform methods, similar to several univariate affine settings.
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